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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
SUPREME COURT NO. 44546
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR.,
Defendant-Respondent.

CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAY P. GASKILL, DISTRICT JUDGE

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Respondent

Mr. Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Mr. Eric D. Frederickson
State Appellate PD
PO Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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Date: 11/14/2016

Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County

Time: 09:28 AM

User: BDAVENPORT

ROA Report

Page 1 of 5

Case: CR-2016-0001591 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr

State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Date

Code

User

3/2/2016

NCRF

SHELLIE

New Case Filed-Felony

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

PROS

SHELLIE

Prosecutor Assigned Justin J. Coleman

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

AFPC

SHELLIE

Affidavit Of Probable Cause

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

IDPC

SHELLIE

Initial Determination Of Probable Cause

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

CRCO

SHELLIE

Criminal Complaint

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

WARI

SHELLIE

Warrant Issued - Arrest Bond amount: 50000.00
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

XSEA

SHELLIE

Case Sealed

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

STAT

SHELLIE

Case Status Changed: Inactive

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

3/7/2016

CHJG

MERT

Change Assigned Judge

Magistrate Court Clerks

4/28/2016

WART

TRISH

Warrant Returned Defendant: Fenton, Larry
Glenn Jr

Magistrate Court Clerks

XUNS

TRISH

Case Un-sealed

Magistrate Court Clerks

STAT

TRISH

Case Status Changed: Pending

Magistrate Court Clerks

ARRN

TRISH

Arraignment/ First Appearance

Magistrate Court Clerks

NORF

TRISH

Notification Of Rights-felony

Magistrate Court Clerks

NTHR

TRISH

Notice Of Hearing

Magistrate Court Clerks

ORPD

TRISH

Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr Order
Magistrate Court Clerks
Appointing Public Defender Public defender Rick
Cuddihy PD 2016

AFPD

TRISH

Affidavit of Financial Status and Order Appointing Magistrate Court Clerks
Public Defender

CHJG

TRISH

Change Assigned Judge

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

HRSC

TRISH

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Conference
05/09/2016 01 :30 PM)

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

HRSC

TRISH

Hearing Scheduled {Preliminary Hearing
05/11/2016 01 :30 PM)

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

4/29/2016

RODD

JENNY

Request For Discovery-defendant

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

5/9/2016

HRHD

BDAVENPORT

Hearing result for Preliminary Conference
scheduled on 05/09/2016 01:30 PM: Hearing
Held

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

MINE

BDAVENPORT

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Preliminary Conference
Hearing date: 5/9/2016
Time: 2: 17 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Brittany Davenport
Tape Number: 3
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

Greg K. Kalbfleisch

RSDP

JENNY

Response To Request For Discovery-plaintiff

Kent J. Merica

RQDP

JENNY

Request For Discovery-plaintiff

Kent J. Merica

5/10/2016

Judge
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Date: 11/14/2016

Second Judicial District Court- Nez Perce County

Time: 09:28 AM

User: BDAVENPORT

ROA Report

Page 2 of 5

Case: CR-2016-0001591 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr

State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Date

Code

User

5/11/2016

MINE

DONNA

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Preliminary Hearing
Hearing date: 05/11/2016
Time: 1:41 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: None
Minutes Clerk: Evans
Tape Number: ctrm 3
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

Michelle M. Evans

CHJG

DONNA

Change Assigned Judge

Kent J. Merica

CONT

DONNA

Continued (Preliminary Hearing 05/18/2016
01:30 PM}

Kent J. Merica

HRSC

DONNA

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Conference
05/16/2016 01:30 PM)

Kent J. Merica

NTHR

DONNA

Notice Of Hearing

Kent J. Merica

5/13/2016

RSDP

JENNY

First Supplemental Response To Request For
Discovery-plaintlff

Kent J. Merica

5/16/2016

INHD

BEV

Hearing result for Preliminary Conference
scheduled on 05/16/2016 01:30 PM: Interim
Hearing Held

Kent J. Merica

MINE

BEV

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Preliminary Conference
Hearing date: 5/16/2016
Time: 2:22 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: BEV
Tape Number: ctrm 3
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

Kent J. Merica

MINE

BEV

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Preliminary Hearing
Hearing date: 5/18/2016
Time: 1:36 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: BEV
Tape Number: ctrm 2
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

Carl B. Kerrick

BOUN

BEV

Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled
on 05/18/2016 01 :30 PM: Bound Over (after
Prelim}

Kent J. Merlca

CHJG

BEV

Change Assigned Judge

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

HRSC

BEV

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 05/26/2016
01:30 PM}

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

BEV

Notice Of Hearing

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

5/18/2016

Judge
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Case: CR-2016-0001591 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr

State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Date

Code

User

5/18/2016

ORBO

BEV

Order Binding Over

Carl B. Kerrick

5/19/2016

CONT

TERESA

Continued (Arraignment 05/19/2016 01 :30 PM)

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

INFO

SHELLIE

Information

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

MINE

TERESA

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Arraignment
Hear[ng date: 5/19/2016
Time: 1:52 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: April Smith

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

DCHH

TERESA

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on
Jay P. Gaskill DJ
05/19/2016 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

HRSC

TERESA

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Motions 07/14/2016 Jay P. Gaskill DJ
01:30 PM)

ORDR

TERESA

Order Setting Pretrial Motion Hearing

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

APPL

TERESA

Application for Transcript of Preliminary Hearing

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

ORDR

TERESA

Order for Transcript of Preliminary
Hearing--TOWLER

Jay P. Gasklll DJ

6/1/2016

TRAN

TERESA

Transcript Filed

Jay P. Gasklll DJ

6/15/2016

MOTN

TERESA

Motion for Extension of Time to File Pretrial
Motions

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

ORDR

TERESA

Order for Extension of Time for Filing Pre Trial
Motions--extended to 6-23-16

Jay P. Gaskill OJ

6/24/2016

MOTN

TERESA

Motion to Suppress and Brief in Support

Jay P. Gaskill OJ

7/14/2016

CONT

TERESA

Continued (Pretrial Motions 07/21/2016 01:30

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

5/24/2016

Judge

PM)

7/18/2016

OCHH

TERESA

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Linda Carlton
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

Jay P. Gaskill OJ

MINE

TERESA

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions
Hearing date: 7/14/2016
Time: 1:44 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Linda Carlton
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: April Smith

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

MOTN

TERESA

Motion to Continue--State

Jay P. Gaskill DJ
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Case: CR-2016-0001591 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr

State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Date

Code

User

7/19/2016

ORDR

TERESA

Order to Continue

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

CONT

TERESA

Continued {Pretrial Motions 08/04/2016 02:30
PM)

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

MINE

TERESA

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions
Hearing date: 8/4/2016
Time: 3:06 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Defense Attorney: Mackenzie Welch
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

ADVS

TERESA

Hearing result for Pretrial Motions scheduled on
08/04/2016 02:30 PM: Case Taken Under
Advisement

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

8/5/2016

MISC

TERESA

Closing Argument--State

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

8/17/2016

OPOR

TERESA

Opinion & Order on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress---GRANTED

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

HRSC

TERESA

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
08/18/2016 01:30 PM)

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

8/4/2016

TERESA
8/18/2016

8/25/2016

Judge

Notice Of Hearing

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

DCHH

TERESA

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
Jay P. Gaskill DJ
on 08/18/2016 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Linda Carlton
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

HRSC

TERESA

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
08/25/2016 01 :30 PM)

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

MINE

TERESA

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 8/18/2016
Time: 1:46 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Linda Carlton
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

DCHH

TERESA

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
Jay P. Gaskill DJ
on 08/25/2016 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

HRSC

TERESA

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
09/01/2016 02:30 PM)

Jay P. Gaskill DJ
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Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County
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Time: 09:28 AM

User: BDAVENPORT

ROA Report
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Case: CR-2016-0001591 Current Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Defendant: Fenton, Larry Glenn Jr

State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Date

Code

User

8/25/2016

MINE

TERESA

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 8/25/2016
Time: 1:40 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 3
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: April Smith

9/1/2016

CONT

TERESA

Continued (Status Conference 09/09/2016 09:00 Jay P. Gaskill DJ
AM)

DCHH

TERESA

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

ORDR

TERESA

Order for Furlough

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

MOTN

TERESA

Motion for Reconsideration---State

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

DCHH

TERESA

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Jay P. Gaskill DJ
on 09/09/2016 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100 pages

MINE

TERESA

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 9/9/2016
Time: 9: 12 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 3
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

Jay P. Gaskill OJ

9/16/2016

MISC

TERESA

Defendant's Response to State's Motion for
Reconsideration

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

9/26/2016

NTAP

BDAVENPORT

Notice Of Appeal

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

APSC

BDAVENPORT Appealed To The Supreme Court

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

9/30/2016

OPOR

TERESA

Opinion & Order on State's Motion to
Reconsider---DENIED

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

10/7/2016

MOTN

SHELLIE

Motion to Appoint State Appellate Public
Defender (D)

Jay P. Gaskill DJ

10/11/2016

ORDR

BDAVENPORT Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Jay P. Gaskill DJ

9/2/2016
9/9/2016

Judge
Jay P. Gaskill DJ
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney

F, LED

Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
I.S.B.N. 2923

tmG {))AR '2. P\l"l \.\ 02

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
CASE NO.c

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Rl 6 -o 15 91

AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
WARRANT TO ISSUE PURSUANT TO
I.C.R. 4

LARRY G. FENTON,

Defendant.
Comes now the undersigned Senior Deputy Prosecutor who on oath deposes
and says:
l,

Affiant is the duly qualified Senior Deputy Prosecutor with the Nez

Perce County Prosecutor's Office.
2.
defendant

Affiant desires that a warrant issue for the arrest of the above-named
for

the

crime(s)

of:

COUNT

I

TRAFFICKING

IN

METHAMPHETAMINE, I.C.§ 37-2732B{a)( 4){C), a felony.

3.

Affiant believes probable cause exists for the issuance of this

requested warrant; your affiant has attached to this Affidavit and incorporates by

AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

-1-

7

reference herein an accurate copy of documents on file with the Lewiston Police
Department which form the basis for this reque

for

warrant.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to b

AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

-2-
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Law Supplemental Narrative:
Supplemental Narratives
Date
Narrative
11:44:18 02/29/16
LEWISTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CAP SHEET AND
CASE DISPOSITION SHEET

Seq Name
3 Stormes Joe

DATE:

02-29-16

IN CUSTODY:

[

] YES
NO

[XX]

DEFENDANT:
Name:
Address:
Telephone:
Date of Birth:
Social Security Number:

Larry G. Fenton, Jr.
802 9th Avenue, #4, Lewiston
208-413-7221; 208-983-3020

LEWISTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CASE NUMBER:
OTHER AGENCIES RELATED CASE NUMBERS:
DATE OF INCIDENT:
02-28-16
TIME OF INCIDENT: 1219 hours

16-L2915

CHARGES:
1. Trafficking Controlled Substances {Methamphetamine}

~=========~~~=~~=============~~~=~=~========~~~~~~~=======~~~~===
WITNESSES: (NAME,ADDRESS,PHONE):
1. PO Chris Jensen, 908 Idaho Street, Lewiston; 799-5030
CO-DEFENDANTS:
1. Ashley R. Martin, DOB

;=-=-----=========-===-==========~==--===========~~=============~

EVIDENCE:
1. Watchguard in car video and audio
2.
Photographs
3.
State lab report (pending lab results)

=================================================================

SUMMARY
(PROBABLE CAUSE}: On 02-28-16 at approximately 1219 hours, Ofc. Eylar notified
me on the radio that he had located a vehicle which was known to be driven by a
subject identified as Joshua Shingleton. Shingleton is known to be a subject
who uses narcotics and the vehicle was parked at the 8th Street A&B Foods
grocery store. A&B Foods is also known as a location where narcotics are
frequently sold. Ofc. Eylar informed me that he was watching the vehicle and
observed as it pulled out of the parking lot of A&B Foods. At the same time, a
white Pontiac Grand Prix also pulled out and began following the GMC Yukon.
Ofc. Eylar stated that he was following behind both vehicles and both vehicles
pulled into the Southway Zip Trip, again at the same time, however remained in
their vehicles and did not get out. Ofc. Eylar observed from a distance and I
met with him just west of the Southway Zip Trip in a parking lot. Ofc. Eylar
explained to me all of the details of what he had seen and stated he was going
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to continue watching both vehicles to see what they did and where they went.
The red GMC Yukon is typically seen parked in the driveway at a residence on
Country Club Drive, so I informed him I was going to go out towards that
residence and await to see the vehicles drove by. As I pulled out of the
parking lot and began to travel southbound on Snake River Avenue, Ofc. Eylar
advised me over the radio that the white Grand Prix, with the male subject
seated inside, had just exited and left the Southway Zip Trip. I was able to do
a U turn and get behind the vehicle as it was proceeding northbound on Snake
River Avenue.
While doing a vehicle registration check through dispatch,
dispatch advised me that the vehicle's license plate was not returning in the
NCIC system so I initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle in the 200 block of
Main Street. As the vehicle made a left hand turn onto 3rd Street from Main
Street it did not immediately pull over. After it crossed onto D St. I had to
hit my siren twice to signal the driver to pull over. I requested a cover
officer be sent to my location and I made contact with the driver who was
identified as Larry Fenton, Jr.
Fenton was identified by his Idaho ID card and he also was unable to provide
insurance for the vehicle he was driving.
I returned to my vehicle to write out
citations for Fenton. After after making my second approach to his vehicle as I
was handing him his citations he informed me he was on felony probation.
I
asked him why he had not mentioned that information prior and he told me he was
unaware he was supposed to notify law enforcement of his probation status. He
told me he simply thought he was supposed to contact his PO if he was contacted
by law enforcement.
Prior to me giving him his second copy of his citation I returned to my patrol
vehicle and contacted the on call P&P Officer. Chris Jensen was working as the
on call officer and I explained the circumstances surrounding the stop to her.
Jensen told me the vehicle needed to be searched and advised she was at her
office and would be coming to my location shortly. I approached Fenton•s
_
vehicle a third time and gave him his other citation. I also handed him back his
driver's license and informed him that PO Jensen was corning to speak with him. I
then stood by with my cover officer until PO Jensen arrived.
Prior to PO Jensen's arrival I shut down my emergency overhead lights.
Once PO
Jensen arrived she performed a pat down of Fenton 1 s person and instructed him to
sit on the curb. PO Jensen requested my assistance in a search of the vehicle.
As we were searching t~e vehicle Fenton stood back up and began stretching.
Despite being ordered to sit down on the curb he took off running in a SE
direction.
I stayed with the vehicle instead of giving chase and found a black
plastic bag that was on the front passenger seat of the vehicle.
Inside of the bag was a large ziplock bag containing large white crystal chunks
which based on my training and experience was consistent with methamphetamine.
Fenton was able to successfully elude officers and was picked up in a van driven
by a female identified as Ashley Martin. After PO Jensen returned to the
vehicle, we continued our search and I located inside a black jacket that was on
the driver's seat, another bag of a white crystal like substance. These
substances were taken to LPD where they were photographed and weighed. The total
weight for both bags was one pound one ounce.
Substances in both bags were
tested with a narcotics identification kit (NIK) and resulted in a presumptive
positive for metharnphetamine (as indicated by the color change for NIK U)
The car was transported to the Lewiston Police Department indoor storage
facility and was placed there for further investigation. PO Jensen advised me
she was going to place an Agent's Warrant for Fenton 1 s arrest, however due to
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the large amount of methamphetamine as well as Fenton's eluding officers despite
be ordered by P&P to remain on scene, I request that the court issue a warrant
for trafficking methamphetamine. Fenton will also be given a misdemeanor charge
for resisting, evading, obstructing an officer.

==--=======;~==~======~======~=~=======~~=====~~=====~~=~===-=~~~
RECOMMENDATION:

[XX] WARRANT
[ ] SUMMONS

========~=~~~=====~~~~=======~========~~=====~~~=~====~=~=====~~~
OFFICERS/INVESTIGATORS:
1. Ofc. Joe Stormes, 431
2~
Ofc. Nick Eylar,
425
3.
Ofc. Tom Sparks, 375
4.
Sgt. Rick Fuentes, 370
PROSECUTOR to POLICE:
DATE:
[ ] Charges filed
[ ] Warrant
[ ] -Referred to Juvenile Services
[ ] Prosecution delayed for further investigation
[ ] Prosecution Declined
[ ] Summons
Assigned Prosecutor:

=~~~==~======================~=========~=========~==========~====

FURTHER INVESTIGATION REQUESTED:
1.
2 .
3 •

Police Follow-up due by:

~~~~========~~=============;=====================================

PROSECUTION DECLINED:

(EXPLANATION)

~~~~~======~~~===================================;========~=~=~==

CASE
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

[
[

DISPOSITION:
Guilty plea as charged
Guilty plea to other charge:
Guilty verdict
J Not Guilty verdict
] Other:

"I certify (or declare} under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the
State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct. 11

(Date} •

11
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ P.ERCEO. WFJ''.,
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
WARRANT OF ARREST

vs.
LARRY G. FENTON,

Defendant.

The undersigned Magistrate having examined under oath Senior Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, who seeks a warrant of arrest for the
above-referenced defendant, and after having examined said officer's Affidavit and
the documents attached thereto, and probable cause having been shown, the
undersigned Magistrate hereby finds that probable cause exists to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, and
authorizes the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the above-referenced
defendant

for

the

crime(s)

of:

COUNT

I

TRAFFICKING

IN

METHAMPHETAMINE, I.C.§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(C), a
i,-.

DATED this

c!

)

MAGISTRATE'S FINDINGS

day of March 2016.

-1-
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
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Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
I.S.B.N. 2923

CL'Ci~i~o//Y)}~-~~:# ~-Jii(1

..

pl~/~
c~ !: :) ~-;-:- .r'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF NEZ PERCE
CASE NO.

STATE OF IDAHO,

C'Rl 6-015 91

Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL
vs.
LARRY G. FENTON,
D.O.B.:
S.S.N.:
Defendant.

STATE OF I D A H O )
: ss.
County of Nez Perce )
PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this 2nd day of March 2016, in the
County of Nez Perce, JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, who, being first duly sworn, complains
and says: that LARRY G. FENTON, did commit the following crime(s):

COUNT I
TRAFFICKING IN METHAMPHETAMINE, I.e.§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(C), a
felony
That the defendant, LARRY G. FENTON, on or about the 28th day of February
2016, in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, was knowingly in actual
and/or constructive possession of four hundred ( 400) grams or more of
Methamphetamine, to-wit: four hundred eighty one (481) grams of
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, or of any mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of Methamphetamine.

COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL

-1-
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All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such
case and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
Said Complainant therefore prays that LARRY G. FENTON be dealt with
according to law.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to

COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL

-2-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO.

CR 16 -0 15 91

Plaintiff,
WARRANT OF ARREST
vs.

I

LARRY G. FENTON,

Defendant.

THE STATE OF IDAHO: To any Sheriff, Constable, Marshal or Policeman of the
State of Idaho, or the County of Nez Perce, GREETINGS:
A complaint on oath having this day been laid before me by JUSTIN J.
COLEMAN,

charging

that the

METHAMPHETAMINE,

I.C.

§

crime(s)

of:

COUNT I

37-2132B(a)(4)(C),

-

a

TRAFFICKING IN
felony;

has

been

committed, and accusing the above-named defendant thereof.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED, forthwith to arrest the above-named
defendant in the daytime and bring said defendant before me at my office at
Lewiston, in said County, or in case of my a11sence or inability to act, before the
nearest or most accessible Judge in this County.
HEREIN FAIL NOT, and due return make hereof.

o).

(XJC~~ _
BOND is hereby set at $__
of"'_______
WITNESS my hand at Lewiston, Idaho, on this the

z~
·

-

day of March

2016.

GREG KALBFLEISCH
JUDGE

WARRANT FOR ARREST

-1-

AUTHORIZED FOR TELETYPE
OR TELEGRAPH SERVICE
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ENDORSEMENT TO ARREST IN NIGHTTIME
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to arrest LARRY G. FENTON in the day time
or night time and bring said defendant before me at my office at Lewiston, in said
County, or in case of my absence or inability to act, before the nearest and most
accessible Judge in this County.

,;rel

WITNESS my hand at Lewiston, Idaho, on this the"<,~day of March 2016.

GREG KALBFLEISCH
JUDGE

WARRANT FOR ARREST

-2-

AUTHORIZED FOR TELETYPE
OR TELEGRAPH SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF NEZ PERCE

,-.

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO.

if://

c· Rt 6 -o 1

f: .

·•· . _-~ ·- -

,o

Plaintiff,
WARRANT OF ARREST .
vs.

.... JV

LARRY G. FENTON,

-

HOUR _LQ~i,.1:

MAR O3 2016

Defendant.

NEZ PERCE COUNTY SHER!FPS OfF!:_.
BY;

~83501

THE STATE OF IDAHO: To any Sheriff, Constable, Marshal or Policeman of the
State of Idaho, or the County of Nez Perce, GREETINGS:
A complaint on oath having this day been laid before me by JUSTIN J.
COLEMAN,

charging

that the

METHAMPHETAMINE, I.e.

§

crime(s)

of:

COUNT I

- TRAFFICKING IN

37-2732B(a)(4}(C), a felony;

has

been

committed, and accusing the above-named defendant thereof.
·• YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED, forthwith to arrest the above-named
defendant in the daytim~ and bring said defendant before me at my office at
Lewiston, in said County, or in case of my aosence or inability to act, before the
nearest or most accessible Judge in this County.
HEREIN FAIL NOT, and due return make hereof.
BOND is hereby set at

$__S-0~--Ib_D_D_ _ __

WITNESS my hand at Lewiston, Idaho, on this the

~-~

of March

2016.

WARRANT FOR ARREST

-1-

AUTHORIZED FOR TELE1YPE
OR TELEGRAPH SERVICE
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~- ..... ·____ .·,·...:-. __ '

·:,

.
f::,::·

-

-· - .· ----- - --------- - -- -

~.r.~,-

-

--- -- _____,. ___________ -. - - - --

.~--

ENDORSEMENT TO ARREST IN NIGHTTIME
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to arrest LARRY G. FENTON in the day time
or night time and bring said defendant before me at my office at Lewiston, in said
County, or in case of my absence or inability to act, before the nearest and most
accessible Judge in this County.
WITNESS my hand at Lewiston, Idaho, on this the

WARRANT FOR ARREST

-2-

L

+

L
day

16.

AUTHORIZED FOR TELETYPE
OR TELEGRAPH SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

vs.

LA~~Y

)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
)
)
)
)
-.kAJTo..tl
)
Defendant,)

1'1'\11. - I

FIL ED

~g.__

NO. -~=-=-~\Ji_
tD/6 IJPR
NOTIFICATION OF RIGHTS 28 fJPJ (S
FELONY
cu: _PA 11 'r n ,

~ Rri

!\ fil•;· ,{·tf~// i-f
~_)£lVfli. ·~ctdrJ,,.r-_:· :1 ,-,.

The purpose of the initial appearance is to advise you of your rights and the charge(s) against you.

•

You have the right to be represented by an attorney at all times.

•

If you want an attorney, but cannot pay for one, the court will appoint one to help you. If
you are found guilty or plead guilty, you may be ordered to reimburse Nez Perce County for
the cost of your defense·.

•

You have the right to remain silent. Any statement you make could be used against you.

•

You have the right to bail.

•

You have the right to a preliminary hearing before a judge.

•

The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether probable cause exists to
believe you have committed the crime(s) charged. A preliminary hearing is not a trial to
decide guilt or innocence.

•

You can cross-examine all witnesses who testify against you.

•

You can present evidence, testify yourself if you wish, and have witnesses ordered to testify
by subpoena.

•

If the court finds probable cause exists that you committed the crime(s) charged, or if you
waive your preliminary hearing, you will be sent to the District Court for arraignment.

If you have questions about the charge(s), about your rights or the court process, don't hesitate

to speak up. It is important that you understand.
Acknowledgement of Rights
I have read this entire document, and I understand these rights as s ~ above .

v~ zz-CL

.11

Date

'13

/>/_ .

Defendant's Signature_ _ _,.," '- ✓-------1--...,<..-.-i'---,/-

Notification of Rights• Felony
19
Moneyaaver Prlntshop 42591:i

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
Case Title:

State

V.

l,-()(V !j

{,_,

rtn k)/1 rJ '(

Hearing Type: Initial ArraiITTiment

Case #:_~CJ!Z

,0- lsq I

Judge:

(Y'k V I ( f .....

Clerk:

(!..U)}f1/\

Courtroom #: 2

2~1~,·~!U=-,'--

Date: _ _ _L-+/~·

BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLO\\TING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD. TO WIT:

start Time:

1

':) r·

u
di'._

-s- -

Defendant present._ _ _ _With/~ounsel_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
!2fcourt advises Defendant of Rights & Charges(s) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
13J)efendant requests Public Defender & signs Affidavit of Financial Status
[j}udge appoints and orders

Bond set $S'Di lTTJO

~"'-4

OR'd_ __

to represent defendant

No Contact Order entered- - - -

_____@~l:_30-'--+-pm_
Next Preliminary Conference date_s;_·_~_-q_-{_fo
Next Preliminary Hearing date_S_..,._-_-/_,___/_..___J:.....l..,,._.,,"-------.l.®=-"-1=:3-=-0..i:cp=m
Other:

Recess:

7 /b ~l

6~
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FILED
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.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF-TIIE SECOND ·nmrcIAL DISTRICT OF THE
·sTAIB qF IDA,HO, IN AND FOR TIIB COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO.

[QI (~ - S~r)...,
I_

AFFIDAVIT OF FINANCIAL STATUS,
APPLICATIONFORPUBLIC
DEFENDER, AND ORDER

)

)
).

Defendant.

This application must be filled out completely before it can be reviewed for assignment o~ a
public defender. All questions must be answered. NO EXCEPTIONS.

1"h••m•
IP!liM•MM
Full Nmne: l~o. r
. Addresf--==·

City:

l..e..iA=I

(

~:----A-o '-"--

r ~
~eofBirtb.~
-

.
State:

J=u

Ph·#
one -~.-'=.....,·,c_
z-:nC'7-it3!'-,- - - --.Zip: 835'b (

Income Information
Are you employed~-- Yes ___ Where?
_
What is your~ ~me (amount before taxes or any other withholdings are taken out)?
Monthly: $_-1--~---- Bi-w_yekly: $_ _ _ _ _ Wee:!dy: $_ _ _ __
How many hours do you work per week? _ __
What is y01µ:, hourly mcome? $
,Married?~~ Yes _ _ _. Spouse'sName:
·
·
_ .
\-1/hat is y&tit'spouse½ ~ inco~e (amount before taxes or any other withholdiiigs ar~ taken)?
Monthly:$-+-_._____ Bi-weekly:$
_Weekly:·$ _ _ _ __
Do you.have ~yo er sources of income@_ _ Yes _ __
Ifyes, from whom? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Howmuchpermonth? _ _ __
Please list which, if any, of the following public assistance you receive:
Self Reliance Program Funds
SSI. or SSDI _·_ Food Stamps
- - County or General Relief.
Medicare/Medicaid _ _ Cash Assistance
Other. Please specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(5)

--

AFFIDAV1T OF FINANCIAL STATUS AND ORDER

PAGE-1
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/·~·-_..,,

Please list each of the following dependents which reside in your household and for whom you
are :financially responsible:
_ _ Spouse
Children. How many total? _ _ _ Plea:;;e list age of each child: -_ _ _ _ __
_ _ Other. Please specify relationship: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
·Debts
'
·_

t:c-

Please list the following debts you pay per month:
Mortgage/Rent: _
Food: _ _ _ _ _ _

Car: _ _ _ _ _ _

Utilities: _ _ _ _ __

Medical:
Credit Cards: - - - - - ' - - - Child Support: _ _ _ __

Doyouownyourhom·.
_ _ Yes ____
Do you rent your horp.e. · o - - - c c Do you live with your parentsy~ _ _ Yes
Please list the approxim~te vhlutof the following property you O'WD.:
Motor Vehicles: _How many? _ _ _ Total Value of All Vehicles: $_ _.;...___
Make and Model of Each Vehicle:
----------------Furniture/Appliances/Electronics: $_ _ __
Sporting Equipment: $____
Guns: How many? _ _ _ Value: $_ _ __
Boats/Recreational Vehicles/Motorcycles/Snowmobiles: $- - - Money in savings/checking accounts: _$
_ Name of Bank: _ _ _ _ _ __
Cash on hand: $____
Stocks/Bonds: $_ _ __
Jewelry: $_ _ __
Other. Specify: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ $_ _ __

(!,

·

What is the last year you filed an income tax return? _ _ Amount of return: $_·_ _ __
Can you borrow money to pay an attorney? No _ _ Yes _ _ If yes, how much? $

---

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I MAY BE REQUIRED_ TO REil'v.IBURSE NEZ

PERCE COUNTY FOR THE SERVICES OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT ALL OF THE ANSWERS TO THE FOREGOING
QUESTIONS ARE UNDER OATH AND SWEAR THAT THE SAME ARE TROE AND
CORRECT. IF I HAVE INTENTIONALLY ANSWERED ANY OF SAID QUESTIONS
INCORRECTLY, I MAY BE PROSECUTED FOR PERJURY.
/
,.
/
.

.

.

20JL ~~

--------

Dated this {(' day of_'"""'2-+2----'

..-,'

/,.

-·· /

...

/.,./
/

Defe~e
AFFIDAVIT OF FINANCIAL STATIJS AND ORDER

PAGE-2
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ORDER
Based upon the information contained in the Court record and on the above-filed

affidavit, the Court hereby

~ru/JJJi

}!~-

S the defe~dant's applic~tion for.

_ ~ ~-----public defender.
counsel to represent the defendant in the above-entitled case.

Dated~ id}of

+1 ,20/k

~s hereby appomted as
.
·

~==-3=

AFFIDAVIT OF FINANCIAL STATIJS AND ORDER
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)

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE No.

co_ 1Lo-1 s-r, 1

} <Y)
~ <)-c)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

(
(

NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY
CONFERENCE
NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY
HEARING
) NOTICE OF SENTENCING
) NOTICE OF HEARING ON

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TO the above-named Defendant that the following hearing
has been set in your case at which you are to appear in the Courtroom of the Nez Perce County
Courthouse, as indicated below:
PMl,JMINARY CONFERENCE to begin at

~ day of

tf'O ~

,20__Jfr_. _

\~)

.

PRELIMINARY HEARil-;f G to begin at \'3Q
I. I ·fl.-aay of
20§ .

ma~

,

-

;.m., on the

0.m., on the
I

(

)

SENTENCING to begin at _ _ _~ _.m. on the _ _ day of
- - - - - ~ 2 0_ _

(

)

HEARING to begin at _ _ ___, _.m. on the _ _ day of
- - - - ~ 20- -

YOU ARE HEREBYNOTIFIED 1HAT IF YOU DO NOT APPEAR IN COURT AT SAID
TIME AND PLACE, ANY BOND POSTED MAY BE FORFEITED BY THE COURT AND A
WARRANT MAY BE ISSUED FOR YOUR ARREST WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE.
DATED this ?__

q day of

·A

r

V't

I

, 2o__l_k.
BY ORDER OF:

("jJ) Copy to Prosecuting Attorney

Cf·)
(

Judge
Copy handed to Defendant ·

) Copy mailed to Defendant

( }j ) Copy mailed/handed/placed in
basket t , Defi

~

's Attorney

Clerk
24
Mo,neysaver Printshop 36435

it!r, Ap r. 29. 2016 10 : 49AM
:111:

No.2516
{

·-

P. 1/4

~

~~:-----~ --

lfilli

1'Ill"•

-

Fl LED
Richard 1\1. Cuddihy, ISB No. 7064

Wl~ PrPR 29 Al'l 10 'i5

KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
Post Office Drawel' 717
312 Seventeenth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (l08) 746~0103
Fax: (208) 746-0118

Attorneys for Defell.dant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
THE STAT:E OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

LARRY FENTON, JR,
Defendant.

)

Case No. CR 16-1591

)
)
)
)
)

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

)
)
)

TO! PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE, STATE OF
IDAHO:

PLEASE TAKENOTICEthattheundersigned,pursuanttoRule 16 oftheidaho Crinrinal
.Rules. requests discovery and inspection of the following information, evidence, and materials:

ONE: Disclose to defense any and all material of information within your possession or
control or which may hereafter come into your possession or control which tends to negate the guilt
of the accused as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment therefore.

'REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

Pagel of 4
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No. 2516

Ap r. 29, 20'16 10: 49AM

P. 2/ 4

TWO: Pennission to the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant, wdtten,
or recorded statements made by the defendant or copies thereof within the possession, custody or
control of the state.

THREE: The substance of any relevant, oral statement made by the defendant or copies
thereof within the possession, custody or control of the state.

FOUR: Permission of the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any written or
recorded statements of a co-defendant and the substance of any relevant, oral statement made by a
co-defendant, whether before or after al1'est1 in response to in.tenogation by any person known by the
co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the prosecuting attorney.

FIVE: Furnish to the defendant a copy of the prior crilninal record of the defendmt, if any,
SIX: Permission of the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any books, papers~
documents, photographs, audio recordings, video recordings, tangible objects, buildings or pl&ees,
or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecuting
attorney and which are material to the preparation of the defense or intended for use by the
prosecutor as evidence at trial or obtained from or belonging to the defendant.

SEVEN: Permit the defendant to inspect and copy ot photograph any results or repol'ts of
physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made i11 connection with the
particular case or copies thereof within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting
attorney.

EIGHT: Provide the defendant with copies of the polatoid's taken as evidence.
NINE: Furnish to the defendant written list ofthe names and addresses of all persons having
kuowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial, together with
JlEQU:EST FOR DISCOVERY

l'uge2 of 4
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No. 2516

P. 3/4

~

any record of prior felony convictions of any such person which is within the knowledge of the
prosecuting attorney.
TEN: Furnish to the defendant statements made by the prosecution's witnesses or
prosecuting a.ttomey or agents or to any official involved in the investigatory process of the case.

ELEVEN: Furnish to the defendant reports and memoranda made by any police officer or
investigator in connection with the investigation. or prosecution of the case.

TWELVE: Provide the defendant with the name of lhe person who called any Law
Enforcement agency. The undersigned further requests permission to inspect and copy said
infonnation, evidence and materials not required to be furnished within fourteen (14) days from
receipt of this notice, or at such other time as counsel may agree.

DATED this 29 th. day of Aplil, 2016.

KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC

REQUEST FOR.DISCOVERY

:Page3 of 4
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No. 2516

-

.-·-~ ..

P. 4/4

CERTIFICATE OF DRLIVERY
I CERTIFY that on this 29 1h day of April, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Request for Discovery to be:

[] hand delivered by providing a copy to: Valley lviessenger Sen1ice
[] mailed postage prepaid
0 ce1tified mail
LX] faxed
to the following:

Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
Lewiston, Idaho

Fa..'-'# 208-790-3080

:KNOWLTON & MlLES, PLLC

A/member of the firm

REQUEST FOR DISCOVEllY

Page4 of 4
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DISTRICT CC.· --.,T JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT, ST' ···~,€ OF IDAHO
L. _..ND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PEk _
1230 MAIN ST.
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501
CASE TITLE: State of Idaho vs. Larry G. Fenton Jr
HEARJNG TYPE: Preliminary Conference
PLF ATTY: Justin J. Coleman
DEF ATTY: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Monday, May 09, 2016

mDGE: Greg K. Kalbfleisch
CLERK: Davenport
·-""7
Magistrate Courtroom # S

)
)
)
)
)

CASE#: CR-2016-0001591
TIME:
\

:;n•'(:Y-''f\

BE IN KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:

• Def not in Custody

Def prese@) without counsel
Kelleher / Smith

€~~sent

)6iDef in Custody

for State

State / Def requests continuance of Prelim

• Court Orders Prelim Conference continued to:
at l:30p.m.
• Court Orders Prelim Hearing continued to:
at 1:30 p.m.
• Def waives Prelim ~ Court binds Def over to District Court
D Case set for District Court Arraignment on

Assigned to:

at

• Stipulation and Motion to Continue Prelim has been filed.
• Def is being considered for:
Mental Health Court I DUI Court / Family Reunification Court

• Def previously waived right to speedy prelim
• Def waives right to speedy prelim
• Defense addresses Court regarding bond.
JJPreliminary Hearing going forward on Wednesday,

Court Minutes - Preliminary Hearing

c;); 1

/ (t)

at 1:30 p.m.

LogSheetPrclimHearing2
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney

zo1, rr)ffY 1D PM ~ 21

JUSTIN J. COLEMAN
Senior Deputy Prosecutor
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
I.S.B.N.: 8023

PATTY 0. WEEi'.:3

~m,-,.,,.~~:,p '. "~

CL[ RK

T

ft_ud,,f!lfC;;,i-· '·-' ;, '
~- ~ :-'- !

1 -· ·.. •

•

'•

••

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR2016-0001591
Plaintiff,
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

vs.
LARRY G. FENTON,

Defendant.

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho
Criminal Rules, requests discovery and inspection of the following information,
evidence and materials:
1.

Books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects or portions

thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control of the defendant, and
which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at trial;
2.

All results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of

scientific tests or experiments made in connection with this particular case, or
---

copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant, which the
defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were prepared by a

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

-1-
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••.•••••

•.•• ••• ••

•:••--• ••-:..•::.•:.

. -;-:-:-:-..

witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial, when the results or reports
relate to testimony of the witness;
3.

A list of names and addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to

call at trial.
4.

Please provide the State with a written summary or report of any

expert witness testimony that the Defendant intends to introduce pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rules 702, 703 and 705 at trial or hearing in the above-captioned matter.
Said summary must describe the expert's opinions, the facts and data for those
opinions and the expert's qualifications. This request shall also include any expert
opinions regarding mental health pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-207.
The undersigned further requests permission to inspect and copy said
information, within 14 days from the date of this request at the Prosecuting
Attorney's Office, Lewiston, Idaho.
REQUEST FOR NOTICE OF DEFENSE OF ALIBI

Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-519 and Idaho Criminal Rule 12.1, the
Prosecuting Attorney requests that you serve upon his office within ten days of your
receipts of this request a written notice of the intention of your client to offer a
defense of alibi in the above-referenced matter.
Such notice must state the specific place or places at which the defendant
claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and
addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi.
fu\

DATED this

I QI.--

day of May 2016.

~U~TIN J. COLEMAN

~ior Deputy Prosecutor

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

-2-
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_,--:-;--,

.~:.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy
of the foregoing REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY was
(1)

JJ--

hand delivered, or

(2) _ _ hand delivered via court basket, or
(3) _ _ sent via facsimile, or
(4) _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail.
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Richard M. Cuddihy
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
312 17th Street
P.O. Drawer 717
Lewiston, ID 83501
DATED this

1&

day of May 2016.

~c~A

~ R I N D. LEAVITT
Senior Legal Assistant

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
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JUSTIN J. COLEMAN
Senior Deputy Prosecutor
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799~3073
I.S.B.N.: 8023

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
CASE NO. CR2016-0001591

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY

vs.
LARRY G. FENTON,

Defendant.

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT AND COUNSEL:
COMES NOW, the State in the above-entitled matter, and submits the
following Response to Request for Discovery.
The State has complied with such request by providing the following:
1.

Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant,

or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the
exercise of due diligence; and also the substance of any relevant, oral statement
made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer,
prosecuting attorney, or the prosecuting attorney's agent have been disclosed,
made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B."

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -1~
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2.

Any written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the

substance of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before
or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person known by the codefendant to be a peace officer or agent of the prosecuting attorney, have been
disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B."
3.

Defendant's prior criminal record, if any, has been disclosed, made

available, or is attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B."
4.

Any

books,

papers,

documents,

photographs,

tangible

objects,

buildings, or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession,
custody, or control of the prosecuting attorney and which are material to the
preparation of the defense or intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial
or obtained from or belonging to the defendant have been disclosed, made
available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B."
5.

Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of

scientific tests or experiments, made in connection with the particular case, or
copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting
attorney, the existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney
by the exercise of due diligence have been disclosed, made available, or are
attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B."
6.

A written list of the names and addresses of all persons having

knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial
is set forth in Exhibit "A."

Any record of prior felony convictions of any such

persons which is within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney and all
statements made

by the

prosecution witnesses

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -2-
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witnesses to the prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney's agents or to
any official involved in the investigatory process of the case have been disclosed,
made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "A."
7.

Any reports and memoranda in possession of the prosecuting attorney

which were made by any police officer or investigator in connection with this
investigation or prosecution of this case have been disclosed, made available, or
are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B."
8.

All material or information within the prosecuting attorney's possession

or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged
or which would tend to reduce the punishment therefore have been disclosed, made
available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit "B."

In addition, with

regard to material or information which may be exculpatory as used or interpreted,
the State requests that the defendant inform the State, in writing, of the defense
which will be asserted in this case, so counsel for the State can determine if any
additional material or information may be material to the defense, and thus fulfill its
duty under I.C.R. 16(a) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9.

Wherever this Response indicates that certain evidence or materials

have been disclosed, made available, or are attached hereto as set forth in Exhibit
"B," such indication should not be construed as confirmation that such evidence or
materials exist, but simply as an indication that if such evidence or materials exist,
they have been disclosed or made available to the defendant.

Furthermore, any

items which are listed in Exhibit \\B" but are not specifically provided, or which are
referred to in documents which are listed in Exhibit "B," are available for inspection
upon appointment with the Prosecuting Attorney's Office.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -3-
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10.

The State reserves the right to supplement any and all sections of this

response if and when more information becomes available.

11.

The State objects to requests by the defendant for anything not

addressed above on the grounds that such requests are outside the scope AND/OR

DATED this-~-

I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy
of the foregoing RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY was

(1)

4

hand delivered, or

(2) _ _ hand delivered via court basket, or
(3) _ _ sent via facsimile, or

( 4) _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail.
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Richard M. Cuddihy
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
312 17th Street
P.O. Drawer 717
Lewiston, ID 83501
DATED this

Io4
I

day of May 2016.

~d~cJ~g
RIN D. LEAVITT
Senior Legal Assistant
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EXHIBIT "A"
LIST OF WITNESSES
STATE OF IDAHO vs. LARRY G. FENTON
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2016-0001591

1.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

2.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

3.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

4.

NAME:
ADDRESS:
PHONE:

5.

NAME:
ADDRESS:
PHONE:

6.

NAME:
ADDRESS:
PHONE:

NICK EYLAR
Lewiston Police Department
1224 "F" Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-0171

RICHARD G. FUENTES
Lewiston Police Department
1224 "F" Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-0171

CHRIS JENSEN
Probation and Parole
908 Idaho Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 799-5030x114

REBECCA L. LEHMAN
612 3rd Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-4558

JAMES H. LEH MAN
612 3rd Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 816-9250

ASHLEY R. MARTIN
802 9th Avenue #4
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 816-9924

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -5-
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7.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

8.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

9.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

-._.._.·.,_._ ·--•-"-'·-·--·· . .-

CHRIS REESE
Lewiston Police Department
1224 "F" Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-0171

TOM SPARKS
Lewiston Police Department
1224 F Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-0171

JOE STORMES
Lewiston Police Department
1224 F Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-0171
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EXHIBIT "B"
LIST OF REPORTS
STATE OF IDAHO vs. LARRY G. FENTON
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2016-0001591

1.

A copy of any audios and/or videos are available by providing blank CDs or
DVDs to the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and by making
prior arrangements during normal working hours.

2.

Lewiston Police Department Cap Sheet and Case Disposition Sheet consisting
of three (3) pages. (1-3)

3.

Lewiston Police Department LAW Incident Table consisting of three (3)
pages. ( 4-6)

4.

Lewiston Police Department Narrative prepared by Joe Stormes consisting of
four (4) pages. (7-10)

5.

Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Robert
Massey consisting of two (2) pages. (11-12)

6.

Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Rick
Fuentes consisting of one (1) page. (13)

7.

Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Tom Sparks
consisting of two (2) pages. (14-15)

8.

Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Nick Eylar
consisting of three (3) pages. (16-18}

9.

Lewiston Police Department Main Names Table consisting of five (5) pages.
(19-23)

10.

Criminal History consisting of thirty (30} pages. (24-53)

11.

One (1) DVD containing Watchguard videos from Rick Fuentes, Mike Rigney,
Tom Sparks and Joe Stormes patrol vehicles; and fifteen (15) photographs.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY -7-
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2016-0001591
State of Idaho ,,s. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Hearing type: Preliminary Hearing
Hearing date: 05/11/2016
Time: 1:41 pm
Judge: Michelle M. Evans
Courtroom: 3
Court reporter: None
Minutes Clerk: Evans
Tape Number: ctrm 3
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

014107
Kelleher, Welch and Fenton Jr. present
State requests continuance
Def waives speedy prelirn but wants the prelim set for next week
Comt sets prelim conference on 05-16-13 at 1:30 p.m. and the prelim hearing for 05-182016 at 1:30 p.rn.
014355

COURT MINUTES

1
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FI'LE·D
ICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
UNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

c& 1Lo--t o/i I

)

CASE NO.

~

)-,___.-'\· NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY

)
)
)
)
)

~NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY
~HEARING
( ) NOTICE OF SENTENCING
( ) NOTICE OF HEARING ON

) <'<~ CONFERENCE

vs.
Defendant,

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TO the above-named Defendant that the following hearing
has been set in your case at which you are to appear in the Courtroom of the Nez Perce County
Courthouse, as indicated below:

04

P~pMINARYCONFERENCEto f1qg~ at
• 2o_J_U'. ,
_JU__ day of f\,,([L-lcf

(~

P~IMINARY H;EARING to begin at
--4&- day of frlA.,lJi,~/" , 20 JU

.

f :.af), C?m., on the

I

,~

} ,J.f) ,l ():n., on the

1

SENTENCING to begin a~J_ _ __, _.m. on the _ _ day of
_, 20
.

(

)

_____

(

)

HEARING to begin at _ _ _~ _.m. on the _ _ day of
- - - - - - " 20- -

YOUAREHEREBYNOTIFIEDTHATIFYOUDONOTAPPEARINCOURTATSAID
TIME AND PLACE, ANY BOND POSTED MAY BE FORFEITED BY TIIE COURT AND A
WARRANT MAY BE ISSUED FOR YOUR ARREST WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE.

DATED this 1L day of

f};uud, ,2JJJ)__
BY ORDER OF:

<X

Copy to Prosecuting Attorney

<)<z Copy handed to Defendant
(

) Copy mailed to Defendant

(~· Copy mailed/handed/placed in
/'v· baskttf[~etJ~s Attorney
-==
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN
Senior Deputy Prosecutor
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
I.S.B.N.: 8023

FILED
zorn rmy 13

PM 12 03

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR2016-0001591
Plaintiff,

FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE
TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

vs.
LARRY G. FENTON,

Defendant.

JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, Senior Deputy Prosecutor for Nez Perce County, Idaho 1
comes before the Court and pursuant to Defendant's Request for Discovery in the
case herein, makes the following first supplemental disclosure compliance pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 16.

1. That attached hereto is AMENDED EXHIBIT "A'1 which sets forth additional
persons who may be called by the State as witnesses at a trial, none of whom are
known by the undersigned to have any prior felony convictions, unless otherwise
indicated.

The State will continue to provide names of any witnesses as they

become available.

FIRST-SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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2. That attached hereto is AMENDED EXHIBIT "B" which sets forth additional
reports.

.,-l

DATED this

f 3- day of May 20()

(\ (

0

~, ( lJ Qli{O./\____

---'----___,,__ ___._.=----------

iefSTIN 'i. COLEMAN
onior Deputy Prosecutor

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy
of the foregoing FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
was
(1)

~

hand delivered, or

(2) _ _ hand delivered via court basket, or

(3) _ _ sent via facsimile, or
(4) _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail.
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Richard M. Cuddihy
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
312 17th Street
P.O. Drawer 717
Lewiston, ID 83501
DATED this

fB)~

day of May 2016.

~~v{ii

~RIN D. LEAVI

Senior Legal Assistant

FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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AMENDED EXHIBIT "A"
AMENDED LIST OF WITNESSES
STATE OF IDAHO vs. LARRY G. FENTON
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2016-0001591

1.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

2.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

3.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

4.

NAME:
ADDRESS:
PHONE:

5.

NAME:
ADDRESS:
PHONE:

6.

NAME:
ADDRESS:
PHONE:

NICK EYLAR
Lewiston Police Department
1224 "F" Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-0171

RICHARD G. FUENTES
Lewiston Police Department
1224 "F" Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-0171

CHRIS JENSEN
Probation and Parole
908 Idaho Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 799-5030x114

REBECCA L. LEHMAN
612 3rd Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 816-0796

JAMES H. LEHMAN
612 3rd Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 816-9250

ASH LEY R. MARTIN
802 9th Avenue #4
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 816-9924

FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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7.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

8.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

CHRIS REESE
Lewiston Police Department
1224 "F 11 Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-0171

DAVID C. SINCERBEAUX (EXPERT WITNESS)
Idaho State Police Forensic Services
615 West Wilbur Suite B
Coeur D'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 209-8700

ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY: David Sincerbeaux is a Forensic
Scientist with the Idaho State Police Forensic Services and will
testify to his observations, findings and expert opinion as a
result of performing the testing on the controlled substances in
this case.

9.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

10.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

11.

NAME:
ADDRESS:

PHONE:

TOM SPARKS
Lewiston Police Department
1224 F Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-0171

JOE STORMES
Lewiston Police Department
1224 F Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-0171

NICK KRAKALIA
Lewiston Police Department
1224 F Street
Lewiston, Ida ho 83501
(208) 746-0171

FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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AMENDED EXHIBIT "B"
AMENDED LIST OF REPORTS
STATE OF IDAHO vs. LARRY G. FENTON
NEZ PERCE COUNTY CASE NO. CR2016-0001591

1.

A copy of any audios and/or videos are available by providing blank CDs or
DVDs to the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and by making
prior arrangements during normal working hours.

2.

Lewiston Police Department Cap Sheet and Case Disposition Sheet consisting
of three (3) pages. (1-3)

3.

Lewiston Police Department LAW Incident Table consisting of three (3)
pages. ( 4-6)

4.

Lewiston Police Department Narrative prepared by Joe Stormes consisting of
four (4) pages. (7-10)

5.

Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Robert
Massey consisting of two (2) pages. (11-12)

6.

Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Rick
Fuentes consisting of one (1) page. (13)

7.

Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Tom Sparks
consisting of two (2) pages. (14-15)

8.

Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by Nick Eylar
consisting of three (3) pages. (16-18)

9.

Lewiston Police Department Main Names Table consisting of five (5) pages.
(19-23)

10.

Criminal History consisting of thirty (30) pages. (24-53)

11.

One (1) DVD containing Watchguard videos from Rick Fuentes, Mike Rigney,
Tom Sparks and Joe Stormes patrol vehicles; and fifteen (15) photographs.

12.

Idaho State Police Forensic Services Forensic Controlled Substance
Analysis Report consisting of two (2) pages. {54-55)

13.

Lewiston Police Department Supplemental Narrative prepared by
Nick Krakalia dated April 15, 2016, consisting of one (1) page. (56)

FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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DISTRICT

co·

T JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, ST/ . ')F IDAHO

Th n.1'\1D FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERL_

1230 MAIN ST.
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

CASE TITLE: State of Idaho vs. Larry G. Fenton Jr
HEARING TYPE: Preliminary Conference
PLF ATTY: Justin J. Coleman
DEF ATTY: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Monday, May 16, 2016

)
)
)
)
}

JUDGE: Kent J. Merica
CLERK: Nelson
Magistrate Courtroom #

d

<
2

CASE#: CR-2016-0001591
TIME: - - - - - -

BE IN KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:
Start

Def · resent iiU1 ' :1thout ;,.ounsel

• Def not in Custody

Kelleher / Srnftri / ~ ) present for State

State/ Def requests continuance of Prelim

at 1:30 p.m.
• Court Orders P1 e'.im Co11ference contiJmed to:
• Court Orders Prelim Hearing continued to:
at 1:30 p.m.
• Def waives Prelim - Comi binds Def over to District Court
Assigned to:
• Case set for District Court Arraignment on
at
• Stipulation and Motion to Continue Prelim has been filed.
• Def is being cor:.sidered for:
Mental Health Court / DUI Comt / Family Reunification Court

• Def previously waived. right to speedy prelim
• Def waives right to speedy prelim
-----------------------------------• Defense addscsses Court-regarding
bond.
• Preliminary He,,ring going forward on Wednesday,
at 1:30 p.m.
-·

Court Minutes - Pr:;limi,1ar:,1 }lea~ing

LogSheetPre1imHearing2
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COURT MINUTES

CR-2016-0001591
State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Hearing type: Preliminary Hearing
Hearing date: 5/18/2016
Time: 1 :36 pm
Judge:Car!B.Kerrick
Courtroom: 2
Minutes Clerk: BEV
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman
1:36:03

Justin Coleman present for the State
Mackenzie Welch present with defendant
Parties are ready to proceed.
State calls Officer Jay Stormes as a witness - sworn in and examined.

1:39:58

Welch - Objection, hearsay.

1:40:05

State - Not being used for the truth of the matter.

1:40:11

Court - Overruled.

1:40:15

State continues exam.

1:46:22

Welch - Objection, hearsay.

1:46:24

Court - Overruled.

1:46:27

State continues exam.

1:50:06

Welch questions the witness in aid of objection. No objection after
questioning.

1:50:17

State continues exam.

Court Minutes

48

1:53:30

State moves to admit exhibit 1.

1:53:35

Welch questions witness in aid of objection. No objection after questioning.

1:54:16

Court - Based on that, State's exhibit 1 is admitted.

1:54:21

State continues exam.

1:56:33

Welch cross examines.

2:04:41

State re-directs.

2:06:33

Welch - Nothing further.

2:06:36

Officer Stormes steps down and is excused.

2:07:01

State rests.

2:07:08

Welch - No evidence.

2:07:13

State submits.

2:07:23

Defense submits.

2:07:26

Court - Based on the evidence, Court finds probable cause that the offense
occurred and defendant committed it. Information has a different amount
than the exhibit. State may want to amend information. Defendant is bound
over to District Court Assigned to Judge Gaskill, set for arraignment
5/26/16 at 1:30 pm.

2:09:33

recess

Court Minutes
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
LARRY G. FENTON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 16-1591
ORDER BINDWG OVER
_,.

Defendant.
______________

The undersigned Magistrate having HEARD the Preliminary hearing in the above-entit]ed matter on
the 181H day of May, 2016, and it appearing to me that the offense set forth in the Complaint theretofore
filed herein has been committed, and there is sufficient cause to believe the above-named defendant guilty
thereof.
I ORDER that said defendant be held to answer the same, and said defendant is hereby bound over to
the Distiict Court for trial on the charge of COUNT I: TRAFFICKING IN METIIAMPHETAMINE; I.C. §
37-2732B(a)(4)(C); a felony.
'

DATED this /

·~

¼

day of May, 2016.

Magistrate

THIS CASE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO:

ORDER BINDING OVER

-=-=--

JAY P. GASKILL, DISTRICT JUDGE

1
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_

Sef_;1~rl Judicial District Court, State of lcf<'?i>)··" . , · "' and For the County of Nez Perce
1230 Main·st.
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

Fl LED

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
Larry Glenn Fenton Jr,
Defendant.

Case No:

r~f un
1

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Arraignment
Judge:

Thursday, May 26, 2016
Jay P. Gaskill DJ

01:30 PM

at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday,
May 18, 2016.
Defendant:

Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
802 9th Ave Apt 4
Lewiston, ID 83501
Mailed

--

Private Counsel:

Prosecutor:

Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
P.O. Drawer 717
Lewiston, ID 83501
Mailed._ _

c//

Hand Delivered

/

Hand Delivered

/

·/n 9;__,,'_Jl

Justin J. Coleman
Mailed__

NOTICE OF HEARING

Hand Delivered
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Fl LED

DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County. Prosecuting Attorney
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JUSTIN J. COLEMAN
Senior Deputy Prosecutor
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
I.S.B.N.: 8023

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
CASE NO. CR2016-0001591

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

IN FORMATION

vs.
LARRY G. FENTON,
D.O.B.: 06/09/1985,
S.S.N.: XXX-XX-1324,
Defendant.
JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, Senior Deputy Prosecutor, in and for the County of Nez
Perce, State of Idaho, who in the name and by the authority of the State, prosecutes
in its behalf, comes now into the District Court of the County of Nez Perce, and states
that LARRY G. FENTON is accused by this Information of the following crime(s):

COUNT I
TRAFFICKING IN METHAMPHETAMINE, I.C. § 37-2732B{a)(4)(C), a
felony.
That the Defendant, LARRY G. FENTON, on or about the 28th day of February
2016, in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, was knowingly in actual
and/or constructive possession of four hundred (400) grams or more of
Methamphetamine, to-wit: four hundred eighty one (481) grams of
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, or of any mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of Methamphetamine.

rJld~

All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case

and against the peace and dignity of the State

J STIN J. COLEMAN
enior Deputy Prosecutor
INFORMATION

-1-
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COURT MINUTES
CR· 2016-0001591
State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Hearing type: Arraignment
Hearing date: 5/19/2016
Time: 1:52 pm
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Courtroom: 1
Court reporter: Nancy TO\l\rler
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: April Smith
15217

Defendant present, in custody, ,,vith counsel.

CR16-01591 State's Information previously filed for the crime of Trafficking
15312
in Methamphetamine.
15318

Defendant understands the charge.

15332

Defendant understands the penalties.

15344

Defendant's name, date of birth and social security number are correct.

15351

Defendant waives the reading of the Information.

15358

Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court and Defendant will enter a not guilty plea in
CR16-1591 and intends to file a motion that ,Nill determine the outcome of both matters
(probation violation CR13- 7217)

15546
Mr. Cuddihy to file motions by 6-16-16, response due 6-30-16 and Court will
hear motions on 7-14-16 at 1:30 p.m. (CR13-7217 will be set for a status conference).
15632

Court recess.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECO1'1D .HJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

CASE NO. CR16-01591

)
vs.

)
)
)

LARRY G. FENTON, JR.,

ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL
MOTION HEARING

)
)

Defendant.

)

The above-entitled case is hereby scheduled as follows:
All pre-trial motions shall be filed on or before; June 16, 2016;
Supporting Briefs due: June 16, 2016;
Responding Briefs due: June 30, 2016;
All pre-trial motions shall be heard at the hour of 1:30 p.m. on Thursday, July 14, 2016, with the
defendant personally present at said hearing. If no motions are filed, there will be no hearing on this
date.

ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL MOTION

1

HEARING

54

.

\

Dated !bis

2~ of May, 2016.

ORDER SETTJNG JURY TRIAL AND
SCHEDULING PROCEEDINGS

2

55

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL MOTION
HEARING was:

---band

delivered via court basket, or

_ _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
2016,to:

2 lf r-day of May,

Rick Cuddihy
PO Drawer 717
Lewiston ID 8350 1
Justin Coleman
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
PATTY 0. ·wEEKS, Clerk

ORDER SETTING JURY TRIAL AND
SCHEDULING PROCEEDINGS
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KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
Post Office D:rawer 717
312 Se~enteenth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 746-0103
Fax: (208) 746-0118
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lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

T~ STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZPERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

v.

)

LARRY FENTON,

)

Case No: CR 16-1591
APPLICATION FOR TRANSCRill'
OF PRELIMINARY BEARING

)

Defendant.

)
)

--------------)
COMES NOW, Richard M.

Cuddihy, Attorney for the above-named Defendant, and

respectfully shows the court as follows:

I.
That Petitioner was appointed on the 28 th day ofApril~ 2016, as Attorney for the above-named
Defendant and on the 18 th day of May, 2016 a Preliminary Heating was held, after which the Court
issued an order binding the Defendant over to District Court.

II.

That thereafter on the 1st11 day of May, 2016 the Defendant appeared in the District Court and
entered a plea of :not guilty, and this matter has been set for jury trial.

APPLICATION FOR TRANSCRIPT
OF PRELIMINARY HEARING
Page 1 of 3
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May.24.2016 9:29AM

No. 2897

P. 2/5

III.
That a transcript of the Preliminary Hearing is necessary for Petitioner to properly prepare for
cross examination and all further necessary trial preparation.
IV.

That said Defendant is indigent and without funds or other resmu-ces to pay for the said
transcript.
WHEREFORE,. Petitioner prays that an Order of the Court be made for preparation of the

Prelirninazy Hearing transcript.
PATED this 24th day of May, 2016.

KNOWLTON & Mr.LES, PLLC

Richard M. Cucldihy

.AJ>PLlCATION FOR TRANSCRIPT
OF PRELil\lllNAllY HEAllING

:rage 2 of 3
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May.

No. 2897

24. 20i6 9:29AM

P. 3/5

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 241h day of May, 2016, I caused a 1nle and correct copy
of the foregoing Application for Transcript of Preliminary Hearing to be:

[X] Faxed
to the following:
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
Lewiston, ID 83501
Fax: (208) 799-3080

ftbeFirln

APPLICATION FOR TRANSCRIPT
OF PJlEUMlNAllY HE.ARING
Page3 of 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO 1

Plabdlff,
v.
LARRY FENTON,

Defendant.

)
)
.)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CR tt-15.91

ORDERFORTRANSCRIPT
OF PRELIMlNARY HEARING

THE COURT, having read and passed upon the foregoing Application for Transcript for
Preliminary Hearing and being fully advised in the premises,
It is hereby ordered that a transcript be prepared ofthe above-named.Defendant's Preliminary
Hearing dated the 18 111 day of May, 2016.
DATED this

2qt;:y of May, 2016.

TRANSGRiPT P,RSiGl~f.~l) ,O

ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT
OF PRELIMINARY HEARING

•
'fl!TO'''l'i/LEF

CARLTON
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No. 2897

May. 24. 20i 6 9: 30AM

P. 5/5

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

aday

I CERTIFY that on this
of May, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order fo:r- Ti-iu1script of Preliminary Hearing:

[XJ faxed
to the following:

Nez Pe:ree County Prosecutor's Office
Lewistoll, lD 83501
Fa..x: (208) 799-3080
Richard M. Cuddihy
.
KNOWLTON & MILESi PLLC
Lew\~ton, ID 83501
Fax: (208) 746-0118

CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDER :FOll TRANSCI.UPT
OF PRELIMINARY HEARING

Page2 of2

61

Jun. 15. 20i6
'·

No. 3251

9:53AM

P. 1/4

Richa"fd M. Cuddihy, ISB No. 7064
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
312 Seventeenth Street
Post Office Drawer 717
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 746-0103
Fax: (208) 746-0113
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDI
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT
STATE OF IDAHO,

'V.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 16-1591
MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME TO FILE PRE-TRIAL
MOTIONS

)
LARRY FENTON,
Defendant.
______________

)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Defendant in the above-entitled matter, by and through her Attorney
of record, Richard M. Cuddihy of Knowlton & Miles, PLLC, and respectfully requests this Court
grant the defense a one (1) week e>..1:ension to file Pre-Trial Motions as ordered in the Order
Setting Jury Trial and Scheduling Proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

DATED this

fQ-1\:ray of June. 2016.

MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME TO FILE PRE-TRIAL
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MOTIONS
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Jun. '15. 2016

9:54AM
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY th.at on the
foregoing document was faxed to:

~ day of June, 2016, a true and correct copy of the

Nez Perce Cou)1.ty Prosecutor
P .0. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
Fax # 208-799-3080

MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME TO FIL:E :PRE-TRIAL
MOTIONS

63
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ThT THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
LARRY FENTON)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.CR 16-1591
ORDER FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME FOR FILlNG
PRE-TlllA.L MOTIONS

Defendant.
)
_____________
)

TffiS MATTER having come before the Court upon the Defendane s Motion for
Extension of Time to File Pre-Trial Motions, and it appearing that good cause exists for granting
said Motion;

IT IS lIEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that deadline for filing
all Pre-Trial Motions of June 16, 2016 in the above-entitled case, is hereby extended to June 23,

2016.

DATED this

Way

of June, 2016.

rs~--

,•··--·-·----~·

~
ORDER FOR EXT:ENTION
OF TIME FOR TILING
P.RE~TlllAL MOTIONS
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No. 3251

15. 2016 9:54AM

P. 4/4

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
l CERTIFY that on this /~·day of June, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing 0:rdet foi- Extension ofTbne for Filing Pre-Trial Motions to:

[X] faxed to the following:

Richard M. Cuddihy
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
312 17r11 Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Fax: 208w746w0118
[X] faxed to the following:

Nez Perce County Prosecutor
1221 F Street
Lewisto:n, ID ·83501
Fax: 208-799-3080

OR.llli::R Foll 'EXTU:NTlON

OF TIM'E FOil FJLlNG
PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS

:Page2of2
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Richard M. Cuddihy, ISB No. 7064vv
KNOWLTON &MILES,PLLC
312 Seventeenth Street
Post Office Drawer 717
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 746"0103
Fax: (208) 746"0113

FILED
201, JUN 21 PM i; a9
CL rn

Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
PERCE
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

NEZ

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
v.

LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-

1

Case No. CR16"1591
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT

COMES NOW the defendant, by and through his attorney, Richard M. Cuddihy of the

law firm of Knowlton & Miles, PLLC, and respectfully requests that the Court suppress all
evidence relating to the unlawful seizure and search of Larry Fenton by Officer Storms in Nez
Perce County, on February 28, 2016; for the reasons that the search and seizure of Mr. Fenton
was conducted in violation of the Idaho Constitution Article I § 17, and the U.S. Constitution 4th
and 5th Amendments.
ORAL ARGUMENT and leave to adduce testimony is hereby requested.

INTRODUCTION

The defendant was illegally stopped because the facts available to the officer at the time
he detained the defendant did not provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he had
committed, or was about to commit, a crime. Additionally, the defendant was illegally detained

MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
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because his detainment occUITed after the purpose of the stop had been completed; therefore
there was no reason to prolong his detainment by ordering the defendant to remain at the scene
for his probation officer to respond. Finally, the defendant's vehicle was illegally searched, as
there were no reasonable grounds that would cause one to believe that the defendant had violated
a condition of his probation. The evidence acquired as a result of these unconstitutional acts
must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

FACTS
On or about February 28, 2016, Officer Joseph Stormes was working the daytime patrol
shift. (P.H.T. 6, 1. 20-24). He began following a vehicle that was being driven by Larry Fenton.
(P.H. T. 7, 1. 8-9). Although no traffic infractions had occurred, Officer Stormes performed a
registration check of Mr. Fenton's license plate number. (P.H.T. 8, 1. 9-10; 22, 1. 1-3). The
dispatcher responded by saying that they did not find a record for that plate number. (P.H.T. 8, 1.
13-14). Officer Stormes checked the wrong license plate number the :first time, so on the second
attempt he asked dispatch to change out a digit to see if that produced a record for that plate
number. (P.H.T. 8, 1. 16-20; 27, 1. 8-10). Dispatch responded that not record was found in the
system, which caused Stormes to realize it was because he relayed the wrong number a second
time. (P.H.T. 8, 1. 20-22; 27, 1. 10-11). Rather than correct his mistake and run the actual
registration number, Officer Stormes elected to make a traffic stop on the vehicle with no
reasonable suspicion and relayed the correct plate number to dispatch. (P.H.T. 9, 1. 7-9). Officer
Stormes claimed that the purpose of the stop was to investigate why the inaccurate registration
information that he and dispatch had run was not shov-.iing up in the system. (P.H.T. 9, 1. 13-15).
Fianlly, dispatch ran the correct license plate number, but never communicated the registration

MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
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infonnation to Officer Stormes that the vehicle's registration information came back correctly to
Mr. Fenton's vehicle. (P.H.T. 27, 1. 8-22).
Officer Stormes obtained Mr. Fenton's registration card, compared the card with the
license plate and vin number, and discovered that they all correctly matched. (P.H.T. 10, 1. 2125). Officer Stormes then communicated with dispatch regarding Mr. Fenton's prior citations
for insurance-related issues. (P.H.T. 11, 1. 18-21). Officer Stormes cited Mr. Fenton for failing
to purchase a driver's license and failing to provide proof of insurance. (P.H.T. 12, 1. 2-4). As he
was handed his citation, Mr. Fenton informed Officer Stormes that he was on probation. (P.H.T.
12, l. 5-8). Officer Stormes then contacted the on-call Probation and Parole officer to let them
know the situation and ''just advised them." (P.H.T. 12, 1. 12-15). The probation officer, Chris
Jensen, told Officer Stormes that she would be coming to the traffic stop and that she wanted to
search the vehicle. (P.H.T. 12, 1. 24-25; 13, I. 1). Officer Stormes gave all of Mr. Fenton's
information back to him and completed the purpose of the stop. (P.H.T. 13, 1. 4-6; 20, 1. 4-10).
Officer Stormes informed Mr. Fenton that Ms. Jensen would be coming to the traffic stop
because she wanted to speak with him and that she wanted him to stand by, indicating to Mr.
Fenton he was not free to go and was to remain on the scene. (P.H.T. 13, 1. 4-8; 24, 1. 13-15).
Officer Sparks also on scene stood alongside Officer Stormes, next to Mr. Fenton's vehicle.
(P.H.T. 25, 1. 5-12). As soon as Ms. Jensen arrived, she immediately suggested that Mr. Fenton
be handcuffed. (P.H.T. 13, 1. 14-17).
Ms. Jensen and Officer Stormes proceeded to search the vehicle, while Officer Sparks
was standing nearby. (P.H.T. 13, 1. 20-23). The search of Mr. Fenton's vehicle did end up
producing illegal drugs, for which he was subsequently arrested. (P.H. T. 15, L 9-16).

BURDEN
MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
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Upon a motion to suppress, where an investigative stop results in the seizure of evidence,
the State carries the burden of proving that the officer's actions were reasonable. State v. Haworth,
106 Idaho 405, 406 (1984). The State must meet its burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the
original detention and of any subsequent extension. State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562, 112 P .3d
848, 850 (Ct. App. 2005).
Evidence obtained by an invalid investigatory seizure is inadmissible in court.

Dunaway v. N.Y., 442 U.S. 200, at 218-219 (1979).

"Any evidence seized pursuant to an

unlawful stop or an unreasonable detention is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and is, therefore,
inadmissible." Bordeaux, 217 P.3d at 6.
ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of persons to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "[n]o right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968). Officer Stormes unlawfully stopped Mr. Fenton because there was no reasonable
suspicion present that would justify such action. Mr. Fenton was also unlawfully detained and
handcuffed by Officer Stormes after the stop had concluded, when Mr. Fenton should have been
free to leave. Lastly, both Officer Stormes and Officer Jensen unlawfully and unreasonably
searched Mr. Fenton's vehicle, as there was no reasonable grounds for doing so. For the reasons
stated above, the evidence found during the search of Mr. Fenton's car should be suppressed.

MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND
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There was no reasonable suspicion present to justify the stop of Mr. Fenton.
The stop of Mr. Fenton's vehicle was unlawful because there was no reasonable
suspicion present to justify such action. A traffic stop constitutes "a seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment," and "is constitutional if it is either based upon probable cause to
believe a traffic violation has occurred or justified by reasonable suspicion." United States v.

Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1248 (11th Cir.2009).

When a police officer stops a vehicle for

investigative purposes, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the officer has a "reasonable and
objective basis for suspecting that the vehicle ·or an occupant is involved in criminal activity."

State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 737 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
663; State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615
(Ct. App. 1997)). More succinctly, the officer must have "reasonable articulable suspicion that a
person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." State v. Morgan, 294 P.3d 1121, 1125
(2013).
This test is based upon the "totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before
the time of the stop." Id. Although the required information leading to fonnation of reasonable
suspicion is less than that required to form probable cause, it still must be "more than speculation
or instinct on the part of the officer." State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 2005).
"There must be 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion."' Cerino, 141 Idaho at 738 (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so as to justify stop must be based on specific,
articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts; reasonable
suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion. Morgan,

MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND
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294 P.3d at 1124. In Morgan, the officer stopped a vehicle driving without a front license plate,
which would be illegal if the vehicle was registered in Idaho. Id. at 1123. However, the vehicle
was registered in a different state, therefore making the stop unlawful. Id The court held that
the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant violated car registration
statute, so as to justify stop of defendant. Id. at 1125.

In this case, there was no reasonable or objective basis for suspecting that Mr. Fenton
was involved in criminal activity. In Morgan, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to
believe that defendant violated the state's registration statute, so as to justify a traffic stop of the
defendant. Here, Officer Stormes similarly did not have reasonable suspicion that would justify
the stopping of Mr. Fenton, as the registration did not come back as invalid or mismatched with
the license plate number; the registration did not come back at all, which should have been a
clear indication that the number was entered incorrectly. The first time Mr. Fenton's license
plate number was ran, Officer Stormes told dispatch the incorrect number, so no record of the
registration came up. The second time Mr. Fenton's license plate number was ran, either
dispatch ran the wrong number or Officer Stormes, once again, told dispatch the incorrect
number. At that point, Officer Stormes made the decision to unlawfully stop the vehicle for no
other purpose than to investigate why Mr. Fenton's registration infom1ation was not showing up
in the system. Meanwhile, on the third attempt, the license plate number was ran correctly and
produced registration that matched with the plate number. This is where the stop should have
immediately ended, as there was absolutely no reason to initiate that stop in the first place.
However, Officer Stormes proceeded with the stop, and subsequently issued Mr. Fenton two
citations.

MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND
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There was no reasonable, aiticulable suspicion of criminal activity so as to justify the
stop. Officer Stormes pulled Mr. Fenton's vehicle over solely based upon the fact that the
license plate number was incorrectly ran through dispatch, at the fault of both Officer Stormes
and the dispatcher. Therefore, the stop of Mr. Fenton was unlawful.
Mr. Fenton's detention by Officer Stormes was unlawful.

Mr. Fenton's detention by Officer Stormes was unlawful, because the stop was
unreasonably and unjustifiably extended. Officer Stormes purposefully withheld information
from Mr. Fenton that the probation officer, Ms. Jensen, intended to search the vehicle, as well as
his person; he only told Mr. Fenton that she wanted to speak with him, and that she wanted him
to "stand by."

This caused Mr. Fenton to feel as if he had to remain with the officers.

Additionally, Officer Stormes failed to inform Mr. Fenton that he was free to leave.
Once the purpose of a valid traffic stop has been completed and an officer's initial
suspicions have been verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless there is additional
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts. United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631
(5th Cir.2006); United States v. Jackson, 517 F. Supp. 2d 859, 862 (W.D. La. 2007). In Jackson,
the government failed to show a sufficient, reasonable suspicion to prolong the defendant's
traffic stop. Id. at 863. The court held that there were insufficient reasons for suspicion to
continue once the defendant's identification cleared. Id

A constitutional violation occurred

when the detention continued past that point. Id. A person is "seized" within the meaning of
Fourth Amendment only when by means of physical force or show of authority his freedom of
movement is restrained. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). Additionally, if a
reasonable person believes that he is not free to leave, in view of all the surrounding
circumstances, it effectively constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Florida v.
MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT

Page 7 ofll

72

. .--:--:--.---::

Royer, 460 U.S. 491,502 (1983). In Royer, the officers asked the defendant to follow them to a
room without indicating in any way that he was free to leave, which effectively constituted a
seizure. Id. at 501. The Court held that the police exceeded the limits of the investigative stop.

Id. at 501.
Officer Stormes did not have reasonable suspicion to continue detaining :Mr. Fenton after
handing back his ID card and registration card. There was nothing inherently suspicious about

:rvrr. Fenton's statement that he was on probation that would have warranted renewed detention
after initial traffic stop. Similar to Royer, where the defendant felt like he had to abide by the
officer's instructions, here Mr. Fenton felt as though he had to remain with the officers until
Officer Jensen arrived. And understandably so, especially since both officers stood only a few
feet av,.ray from l\1r. Fenton the entire time, until Officer Jensen arrived, which likely caused him
to feel extremely intimidated and frightened.

Additionally, upon Officer Jensen aniving on

scene, and before the search began, Mr. Fenton was subsequently handcuffed.
In this situation, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. Therefore, the
continued detainment of Mr. Fenton by Officer Stormes was unlawful.

The search of Mr. Fenton's vehicle was unreasonable.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution forbid unreasonable searches. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable
and the fruits of that search are suppressible, unless the search falls within certain specific and
well-delineated exceptions. State v. Harwood, 495 P.2d 160, 162 (1972).
"The exceptions to searches conducted outside the judicial process without a
warrant include the following, (See generally: Wheeler v. Goodman, 330 F.Supp.
1356 (W.D.N.C.1971)): (a) Search incident to and following a lawful arrest, but
only of the suspect's person and of areas within his immediate reach or physical
control necessary to protect police against hidden weapons, destruction of the
evidence or fruits of the crime, etc. Chimel v. California, supra; Von Cleef v. New
MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
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Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 2051, 23 L.Ed.2d 728 (1969). (b) Search of a
vehicle upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains articles that the
officers are entitled to seize and where the ease and probability of mobility for
escape or destruction of the evidence is clear. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). (c) Consent searches where such consent is
knowing and voluntary. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92
L.Ed. 436 (1948); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20
L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). (d) Search, with probable cause, for and in hot pursuit of a
fleeing and dangerous felony suspect. Warden Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). (e) Search of abandoned real
estate or personal property. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4
L.Ed.2d 668 (1960). (f) A search under urgent necessity (a medical emergency or
screams from within a dwelling). United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d. Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004, 84 S.Ct. 1940, 12 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1964). (g)
Search pursuant to custodial prerogative (as in a vehicle held for forfeiture).
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). (h)
Search, with probable cause, necessary to prevent loss or destruction of the thing to
be seized. United States v. Barone, supra; Johnson v. United States, supra"
Quoting Harwood, 495 P.2d at 163.
Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that searches conducted pursuant to the
administration of probation are an exception to the warrant restriction. State v. Vega, 718 P.2d
598,600 (Ct. App. 1986); See State v. Pinson, 657 P.2d 1095 (Ct.App.1983). However, the state
must show that any such warrantless search conducted by the parole officer is reasonable. Vega
at 600. A parole officer may make a warrantless search of a parolee and his residence if the
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the parolee has violated some probation condition,
and the search is reasonably related to disclosure or confirmation of that violation. Pinson at
1101. A probation officer may also enlist the aid of the police when conducting a justified
search. Id. However, it is impermissible for the police to use parole officers in lieu of a warrant
to search, when conducting a criminal investigation. Vega at 601.
In our case, the search of Mr. Fenton's car was unreasonable because neither the parole
officer, nor the police officer, had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Fenton has violated a
condition of his probation. The related events occurred as follows: First, Mr. Fenton, wanting to
MOTION TO SUPPRESSAND
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cover all of his bases, informed Officer St01mes as the stop was concluding that he ,.,vas on
probation. Then, Officer Stormes contacted the on-call probation officer to inform her that he
just pulled Mr. Fenton over and issued him two citations. She said that she was on her way to
the scene and wanted to search Mr. Fenton's vehicle. Officer Stormes informed Mr. Fenton that
the Officer Jensen wanted to speak with him, but failed to inform him that the she planned on
searching the vehicle. Lastly, after indicating that he was not free to leave, based on reasons
stated earlier, Officer Stormes, along with Officer Jensen, handcuffed Mr. Fenton and began
searching his person and vehicle. Up until that point, no issues had arisen that would have given
Officer Stormes reason to believe that Mr. Fenton violated a condition of his probation. Officer
Jensen also did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Fenton violated some probation
condition; she only knew that he had received to minor citations - citations that occurred as a
result of an unlawful stop. Thus, the search was not reasonably related to the confirmation of
that violation, as there was nothing to confirm. Therefore, the search of Mr. Fenton's vehicle by
Officer Stormes and Ms. Jenson was not only unreasonable, but also unlawful.

CONCLUSION
Any evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful stop, the unreasonable detention, and the

illegal and unlawful search is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and is, therefore, inadmissible. Thus,
the evidence found as a result of the unlawful search should be suppressed.

DATED this

.,,-~

l,

day of June, 2016.

KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC

~

Richard M. Cuddihy
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_-----=-_ day of June, 2016, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be:

[X] faxed
to the following:
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Fax: 208-799-3080
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Q. Okay. So you had prior law enforcement

2 experience before --

2

3
4

A. Idid.
A. Yes, sir.

present. He's currently being represented by Ms. Welch.

5
6
7

The State is ready to proceed on this prelim.

8

PROCEEDINGS
MR. COLEMAN: Next if we could take up State
of Idaho versus Larry Fenton, CR16-1591. Mr; Fenton is
8

6

1

1:3t> P.M.

THE COURT: And are you as well,

Q. -- working in Lewiston?
Q. What did you do before that?

A. I was a patrol officer in Bosque Farms, New
Mexico.

Q. How long did you do that?

9
10

A. Two-and-a-half years.

MS. WELCH: Yes, Your Honor.

11

Q. As a part of your training and e_?(perieric~·; ri1;1ve _

THE COURT: Okay. Based on that then,

12 you been trained how to recognlz~· c~ntrol\ed sub;tance;?
13
A. Yes.
·'"
14
Q. What kind of training have you had as regards to
15 that?
16
A. I've had a narcotics class in the academy in

Ms. Mackenzie -- Ms. Welch, I mean?

Mr. Coleman, you may call your first witness on behalf
of the State.
MR. COLEMAN: Thank you, Your Honor, State
calls Officer Joe Stormes.

17
18
19
20

which various types of narcotics were brought into the

a witness of lawful age, having been first duly sworn to

21

February 28th of this year?

tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the

22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Sir, if you'd like to come
forward, you'll need to raise your right hand and be
sworn. You can then have a seat in the witness stand.
JOSEPH STORMES,

truth, was thereupon called as a witness on behalf of
the State and testified upon his oath as follows:
THE COURT: All right. You can have a seat

class and we were shown those narcotics and what they
look like. And also through my experience on the job.

Q. Were you working in your current capacity on

A.

Yes.

Q. Do you recall what shift you were working?

A. I was working day shift patrol.
Q. What hours does that cover?
7

5

there.
And, Mr. Coleman, you may inquire.
MR. COLEMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
1--'""

~

2

patrol, dld you ever stop a vehicle driven by a
Mr. Larry Fenton?

A. Yes, I did.

A. Good afternoon.

A. I was driving on Snake River Avenue heading

Q. Could you please state your name and spell your

8

northbound, and I observed Mr. Fenton and his Pontiac

9

Grand Prix.

7

1

3

4

5
6
7

Q. Good afternoon.

8

A. It covers 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Q. on that day while you were on -- when you were on

.

BY MR. COLEMAN:

6

___,9

1
2

last for the record?

Q. Can you describe how that came about?

A. Joseph Stormes, It's S-T-O-R-M-E-5.

10

Q. What did the Pontiac Grand Prix look like?

Q, And what's your current occupation?

11

A. It was a white four-door sedan.

A. I'm employed with the Lewiston Police Department 12
Q. And you said -- what street did you say that was
13 on?
A. Snake River Avenue.
Q, How long have you been doing that?
14
A. Since October of 2015.
15
Q. And was that in Nez Perce County and the state_ of
-Q. Are you certified to be a police officer in the
16 Idaho?
A. Yes.
state of Idaho?
17
A. Yes.
18
Q, What -- what did you do next when you observed
as a patrol officer.

Q. What certifications do you hold?

19

A. Basic.

20

Q. You"ve attended POST and all that comes along

21

I completed a registration check through my dispatch,

22

And my dispatchers advised me that the --

23

MS. WELCH: Objection. Hearsay.

in New Mexico, but through all the paperwork, I've been

24

THE COURT: Mr. Coleman?

certified here in New -- or Idaho.

25

MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, this isn't being

with that?
A. I've been certified through the -- my academy was

" /01/2016 10:36:23 AM

that vehicle?
A. Once I observed the vehicle traveling northbound,
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2

matter. It's just being used to show the effect it had

2

3
4

ostnopth. is listener, what he did next with regards to the

3
4

Q. Who was it?
A. It was Larry Fenton, Jr.

5

Q. Do .you see Larry Fenton in the courtroom today?

that basis.

6

A. Yes, sir.

BY MR. COLEMAN:

7

Q. Can you point to him and describe what he's

THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection on

11
~ :2
3

i'4

1is
16

provided me with an Idaho identification card.

Q. Go ahead.

8 wearing?

A. I completed a registration check through my

9

dispatcher, and they told me that the registration did

10

not return.

11

Q. What does that mean?

12

A. It means they were not finding a record coming

13

back in the computer system.

A. He's in the striped jumpsuit sitting next to
defense counsel,
Q. Okay. So what•did you do next- in .regard!j·to the

investigation you were conductini;r al that "ti~~? '".

A. So after I obtained Mr, Fent'on's ID card, I

14

advised him of the reason for the stop. I also

Q. Okay. So what did you do next?

15

requested his insurance and registration information

A.

16

such as a registration card.

I tried changing one of the digits on the license

1

plate. I thought I might have mistaken the letter eight

17

Q. Did he provide those to you?

for the -- excuse me, the number eight for the letter

18

A.

· 19
,0

"B." So I asked dispatch to change that digit and see

19

if it had any record that would return, and dispatch

20

17
;S

1
:1

He provided me the registration card. However,

he did not provide me current proof of insurance.

Q. And what happened?

still told me that they did not have a record coming

21

22

back in the system.

22

"3
:4

23

make sure that they all matched. And all the numbers

been no record return even though you're reading the

24

did match and they were correct, indicating that this

25

license plate number?

25

was the correct car to the license plate and the VIN.

1

Q. Have you ever experienced something like that

1

Q. Have you experienced this before where there's

A. S_o then I began to compare the registration card
with the license plate and also the VIN on the car to

11

9

1

I!
4

I:!
i

l_

A.

Yes,

Q. And in the past, has that -- well, scratch that.

2

So when you redid the numbers just to clarify it and

3

A. Yes, I have.

there was no record return, what did you do next?

4

Q. Typically, what does that indicate?

A.

Once I got behind the vehiei"e; I told my

A. Sometimes when a car is registered on, let's say,

5

dispatch -- when I say "behind the vehicle," I got

6

for instance, as an example, a Friday and the person is

7

closer to the vehicle. I told my dispatch that I was

7

stopped on a Saturday, there may not be enough time for

8

going to make a traffic stop on that vehicle. I read

8

all the documentation and paperwork to make its way

9

the plate off a third time to them. And then as we got

9

through the system to indicate that the license plate is

close to the intersection of Third Street and Main

10

Street, I turned on my overhead emergency lights and

11

initiated the traffic stop.

12

A. To investigate the issue of the registration not
coming back in the system.
Q,

Did the vehicle stop?

A. Yes, the vehicle did end up ptopping at the
intersection of Third Street and Capitol.

Q. And that's still in Nez Perce County, state of
0
1
22

13
"24
25

Idaho?
A.

Yes.

Q. Were you able to identify the individual driving

the vehicle?

currently up to date and registered to the car.
Q. Okay. so now at this point, you've indicated he

didn't have insurance for the vehicle?

A. Or he didn't have it with him --

13

Q. And what was the purpose of the stop?

1

happening before?

14

Q. Okay.

15

A. -- is what he indicated.

16

Q, So what did you do with that information?

A. So I went back to my car and began to write out

17
18

citations. And I also asked my dispatch if Mr. Fenton

19

has had any prior citations for insurance-related

20

issues. And dispatch informed me that he had prior been

21

suspended for ha'{ing insurance citation~. And then I

22

completed writing my citations.

23

A. Yes, I did.

24

Q, How did you do that?

25

Q. Okay. Then what happened after that?

A. After I finished writing my citations and talking
to my dispatch, I went back to Mr, Fenton at his car.

1 ' - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - _ _ _78, J
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12

..

14

1

And, again, I told him why I had stopi.,~d him, handed him

1

A. Yes. If they request us to help them, then yes.

2

back his information, told him I was going to be issuing

2

Q. And had you been requested to help in this

citations for failing to purchase a driver's license and

3

also failing to provide proof of insurance, As I wrote

4
5
6
7
8

13
: 4

out -- or as I was giving him the first citation and he
was talking to me, he told me that he was pn probation,
which he had not stated at any point prior to that in my
contact with him.
Q, And how does that change the nature of the

,:
~:

.. 7

-I!~
··B19

•I
I!
1:
1:
1:
1

4

7

'10

i13

1
'·4

' 5
i 16

1
22

,t:
125

Q, So describe how the search of the vehicle went.

A. So the search of the vehicle, I -- after Chris
have a seat on the curb. I walked to the passenger door

A. Well, what I did with the information is I went

10
11
12

of the vehicle and Chris Jensen. w:al~.e~: t~ ~~~ ~~i~e~s
door of the vehicle, and.we c;,p~hed them up and began our

back to my car. I contacted the on-call Probation and

13

search. Just a few· seconds into the se~rch, I located

investlgation for you at that point, or what do you do
with that information?

Parole officer to let them know the totality of the

14

on the driver's seat a black plastic bag. And as I had

circumstances, what had happened, and just advised them.

15
16
17

my hands on the bag, I looked over to where Mr, Fenton

Q. And what happened next?

A. So as I finished -- I was starting to complete my

18
19
20

conversation with the on-call Probation and Parole
officer Chris Jensen. She told me that she was at her
office --

had been sitting, and I observed that he was now
standing back on his feet.

Q. And what did you do?
A. I told Mr. Fenton to sit back down, at which time
he took off running.

MS. WELCH: Objection. Hearsay.

21

Q. Did you complete your search of the vehicle?

THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the

22

A.

23

in addition to the one I located that had a white

THE WITNESS: She told me she was at her

24

crystal --

objection.
office and would be coming to the traffic stop and that

Yes. It was completed, and there was another bag

MS. WELCH: Object. May I ask a question in

25

13

15

1

she wanted to search the vehicle.

aid of objection?

2

BY MR. COLEMAN:

Q. Did you make Mr. Fenton aware of this?

3

A.

4

Yes. I told him, after I gave him his citation,

THE COURT: You may.
MS, WELCH: This other bag that you just

referred to, dld you locate that?

his second citation, and also all of ills information

5

THE WITNESS: I located the other bag.

back, his driver's license, I told him that Chris Jensen

6

MS. WELCH: No objection.

was going to be coming to the traffic stop because she

7
8

wanted to speak with him.

Q.

THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. COLEMAN:

9

Did Ms. Jensen ever arrive?

A. Yes, she did.

Q. So what did you find ln -- well, first of all,

10
11

the second bag, where did you find that one?

A. When she arrived, I, again, reiterated to her the

12

the driver's seat where Mr. Fenton had been sitting.

reason for my stopping Mr. Fenton and also observations

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q.

What happened after she arrived?

that had been observed. And then she told me that,
again, she wanted to search the vehicle and she wanted
to search his person for officer safety, and also

Q. And did -- did you_guys then complete a search of

.o

Q. ls Ms. Jensen a felony probatlon officer?

A. Yes, she is.

Jensen had finished searching Mr. Fenton, he was told to

suggested that we should handcuff Mr. Fenton.

19

A. Yes.

9

22

25

situation?

the vehicle?

A.

Yes, a search of-the vehicle began to be

A. That was in the black jacket pocket that was on .
,.:.-·1..
~;

Q. And where specifically was the first bag you
described located?

A. That was· on the passenger seat, in the front

(f'.
\

\

passenger seat of the vehicle.
Q. Passenger seat. I think you had previously

testified that it was located on the driver's seat, but
that's not where you found it?

A. There was two different bags.

conducted by myself and Chris Jensen. And Officer Tom

21

Q. Yeah,

Sparks was standing by as a back-up officer, And he was

22

A. There was the first one I found; which was in a

at the traffic stop as well.

23

Q. Is it common for you, as a patrol officer, to
assist Probation in searches of this nature?

1~/01/2016

black plastic bag on the front passenger seat. After

24

Mr. Fenton had left the scene and we came back to

25

complete the search of the vehicle, there was another

79
10:36:23 AM

Page 12 to 15 of 31

6 of 11 sheets

,·':•_.,__,1-~_..;Ae-.-I-ci_t_e_d_h_i_m_fo_r_th_e_f_a-il-u-re_t_o_p_u_t=..,....,1-a_s_e_a_____2_0_---._1___Q
___O_k_a_y_._D_i_d---cc::--:-u_n_o_t_ic_e_a_n_y_t-ra_ff_i_c_in-f-ra-ct-io_n_s_a_t____
2_
2 _~

I'
I. . 2
-3

, 4
, 5
6

, 7
- 8

'.;.'·g
0

~

'11

li2

ij'.

~3

4:

2

driver's license and also failing to provide proof of
insurance,

Q. And had the investigatlon with regards to the
traffic stop that you were conducting concluded at that
point?

Q. Okay, So you got behind the vehicle and called

11

Q, So you were just waiting for the probation
officer to respond at that point?

A. Yes.
And you had indicated to him that she intended to

come and talk to him?

A. Yes.

she ran it in the computer system.

15

Q. And so that was the reason that the vehicle

16

i:egistration information did not come back as valid?

.,o
1

MS. WELCH: Thank you, Your Honor.

125

I

1

BY MS. WELCH:
Q. Prior to stopping Mr. Fenton, you were in

license plate number having been ran through dispatch
incorrectly?

21

A. Correct.

22

Q. Okay. And so you stopped the vehicle based upon

communication with several other officers; is that

23

that and ended up contacting the driver, who you

correct?

24

identified was Larry Fenton?

A. With one other officer.

23

21

I~

2

1:
10

13

A. Correct.

25

A. Officer Nick Eylar.

1:
1;
1:

Q, And so you pulled over the vehicle based upon the

19

1

7

· A. Correct.

20

Q. Okay. And who was that?

4

Q. And, in fc!ct, the vehlcle -- or the registration

that was ran was I-180728?

14

~

CROSS-EXAMINATION

A. Correct.

A. That's what the dispatcti~/h~ci iat~~ t~l•d.me ~he

18

4

were referring to a local Hcense plate?

thought that was the plate that w.;s;' ru~. So that's how

THE COURT: Ms. Welch?

·,!:1 3

Q. And you thought that the dispatcher knew that you

13

17

: 22

A. Correct.

12

MR. COLEMAN: I have no further questions.

1

in the license plate to dispatch as Idaho plate 180728?

9
10

citations. And I had shut off my emergency overhead
lights.

_7:

A. At that point, no.

8

license information,. registration card, and also his

Q.

3

4
5
6

7

Yes. I had handed him back all of his driver's

A.

that point?

Q. And you asked him for his registration and

insurance?

Okay. And what vehicle were you watching?

3

A. Correct.

A. Which -- which vehicle was I watching?
Q, Correct.

4
5

A. Correct.

A. I saw a couple vehicles, but I wasn't watching

6

Q. And at that time, did you determine that you were

Q.

any particular vehicle.
Q.

Okay.

A. As I left the area where I had been speaking with
Officer Eylar, I looked over at the gas pumps, and I
could see a male subject sitting in a white Pontiac
Grand Prix at the gas pumps-at Southway Zip Trip. And
then I pulled out and I left.

Q. Okay. So you pulled out and started following
the Pontiac -- Pontiac Grand Prix?

Q. Went back to your car?

7

going to cite Mr. Fenton for failure to purchase a

8

driver's license and failure to provide proof of

9

insurance?

10
11
12
13

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did you write out the citations at that
point?

A. I went back and looked at his license plate and

14

looked at the registration sticker to make sure that

15

those matched.

,~
,~

Avenue, that the vehicle had pulled out and was now

20

A.

I handed him one citation.

going -- coming towards the roundabout. So I pulled a

21

Q.

Okay. Which citation was that?

22

U-turn and saw the white Pontiac Grand Prix go through

22

A.

I don't recall. It was one of the'ones_ I had

the roundabout and start heading northbound on Snake

23
24
25

16

19

13.4
25

I

16

Q. Okay.

excuse me, southbound on Snake River Avenue, Then I was

17

A.

advised by Officer Eylar that at the same time I had

18

pulled out and cleared the roundabout on Snake River

19

Q. Okay. And then you handed him the citatlons?

A.

I pulled out and began heading northbound -- or

River Avenue -- Snake River Avenue. And that's when I
got behind him,

~/01/2016 10:36:23 AM

But yes, I went back and wrote the -- the

citations for that.

written out. There was two. ·

Q, Okay. And then you went back to your car and
called Probation and Parole?
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24

1

A. After he told me that he was on probation, yes.

26
1

A. Uh-huh.
Q. Can you tell me whlch lab item number corresponds

2

I didn't give him his second citation back. I went back

2

3

to my car and I called Probation and Pa-role.

3 with the two different packages that were found in the
4 vehicle?
5
A. I can't. I can only tell you what's on the

Q. Okay. And do you recall what time you called
Probation and Parole at?

A. I don't.

6

Q. Okay, And so after you talked to Probation and

7
Q. And did you have the black plastic sack or any of
8 the packages tested for fingerprints?

Parole, you went back and gave him your second citation?

A. Yes.

9

Q. And at that point, you said -- then you told him
you were going to hold him after that until Chris Jens.en

10

0

I requested that they be tested for fingerprints,

Q. Who did this vehicle belong to? .·
A. This vehicle was regist¢:red.. to anot:"tier couple.

A. No. I told him that Chris Jensen from Probation

13

Q. Okay. So it wasn't registered'-"to Mr. Fenton?

and Parole was coming to speak with him and that she

14

A. No, it wasn't.

wanted him to stand by.

9

A.

and I don't know if that was ever done.

11
12

arrived on scene?

7
8

report here.

15

Q. Did he inform you that he was purchasing it?

Q. Okay. And so you held him there with you?
A. No.

16
17

A. Yes. He informed me he was in the process of
purchasing the vehicle.

Q. He wasn't outside the car at that tlme?

A. No. He was inside his car.

18
19

further questions.

Q. Okay. And where were you?

20

THE COURT: Anything in light of that?

A. I was standing just a few feet away with my

21

MR. COLEMAN: Just a couple of things, Your

partner.

Q. Okay, And so was he free to leave?

A. Yes. Had he left, there wasn't anything I could
have done to stop him. My traffic stop was concluded.

MS. WELCH: I don't believe I have ariy

22
23

Honor.

24

BY MR. COLEMAN:

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

25

Q. With regards to the license plate number, did you

25
1

I~
4

Jensen arrived on scene?

A.

I don't know. I could only give a guesstimation,

but I don't know.

2
3

had entered the number wrong?

A. No.
Q. When did you find out the reason why it was

4

Q. You said Tom Sparks was on =~cene as a cover

5

returning as no registration?

A. After I got back to the station, I was able to

6

officer?

A. Yes.

7

Q. Where was he at at this time?

A. He was standing next to me.
Q. So next to the vehicle? By the vehicle?

A. Yeah, a few feet from the vehicle standing next
to me.

Q. You said you don't recall how long It was before

listen to the audio recording of the radio traffic

8 between myself and dispatch, And that's when it was
9 confirmed that I had run the plate wrong initially with
10 the digits messed up. And then the second time, again,
11 it was run wrong.
12
The third time when I actually told dispatch what
13 plate I was going to be out with, I actually spelled it
14

out correctly, gave it to them correctly, However,

A. I don't know an exact time period, no.

15

throughout the entire time of the stop, they never -

Q. So when she showed up, was Mr. Fenton removed

16

informed me that they had gotten a return back on, I

17

believe, the third time that I ran it.

Chris Jensen showed up?

from the vehlcle?

A. Yes. She told him to step out of the vehicle,

18

Q, And you said that you collected the evidence and

19

Q. You don't know if they ran it the third time or
not at that point?

sent it to the lab. Can you tell me which lab item

20

A. I was told later they had run it and had gotten a

number corresponds with the two different items that you

21

return, but they didn't tell me they had.gotten a return

22

while I was on my stop.

located in the vehicle?

A. I'm sorry, could you repeat the question? I
don't understand what you're asking.

:25

27

1 know at the time that you made the stop that dispatch

Q. And so how long was it before Jensen -- Chris

Q, The lab item number on State's Exhibit 1?

23

Q. You had already made the stop by that point?

24

A. Right, I had already made the stop, and

25

everything had been concluded before -- I found out
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2016-0001591
State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions
Hearing date: 7/14/2016
Time: 1:44 pm
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Courtroom: 1
Court reporter: Linda Carlton
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: April Smith
14416

Defendant present, in custody, with counsel.

Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court and the State's witness is not available
14434
today and parties are requesting 1 week continuance.
14453

Court continues this matter until 7-21-16 at 1:30 p.m.

14507

Court recess.

Court Minutes
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR2016-0001591
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO CONTINUE

vs.
LARRY G. FENTON,

Defendant.

JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, Senior Deputy Prosecutor for Nez Perce County, State of
Idaho, comes before the Court and moves that the Pretrial Motion Hearing which
was scheduled for July 21, 2016, at 1:30 P.M., be rescheduled for a time that is
convenient for all parties.
This Motion is being made based upon a key witness for the State being
unavailable and will not return until July 28, 2016.

125-Y½
DATED this _ _
_ day of July 2016,----- . . . --------- _

ior Deputy Prosecutor

MOTION TO CONTINUE

1
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full 1 true, complete and correct copy of
the foregoing MOTION TO CONTINUE was
(1)

I,

\__,

1')
I

hand delivered, or

(2) _ _ hand delivered via court basket, or
(3) _ _ sent via facsimile, or
(4) _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail.
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Richard M. Cuddihy
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
312 17th Street
P.O. Drawer 717
Lewiston, ID 83501
DATED this

i ytb

day of July 2016.

,,.q
( / L~ I. /,/\._,
----

. (_

,

j. r-~;c~:ia /)~;/-;;t·~
I

/7ERIN D. LEAVITI,,/ /
Senior Legal Assistant

----------

MOTION TO CONTINUE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR2016-0001591
Plaintiff,
ORDER TO CONTINUE

vs.
LARRY G. FENTON,

Defendant.

Having read and considered the foregoing Motion to Continue, and being fully
advised in this matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Pretrial Motion Hearing which was

.

scneduled for July 21, 2016, at 1:30 P.M. be rescheduled for the
\

.~~+- ,

204, at the hour of

DATED this

[t:jf--..

ORDER TO CONTINUE

Z : 3tJ

r,.

~

day of

~-M.

day of July 2016.

1
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER TO
CONTINUE, was
(1)

(2)

_ _ hand delivered, or
/

hand delivered via court basket, or

(3)

_ _ sent via facsimile, or

(4)

_ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States mail, addressed to the following:

Prosecutor's Office
P. O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
Richard M. Cuddihy
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
312 17th Street
P.O. Drawer 717
Lewiston, ID 83501
DATED this

,qr

ORDER TO CONTINUE

day of July 2016.

2
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2016-0001591
State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Hearing type: Pretrial Motions
Hearing date: 8/4/2016
Time: 3:06 pm
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Courtroom: 1
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Defense Attorney: Mackenzie Welch
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman

30625

Defendant present, in custody, with counsel.

30658

Ms. Welch addresses the Court re: oral correction to brief page 4.

30844

Mr. Coleman addresses the Court re: stipulation to admission probation

agreement.
30916

Ms. Welch has no objection and stipulates to admission probation agreement.

30937

Mr. Coleman calls Officer Nicholas Eylar, Sworn, Mr. Coleman begins direct

examination.

31539

Ms. Welch begins cross examination Officer Nicholas Eylar.

31858

Witness steps down.

31906

Mr. Coleman calls Officer Joseph Stormes, sworn, Mr. Coleman begins direct

examination.
- - - ----··-·-···~--- --·-----···--------· ----

33748

Ms. Welch begins cross examination Officer Joseph Stormes.

34350

Mr. Coleman begins redirect Officer Joseph Stormes.

34419

Witness steps down.

34435

Mr. Coleman requests he be able to file written closing argument and attach
the stipulated probation agreement.
Court Minutes
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34450

Court will auow Mr. Coleman to file written closing dnd will take matter
under advisement.

34454

Court Minutes

Court recess.
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JUSTIN J. COLEMAN
Senior Deputy Prosecutor
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
l.S.B.N.: 8023
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR2016-0001591
Plaintiff,
CLOSING ARGUMENT

vs.
LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR.,
Defendant.

JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, Senior Deputy Prosecutor for Nez Perce County, State
of Idaho, comes before this Court and hereby provides the following Argument in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 24, 2014, Larry Fenton (hereinafter Defendant) was found guilty of
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DELIVER, a felony,
-~commi-tt-ecl-on---erab0ut-September-2-3r--2Q-l~nd-wa-s-sentenced---to--tl:lecustody-of ...... ________ _
the IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS in Nez Perce County Case No. CR20130007217.

On March 16, 2015, the Court suspended the remainder of Defendant's

sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for five (5) years beginning April
24, 2014. The Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation was signed and

CLOSING ARGUMENT
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initialed by the Defendant on April 20, 2015. The Defendant also signed and
initialed the Idaho Department of Correction Standard Agreement of Supervision on
~:

,--

April 20, 2015.

The Defendant's probation agreement is attached as stipulated to

by the parties and marked as Exhibit A.
On February 28, 2016, Officer Joseph Stormes of the Lewiston Police
Department was working day shift patrol. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing
(hereinafter "Tr.") at p. 6, I. 24. Officer Stormes testified at the evidentiary hearing
on August 4, 2016, before this Court, that during his patrol he came in contact with
Officer Nick Eylar regarding suspicious activity involving two (2) vehicles.

Officer

Eylar testified that he recognized one of the vehicles as belonging to a known drug
associate and that he observed the vehicles at a parking lot where drug activity
frequently occurs. He observed the vehicles merely park, with no one exiting the
vehicles, then leave the parking lot and appeared to travel together. Officer Eylar
testified that he followed the vehicles and eventually saw them stop at a gas station
together, again with no individuals appearing to exit either vehicle.
he contacted Officer Stormes.

At that point

Officer Stormes testified that he personally

observed the vehicles, one of which was a white four-door sedan, at a gas station
on Southway Avenue.

Officer Stormes testified that he left the gas station after

discussing the matter with Officer Eylar and proceeded southbound on Snake River
Avenue. Within moments he was notified that the white car had left the gas station
- - - •

••

•••••----.••-•-••-----

-•

••••

••---•••••••

• • • - - - - - • ••--•-

• • • • • • • - - -.. • - - • r - - • • • • • • • - - • - - • •

•••••••--- - • • • • • • - -

- - -

-------

and was heading towards Snake River Avenue. Officer Stormes turned around and
proceeded to drive northbound on Snake River Avenue. Tr. p. 7, II. 2-22. Officer
Stormes testified that he was traveling behind the white car and proceeded to have
dispatch run the license plate as he read the numbers. Officer Stormes completed

CLOSING ARGUMENT
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one (1) registration check through dispatch and was told that the registration did
not return. Tr. p. 8, II. 9-11. In order to be sure, he asked dispatch to complete the
registration check again but replacing the number eight for the letter "B" in the
event that he had been mistaken. Tr. p. 8, II. 16-22. This occurred as Officer
Stormes continued to travel behind the white car on Snake River Avenue. Dispatch
told him that the second search did not pull up a record for the vehicle either. Tr. p.
8, II. 20-22. At that point Officer Stormes determined he would make a traffic stop
on the vehicle to further investigate.

Officer Stormes testified at the evidentiary

hearing, that it is a standard practice for him to stop a vehicle that is not returning
a registration through dispatch. He explained that there could be many reasons why
this was occurring, several of which would signify a traffic violation.

Officer

Stormes next notified dispatch that he was going to conduct a traffic stop in order
to investigate why the registration was not pulling up, and for a third time read
dispatch the license plate number. Tr. p. 9, II. 5-9. Dispatch never informed Officer
Stormes of the results of the third record check while he conducted the stop.
During the traffic stop Officer Stormes asked the driver, identified as the
Defendant, for his driver's license and the Defendant provided him with an Idaho
identification card. Tr. p. 10, II. 1-2. Officer Stormes then requested to see
insurance and registration, of which the Defendant was only able to procure a
-~------------- registration card. Tr. p. 10, II. 14-19. Officer Stormes also completed his
---·-··-···--···~---·--~ ---------··---

investigation regarding the license plate not returning a valid registration.

After

comparing the registration card with the license plate and the VIN Officer Stormes
concluded that the numbers matched and were correct. Tr. p. 10, II. 21-25.
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Officer Stormes proceeded to write out citations for failing to purchase a
driver's license and failure to provide proof of insurance for the Defendant. Tr. p.
12, II. 1-5. As he gave the first citation to the Defendant, the Defendant told him
that he was on probation. Tr. p.12, II. 5-8. Officer Stormes inquired as to who the
Defendant's probation officer was, and testified that he was able to discern that the
defendant was on felony probation.

After receiving this new information Officer

Stormes went back to his patrol car and contacted the on-call Probation and Parole
officer, Chris Jensen, to let them know about the incident. Tr. p. 12, II. 12-15.
Officer Stormes testified that he relayed all the information regarding the stop as
well as the suspicious activities that had been observed prior to the stop.

Ms.

Jensen told officer Stormes that she would be coming to the traffic stop to talk to
the Defendant and that she wanted to search the vehicle. Tr. p. 12, II. 24-25.
Officer Stormes then proceeded to give the Defendant his second citation and told
him that Ms. Jensen was going to be coming to the traffic in order to speak with
him. Tr. p. 13, II. 4-8. At this point the Defendant was not free to leave as he had
been instructed that his probation officer was coming to meet him.

When she

arrived, Ms. Jensen wanted to search his person for officer safety reasons and
search the vehicle. Tr. p. 13, II. 14-17. During the course of the search, as
explained by Officer Stormes, the Defendant fled the scene on foot.

The search

yielded the discovery of a large amount of narcotics leading to the charges before
the Court. Tr. p. 15, II. 9-16.

ISSUES

I.

Whether or not the search of the Defendant's vehicle was lawful?
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Whether or not Officer Stormes had reasonable suspicion to stop the
Defendant?

III.

Whether the detention of the Defendant was lawful?-

ARGUMENT
I.

The search of the Defendant's vehicle was lawful.

The condition of probation that a defendant consent to a search of his person
by a law enforcement officer without a search warrant is a supervisorial procedure
related to his reformation and rehabilitation in light of the offense of which he was
convicted. State v. Gawron, 736 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 1987). The purpose of an
unexpected, unprovoked search of defendant is to ascertain whether he is
complying with his terms of probation; to determine not only whether he disobeys a
law, but also whether he obeys the law. Id. The court in its discretion may allow a
probationer to be subject to warrantless searches if they waive that right as a
condition of their probation. Id.
The defendant signed and dated his court-ordered probation and the Order
Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation. See Exhibit A. The Defendant also
signed and initialed the Standard Agreement of Supervision which explicitly stated
that he would consent to searches as a condition of his probation and that he
waived his Fourth Amendment rights regarding searches.
Condition #11.

See Exhibit A at

As such, the Defendant, rightfully, waived his Fourth Amendment

-------------------····--··---··-·····-----------------right as a condition of his probation and is subject to warrantless searches by his
probation officer even if the probation officer does not have reasonable grounds to
- believe that a probation violation has occurred. Additionally, the Defendant is also
required to notify all law enforcement he comes in contact with that he is under

CLOSING ARGUMENT
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supervision and tell them the name of his supervising officer. See Exhibit A at
Condition #2. Furthermore, the Defendant must obey all requests by probation and
parole offic<:fr: Id. As Defendant's probation officer, ·Officer Jensen- was within the
law to request the Defendant to remain where he was located as she responded to
the scene.

She was also allowed to search the Defendant and the Defendant's

vehicle.

II.

Officer Stormes had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct
a traffic stop on the Defendant's vehicle.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a person may be detained by an
officer even though he does not possess probable cause; the seizure is justified
under the Fourth Amendment if there is a reasonable articulable suspicion that the
person has committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho
930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992) (rehearing denied)(citing Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491 (1983)). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable

cause, but more than speculation or instinct on the part of an officer. Id. at 664.
An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the
person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411(1981).

v.

The reasonableness of the suspicion must be

evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. Mason v.

State Department of Law Enforcement, 103 Idaho 748, 750, 653 P.2d 803, 805

(Ct.App. 1982). In orcter to detai11 a person for purposes of an investigator)' stop,
law enforcement officers must have specific facts which would "warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate''-that a
traffic law has been violated or that some criminal activity has been or is about to
be committed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); see also United States v.
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Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 {1975); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103, 831

P.2d 942, 945 (Ct. App. 1991). A police officer's reasonable, good-faith mistake
· does not violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights. Heien v. North Carolina, -135

S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014),
In this case, Officer Stormes had articulable reasonable suspicion that a
traffic violation had occurred or that he needed to further investigate a clear
concern of possible violation. Pursuant to this reasonable suspicion he made a
traffic stop. He made multiple attempts to check the registration on a vehicle and
dispatch told him on two (2) different occasions that no records were coming up for
that license plate number. On the third attempt to have dispatch check the license
plate numbers, he did not receive any response from them as to whether or not the
registration was valid and had already stopped the vehicle to investigate. While it
turns out that the registration was up to date, this does not diminish the legitimacy
of the traffic stop because at the time the stop was conducted Officer Stormes had
reasonable articulable suspicion to support the stop. Officer Stormes also testified
that the ultimate mistake was that dispatch had ran the wrong county of origin
number.

Officer Stormes was operating under a good faith belief that the

registration was not returning after he made every effort to verify the numbers.

III.

Even if the Defendant was not on Felony Probation, Officer
Stormes did not unlawfully detain the Defendant.

Law enforcement officers may pose questions, ask for identification, and
even request consent to search items provided they do not induce cooperation by
coercive means. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991).
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inquiry necessitates a consideration of \'all the circumstances surrounding the
encounter." Id., at 439.
In this Case -Officer Stormes-conducted his traffic ·stop and began writing two
(2) citations because of the Defendant's failure to purchase a driver's license and
his lack of insurance. While handing him the first citation the Defendant told Officer
Stormes that he was on probation. Officer Stormes then contacted a probation
officer to let them know that a probationer had just been stopped and cited, and
had previously been engaged in suspicious activity with a vehicle known by officers
to belong to a suspected drug dealer. The probation officer requested to speak to
the

Defendant and informed Officer Stormes she intended to search the

Defendant's car. Officer Stormes then told the Defendant that a probation officer
wanted to speak to him and that they were on their way to the location. At this
point the traffic stop was concluded since the Defendant had by that point received
both citations for the traffic violations, and the Defendant was no longer being
detained by Officer Stormes for the stop. He was however not free to leave, as he
had received a specific request from a probation and parole officer and was
required to follow those instructions per the terms of his probation. The detention
and search were valid and lawful.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this court deny
-····"···----------------

Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVIc;E
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy
of the foregoing CLOSING BRIEF was
(1)

~ hand delivered, or

(2) _ _ hand delivered via court basket, or
(3) _ _ sent via facsimile, or
(4) _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United
States Mail.
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Richard M. Cuddihy
Knowlton & Miles, PLLC
PO Drawer 717
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
DATED this

~

day of August, 2016.

J)A;~

u;dl[~/j;

~ND.LEAVI~
Senior Legal Assistant
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lDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
Standard Agr'ee.ment of Supervision
1. Supemsion_Levei: The defendant's level of supervision, il}_ch~_din~ ~eltied type.and electronic monitoring
. shall be determined by the Idaho Department of Correction {IDOC).
2. Laws and Conduct: The defendant shall obey all laws, municipal, county, state and federal. The defendant
shall comply with all lawful requests of the \DOC district manager, section supervisor, or probation and parole·
officer (PPO). The defendant e;hall be completely truthful at all times with the IDOC district manager, section
supervisor, or PPO. During any contact with law enforcement pen;onnel the defendar-it shall provide his identity,
notify the law enfoi"'?ement officer(s) that he is under supervision and provide thp ~Jlof his supervising PPO.
The defendant shall notify his supervising PPO of the contact within 24 hrs. C......--1 ·
·
3. Residence.: The defenqant shall not change residence without first obtaining permission from the lDOC disbict
manager, section supervisor, or PPO. 1 .,, Y
4. Reporting: The defendant snall report to his supervising PPO as directed. The1clefendant shall provlde truthful
and accurate information or docurnenta.tion whenever requested by the IDDC. L. i~
.
5, T~v:I: The de~endant s~~II not leave!:~ of Idaho or the assigned districl without first obtaining
permIss1on f.rom his supervising PPO.
6. Extradition: lf the defendant does leave the stale of Idaho, with or without permission, the defendant does .
hereby w~iv.e.,ex:tradition to the state of Idaho and will not contest any effort to return the defendant to the state of
Idaho.
1/
.
7. Empfoyment or Alternative Plan: The defendant shall seek and maintain gainful, verifiable, full-time
employment The defendant shall not accept, cause to )?e terminated from, or change employment without first
obtaining written permission from his supervising PPO. In lleu of full-time employment, the defendant may
participate \n full-time education, a combination of employment and education, vocational program or otljer,.altemative plan based on the defendant's specific situation and as approved by his supervising PPO. l,.. J8. Al~ohol: The defendant shall not purchase, possess, or consume alcoholic beverages in any form and will not
enter any establishment where alcohol is a primary source of income. l.- '=:
9. Controlled Substances; The defendant shall not use or possess any illegal iirug. The defendant shaU not use
or possess any paraphernalia for the purpose of ingesting any illegal drug. The defendant shall not use or
poe;sess any controlled substances unless lawfully prescribed for him by a licensed physician or dMlisl The
defendant shall use medications only in the manner prescribed by his physician or dentisl
L,
1O. Firearms· or Weapons: Toe defendant shall not purchase, carry,• possess or have control of any firearms,
chemical weapons, electronic weapons, explosives or other dangerous weapons. Other dangerous weapons may
include, but are not limited to, \Q"lives with blades over two and one half inches (2 ½") in length; switch-blade
_.Ji:iives; bra.ss knuckles; swords; throwing stars; and other martial arts weapons. Any weapons or firearms seized
will be forfeited to IDOC for disposal. The defendant shall not reside in any location that contains firearm)! upless
the fir9?rtns are secured and this portion of the rule is exempted in writing by the district manager.
(.....,-,-11. Search: The defendant shall consent to the search of his person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and
other real property or structures owned or leased by the defendant or for which the defendant is the controlling
authority. The search will be conducte~ by the IDOC district manag7r, section su~ervisor, or PPO ozr.)a~
enforcement officer. The defenda_nt waives his Fourth Amendment- nghts concerning searches.
_ ..-:
12.- Cost of Supervision: The defendant shaii·comply with Idaho Code, Section 20-225, which authorlzes the
IDOC to collect a co1t of.supervision tee. The defendant shall.make payments as prescribed in his monthly cost of
supervision bill.• - L,. (--: 13. Associations: The defendant shall not associate with any person(s) designated by the IDOC district
---ma~E!ger,section supe~r,-Gr-P:P-0-==t,.
14. Substance Abuse Testing: The defendant shall submit to any test for alcohol or controlled e;ubstances as·-- ~--- · ·
requested ancf directed by the IDO~ district manager, section supervjs~r, or PPO or Jaw enforcement officer. The
defendant may be requirec:j to obtain t~ts at his own expense. If the results of_ the test inqicg,ie-an adulterant has
been used to interfere with the results, that test will be deemed to have been positive. __.,L=-·t-__
·
15. Evaluation and Program Plan: The defendant shall obtain any treatment evaluation deemed necessary and
as ordered by the court c;ir 1009 disbict manager, section supervisor, or PPO. The defendant shall meaningfully
participate in and successfully complete any treatmen~ counseling or other programs deemed beneficial and as
directed by the court or IDOC district manager, section supervisor, or PPO. ;t:Ae defendant may be required lo
attend treatmen~ counseling or-other programs at his own expense,
(.;...t.

k-C: ·

--- -. -- -- - --
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16. Cooperation with Supervision: When home, the defendant shall answer the door for the PPO. The
---- -defetidanrsliall:allow the PPO to· enter his residence,-other real property, place .of employment and vehicle for the __
purpose of visitation, inspections and other supervision functions. The defendant shall not possess, install or use.
any monitoring instrumen~ camera, or other surveillance device to observe or alert them to the PPO's visit The
defendant shall not keep any vicious or dangerous dog or other animal on~ Ip.his property that the PPO
perceives as an impetliment to accessing the defendant or his property. __.,i.,,,""-'\-_
17, Absconding Supervtsion: The defendant Will not leave or attempt to leave the state of Idaho or the assigned
district in an effort tci abscond or flee supervision. The defendant will make himself available for supervi:~~an
program participation as instructed by his supervising PPO and will not actively avoid supervision.
Ld.'t
1B. Court Ordered Flnari"c::iaf Obligations: The defendant shall pay all costs, fees, tines and restitution in the
amount and manner ordered by the court The defendant shall make payments as ordered by the court or.as
designated in a payment agreement and promissory not!io-;be completed with the !DOC district manager, section
supervisor, or PPO and signed by the defendant
~ ¼-'
•
19. Confidential fnfomrant The defendant shall not act as a oonfide,ntial informant for law enforcemen~e~t
as allowed. per IDOC standard operating procedure (SOP) 701 .04.02.019, Informants: Confidenttal. _..,.k'.
........t=___
__
20. Intrastate. or Interstate Violations: If allowed to transfer supervision to another district or state, the
defendant agrees to accept any violation allegation documents purportedly submitted by the agency or officer
supervisipg the defendant in the receiving district or state as admissible into eviqery;e as credible and reliable.
The defendant waives any right to confront the author of such documents. _ __..&_"'-",-21. Additional Rules: The defendant agrees that other supervision rules may be imposed depending on the
district or specific district office that provides his supeNision. At all times, these additional rules•Will be impC!sed
only after considering the successful supervision of the defendant and the secure operation of the district or
sp~cific district office. All additional rules will "e exp!ained/o tt:i,e.defendant and provided to him, in writing, by the
!DOC district manager, section supervisor, o PPO. _ _,__,cc-✓-----\--_ __
\ have read, or have had read to me, the ab e agreement I understand and accept these conditions of
supervision. I a e abide by anti ca
thei;n and understand that my failure to do so may
in the

•

,uOmission

a

rat

rlt<;

o

ofv!olalion

i sen nclng auttiority.

_ ~ [

Date;

~

--------·········-·
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C. L. "BUTCH" OTTER
GOVERNOR

KEvlNKEMPF

DIR.ECTOR

District Two Additional Rules
1.

2.

3.

I will ~~t go into any g ~ · establishment without first obtaining permission from my
supeIVIsrng officer.---r--I will not associate 'With any person who is engaged in illegal activities, is on probation or parole,
or who has been convicted of a felony crime; without prior authorization of my supervising
officer.
· 1understand my curfew is from 10pm-6am, where I must be at my residence during these times,
with. some exceptions that have already been explained to me. My supervising officer can_..Jaise .
or lower my curfew, based upon my actions, at my supervising officer's discretion.
I understand that if! owe.my PSI fee, and/or if my Cost of Supervision reaches $120, my curfew
automatically reduces to 8pm-6am (with exceptions th.at have already been explained to me.)
My curfew does not revert to its prior time until my Cost of Supervision and/or PSI fee are paid
in~.
I will not accwt any loan without first obtaining the permission ofmy supervising
officfil.---'L,;~1----__
I will ensure all persons in my presence have valid photo identification at all times. --=-....
L-I will obey all rules of any city or county jail in which I am incarcerated. L~
I will not visit any perso: :!,u any jail or prison without first obtaining written permission from my
supervising officer.
l--l::
I will fill any prescriptions I receive in the State ofldaho only.
\-

l J;:

lt--:

4.

l~

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

-·

LF-

L,.,,-

I have read, or have had read to me, the above agreement I unaerstand and accept these additional
rules of supervision, I agree to abide by and conform to them and understand that my failure to do
so may result in the bmission of a report of violation to my sentencing authority.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR.,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CR 2016-1591
OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

1bis matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The
State ofldaho was represented by Justin Coleman, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez
Perce County. The Defendant was represented by Mackenzie Welch, of the firm
Knowlton & Miles. Evidence was presented to the Court on August 4, 2016. The Court
allowed the parties additional time to submit briefing. The Court, being fully advised in
the matter, hereby renders its decision.
-----·--·····--····---·--····-··-······--------
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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On February 28, 2016, Officer Nick Eylar of the Lewiston Police Department was
on patrol when he saw a red/maroon GMCYukon thathe recognized from previous
narcotic activity. Officer Eylar observed the Yukon enter the parking lot of A&B Foods,
and then when the vehicle left the parking lot there was a white Grand Prix following it
out of the parking lot. Officer Eylar testified that in his experience drug activity was
common at the A&B Foods parking lot.
Officer Eylar followed the vehicles as they traveled south on 8th Street and then
west on Southway, until the vehicles both entered into the Zip Trip gas station. The
Yukon parked in a parking stop at the gas station and the Grand Prix parked at the gas
pumps. Officer Eylar also parked in a parking spot and he was met there by Officer
Stormes. The officers discussed the vehicles and then Officer Stormes left the gas station
parking lot. Shortly thereafter, the white Grand Prix left the parking lot and Officer Eylar
contacted Officer Stormes by radio to inform him. Officer Eylar stayed and continued to
observe the Yukon.
Officer Stormes testified that after he was informed the white Grand Prix left the
gas station, he observed the car driving north on Snake River A venue. Officer Stormes
estimated he was about 100 yards, or 10 car lengths, away from the white Grand Prix
when he contacted dispatch to check the license number of the car to see if the

a

registraifon was current. Offfcer Sforiiies-first reported to dispatch licerise-iiiinilier
"Ida" 18028, which dispatch returned as record not found. Officer Stormes then asked
dispatch to run the same plate number, but change the last number to the letter "B". This
number also returned as record not found.
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Officer Stormes caught up with the white Grand Prix and the intersection of
Snake River Avenue and the Prospect Grade. He decided to initiate a traffic stop in order

- --- -to "investigate thewliether the-car registration was up to date.

Officer Stotriles informed

dispatch he was making the stop and he repeated the plate number for a third time, this
time stating «Nora" 18028. Dispatch did not respond on this plate number before
Stormes initiated the traffic stop. Later in the day, well after the stop was completed,
Stormes found out that dispatch did get a return on the third plate number, which was the
correct plate number.
Officer Stormes contacted the driver of the white Grand Prix, who identified
himself as Larry Fenton, Jr. Fenton provided Officer Stormes with the registration
information for the car and Officer Stormes was able to verify that the vehicle was
currently registered, thus, the registration concerns were taken care of. Officer Stormes
also found out that Fenton did not have a current driver's license or proof of insurance, so
Officer Stormes decided to write citations for these two violations.
Officer Stormes retumed to the vehicle to issue the citations to the driver. He
handed the first citation to Fenton, and at that time, Fenton informed him that he was on
probation. Stormes asked Fenton the name of the probation officer, and when Stormes
heard the name, he was able to discem that Fenton was on felony probation. Based on
this information, Officer Stormes did not issue the second citation, but instead returned to
-- hls patrol car and contacted the prooaiioiioffice~---Officei Stormes explaineato the
probation officer that he had stopped Fenton for a traffic infraction and also relayed to the
probation officer the observations Officer Eylar had made of the two vehicles at A&B
Foods and the Zip Trip gas station.
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The probation officer stated to Officer Stormes that she would come to the stop
and search the vehicle based upon the information Stormes had provided. Officer

Fenton that the probation officer was coming to the stop and that she wanted him to stand
by. Tr. at 24. Officer Stormes turned the overhead lights off on his patrol vehicle and
stayed near Fenton's vehicle with his partner until the probation officer arrived on scene
approximately ten minutes later. Officer Stormes testified that he did not inform Fenton
that he was free to leave; however, Stormes believed Fenton was free to leave because if
Fenton chose to leave there wasn't anything Stormes could have done to stop him
because the traffic stop was concluded Tr. at 24.
When the probation officer arrived she asked Fenton to step out of the vehicle and
he was handcuffed for officer safety reasons. Officer Stormes assisted the probation
officer with the search of the vehicle. During the search methamphetamine was located

in the vehicle.
ANALYSIS
The Defendant asserts he was illegally stopped, searched, and seized because the
facts available to Officer Stormes at the time he detained him did not give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable search and seizure. U.S.
CONST: amend. I\( Evidence obtained in violation of tliis amendment generally may not
be used as evidence against the victim of an illegal government action. State v. Page,
140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454,459 (2004); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471,485, 83 S.Ct. 407,416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441,453 (1963). "When a defendant moves
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to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the government carries the burden of proving that the search or seizure in
-- -question wasreasonable.';

Siaiev.

Bishop, 146-Idaho--804~ 811, 203P3dl203,----

1210 (2009); citing State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484,486, 95 P.3d 635, 637 (2004).
Brief investigatory detentions must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889,904 (1968).

The issue in this case is whether Officer Stormes bad reasonable, articulable
suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle based upon information he received from
dispatch after he provided the incorrect license number to be checked. The State
contends that Officer Stormes had reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation
had occurred or that he needed to investigate further regarding the potential registration
violation. Specifically, the State contends that at the time the stop was conducted, the
officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to support the stop.
The Defendant relies on State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,294 P.3d 1121 (2013) to
assert that there was not reasonable suspicion in this case. In Morgan, the officer stopped
a vehicle driving without a front license plate, which would be illegal if the vehicle was
registered in Idaho pursuant to LC. § 49-428. Id. at 111,294 P.3d at 1123. This
requirement does not extend to vehicles registered in other states, which was recognized
by the officer during cross-examination. Id. at 112, 294 P.3d at 1124. The officer had
also testified that it appeared the driver was either very lost or trying to -avoia]iim. Tne-Court found these observations were not sufficient to create reasonable, articulable
suspicion.
The police officer's suspicion of Morgan was based primarily on a series
of four left-hand turns that Morgan made. Although the officer stated that
OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
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he believed Morgan may have been trying to avoid him, the officer
provided no factual justification for that belief. Absent other
circumstances, driving around the block on a Friday night does not rise to
the level of specific, articulable facts that justify an investigatory stop.
---..

-

.. ·- ··-

--·--··

-.

··-.

··-··

. ---·

Id.
The case at hand is similar to Morgan where the police officer believed there was
a violation, but then learned later that there was not. In the case at hand, the officer
checked the vehicle registration information and confirmed the car was lawfully
registered. The State contends that a police officer's reasonable, good-faith mistake does
not violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct.
530, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014).
As the text indicates and we have repeatedly affirmed, "the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness.' "Riley v.
California, 573 U.S.-,--, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L.Ed.2d 430
(2014) (some internal quotation marks omitted). To be reasonable is not to
be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the
part of government officials, giving them "fair leeway for enforcing the
law in the community's protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). We have recognized that
searches and seizures based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable. The
warrantless search of a home, for instance, is reasonable if undertaken
with the consent of a resident, and remains lawful when officers obtain the
consent of someone who reasonably appears to be but is not in fact a
resident. See fl lino is v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-186, 110 S. Ct.
2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). By the same token, if officers with
probable cause to arrest a suspect mistakenly arrest an individual matching
the suspect' s description, neither the seizure nor an accompanying search
of the arrestee would be unlawful. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797,
802-805, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971). The limit is that "the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men." Brinegar, supra, at 176, 69
---- -S.CC1302.---------------- ---- ----- ------- - --- ------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------Id. at 536.
In the case at hand, this Court must decide whether the mistake of fact made by

the officer or dispatch in the transmission of the license plate number was objectively
reasonable, and thus, whether the mistake of fact will operate to forgive or validate the
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Fourth Amendment violation. Mistake of fact and mistake of law were discussed in State
v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300,303,246 P.3d 673,676 (Ct. App. 2010).
The parties, in essenc-e, disagree whetlier the officer's misialce heie\vas
one of fact or law, and the line between the two is not always easy to
draw. For instance, in McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 124-25, 982 P.2d at 95960, an officer stopped a vehicle for speeding but was mistaken concerning
the location of a sign where the speed limit decreased from 3 5 mph to 25
mph. The state asserted that the mistake was one of fact (the sign's
location) and we cited United States Supreme Court precedent to the effect
that a mistake of fact will sometimes operate to forgive or validate a
Fourth Amendment violation. However, we did not blindly accept the
state's characterization of the officer's mistake as one of fact as the
applicable speed limit is certainly a question oflaw. We noted a split of
authority from other jurisdictions as to whether a mistake of law can ever
be held to be reasonable and further noted that the issue in Idaho was
undecided. See, e.g., United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 737-41 (9th
Cir.2001) (officer's mistake of law, although reasonable, cannot form basis
for reasonable suspicion to initiate traffic stop); United States v. Twilley,
222 F.3d 1092, 1096 n. 1 (9th Cir.2000) (officer's correct understanding of
the law, together with a good-faith error regarding the facts, can establish
reasonable suspicion) (also citing McCarthy, supra); compare People v.
Glick, 203 Cal.App.3d 796,250 Cal.Rptr. 315,318 (1988) (mistake of fact
and law treated the same) with People v. White, 107 Cal.App.4th 636, 132
Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376-77 (2003) (distinguishing and disagreeing with
Glick rationale). See also State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646,649 n. 1, 167
P.3d 783, 786 n. 1 (Ct.App.2006); State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595,599
n. 3, 38 P.3d 633,637 n. 3 (Ct.App.2001). Ultimately, in McCarthy we
held that the two types of mistakes were "inextricably connected/' but
found it unnecessary to decide whether a mistake of law is unreasonable
per se because, were that the correct characterization of the mistake, we
concluded that the officer's mistake was not objectively reasonable.
McCarthy, 133 Idal10 at 125, 982 P .2d at 960.

Id. at 303,246 P.3d at 676.
--···-·--····-·-·-··-·----

In this matter, Officer Stormes candidly testified that he was a significant distance
-- -------····-··--··--···-··--···-----·-·-·--- ----

- - - - -~----------- ---- ------ ------·-~~~------- -----

from the car when he first read the license plate number to dispatch. It is clear he was not
certain regarding the numbers he read off in his second communication with dispatch,
where he suggested the last number may be the letter "B" rather than the number "8".
Officer Stormes provided dispatch with a license number three times based upon the
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uncertainty of the plate number. Therefore, based upon the facts of this case, this Court
cannot find the officer's mistake was objectively reasonable, and thus, created a
reasonable, articulable basis for the traffic stop.
A similar issue was addressed in the State of Washington, in State v. Creed, 170
Wash. App. 534, 319 P.3d 80 (2014). In this case, an officer ran the defendant's license
plate number as part of a routine check during his nighttime patrol. The officer
erroneously entered the number as "154 YMK" instead of the actual number-"154
YDK". The incorrect number returned that the car was stolen and the officer initiated a
traffic stop on this basis. Id. at 537-538, 319 P.3d at 81.
Extending Snapp on the facts presented here would elevate the
innocence or culpability of an officer over the real concern of article I,
section 7: the right of citizens to be protected from unwarranted invasions
and intrusions. As our Supreme Court explained in Day, "[w]e suppress
[unlawfully seized] evidence not to punish the police, who may easily have
erred innocently. We suppress unlawfully seized evidence because we do
not want to become knowingly complicit in an unconstitutional exercise of
power. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85, 48
S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)." 161 Wash.2d at
894, 168 P.3d 1265 (emphasis added).
This means that while police may sometimes reasonably rely on
incorrect information provided by third parties, they may not reasonably
rely on their own mistaken assessment of material facts. See, e.g., State v.
Mance, 82 Wash.App. 539,918 P.2d 527 (1996) (holding that police may
not rely upon information that is incorrect or incomplete through their
fault); State v. O'Cain, 108 Wash.App. 542, 31 P.3d 733 (2001) (holding
that a police dispatch indicating vehicle driven by defendant had been
reported stolen did not provide reasonable suspicion for investigatory
stop); State v. Sandholm, 96 Wash.App. 846,848,980 P.2d 1292 (1999)
-------a------------------- ___________(notingj:hat "exclusive reliance on the WACIC stolen vehicle report would
not have provid~d sufficient basis"rorthe-State to establish probable cause - to arrest"); cf State v. Gaddy, 152 Wash.2d 64, 71, 74, 93 P.3d 872 (2004)
(distinguishing officers' right to rely on erroneous license information
from Department of Licensing, which is not a police agency and whose
information is presumptively reliable, from information subject to the
"fellow officer rule").

Id. at 542-43, 319 P.3dat 83-84.
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While this Court is not bound by the determination in Creed, it is instructive in
the case at hand. In this case, Officer Stormes testified he provided the incorrect license
number to dispatch. Officer Stormes distance

from-the Defendant's vehfole-riiayba.ve

been a factor in this error. It is clear in this case, that other than the error regarding the
license plate number, the Defendant was driving in a lawful manner. The officer did not
observe any other traffic infractions. Further, Officer Eylar' s observations of the vehicle
at the grocery store and gas station 1 a.lso did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion to
conduct a traffic stop. In this case, the only claim of reasonable articulate suspicion is
based upon the officer's incorrect recitation of the license plate number. This, without
more, is not a sufficient basis for the traffic stop. Therefore, the Defendant's motion to
suppress is granted.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the defendant's motion to suppress is granted.

ORDER
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED

this

I7

~a;

of August 2016.

did recognize the GMC Yukon as a vehicle owned by someone who had been involved in
other narcotic investigations. However, the fact that this vehicle and the Defendant's vehicle were seen, in
the middle of the day, at a local grocery store and a gas station was not sufficient evidence to give rise to a
traffic stop, or Officer Eylar would have presumably stopped the vehicles at the gas station. These facts are
similar to those of the driver going around the block in State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,294 P.3d 1121
(2013).
10fticer Eylar

OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

9

109

I:"- --··•-•~_:'·••-----•·..:.:·• •::.;-.·~••••·• ·,~_~.-:

·c••_;

J·.-·,.• y· · · ··.•.-.· .. ;-.·-·,.-_..-_• ·":.•.·-•--.•.•--•

:I.-.~-·~-• -

~

-~ .c-.- c· .. -.·- ._.-.·•-;=>-···

_

'!-"···

-~· • -

-

-• .- ..

• • ·--• _ ·.- _..

_

•~--~...._..._ __ .__,_ ___________ ... --•-.;.--=

_ .___·-·-----·•-·-··------•

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS as:

-- --

--- --:ii(,, -

---

~ delivered via court basket, or

_ _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
day of August, 2016, to:
Rick Cuddihy
Mackenzie Welch
P O Drawer 717
Lewiston ID 83501
Justin Coleman
Deputy Prosecutor
P OBox 1267
Lewiston ID 83501
PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK

B
Deputy

OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

10

110

Ser~nd Judicial District Court, State of lrl"'l.io
11::and For the County of Nez Perce
1230 Main St.

tp'rtnrr,o

83501

lOl&i t\US l 7 Pf'» 1>) ~1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.

e.

J
J._: R;- ~;,-0~~,Q_C~o:
_ PATTY

Larry Glenn Fenton Jr,

i1-::':!..:_:

,, :- : ,, ..·
. . "

.

}
)

CR-2016-0001591

NOTICE OF HEARING

)

Defendant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Status Conference
Judge:

Thursday, August 18, 2016
Jay P. Gaskill DJ

01 :30 PM

at the Nez Perce County Courthouse in Lewiston, Idaho.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday,
August 17, 2016.
Defendant:

Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
802 9th Ave Apt 4
Lewiston, ID 83501

Q+,et{(..J_

--

Mailed
Private Counsel:

Prosecutor:

Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
P.O. Drawer 717
Lewiston, ID 83501
Mailed- -

,

f'l)t___/ eu. /

e~,·e1~_x_

Justin J. Coleman
Mailed

--

NOTICE OF HEARING

Hand-Betivered_x_

,

~red_x_
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2016-0001591
State ofldaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 8/18/2016
Time: 1:46 pm
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Courtroom: 1
Court reporter: Linda Carlton
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 1
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman
14625

Defendant present, in custody, with counsel.

14644
Mr. Coleman addresses the Court and requests continuance to determine the
next step and potential appeal.
Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court. Bond is set at $50,000.00 and the Court
14709
recently granted Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
14942
Court will continue 1 week until 8-25-16 at 1:30 p.m. Court would like to
review the files re: bond and will let Mr. Cuddihy know this afternoon.
15006

Court recess.

-----------------

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----------------.-----------

Court Minutes
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2016-0001591
State ofldaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 8/25/2016
Time: 1:40 pm
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Courtroom: 3
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 3
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: April Smith
14012

Defendant present, in custody, with counsel.

Ms. Smith addresses the Court and may file motion to reconsider and just
14042
received the transcript of the motion hearing.
14102

Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court.

14216
hearing.

Ms. Smith requests the probation violation CR13-7217 be set for pv merit

14302

Court sets CR13-7217 for pv merit hearing 9-1-16 at 2:30 p.m.

14330
week.

Court orders Defendant remain in custody at this time and can up again next

14346

Court recess.
- - - - - - - - •s---••--••---••----------
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lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND illDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
LARRY G. FENTON, JR.,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CR16-01591

ORDER FOR FURLOUGH

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant shall be released on a TWENTY-FOUR
(24) hour furlough for the birth of his child. Ashley Martin Felton is to call the jail once she goes in

to labor and Defendant shall be released on his furlough.

tJ.

.

Dated this ~ day of September, 2j)=l=6·'---~

-

ORDER FOR FURLOUGH

------------------------------

1

114

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR FURLOUGH was:

_ _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
September, 2016, to:

~~ftJ: Pr-oJtwHJy-/ tf,,. 'lk. ~')y
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk
~1t..!4l h:J .' /J ;J{

ORDER FOR FURLOUGH

2 nJ.... day of

J11:A \ /

2
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DANIEL L. SPICKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
JUSTINJ.COLEMAN
-- ------·senior Deputy Prnsecutor
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
I.S.B.N. 8023

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR2016-0001591

Plaintiff,
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
vs.

LARRY G. FENTON,

Defendant.

JUSTIN J. COLEMAN, Senior Deputy Prosecutor, for Nez Perce County, State of Idaho,
comes before the Court and moves this Court to reconsider the Opinion and Order filed on
August 17, 2016, suppressing the evidence in this case.
This Motion is being made based upon Defendant's diminished expectation of privacy as
a result of his active parole/probation status and the attenuation doctrine as recently articulated in

Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. _

(June 2016)(attached as Exhibit A, for the Court's convenience).
---

---···--·-·-···--·····-··-·---

-···--·-···--·········--····-·····--··--·····----

The State submits that the Defendant did not have a Fourth Amendment right that was intruded
upon by the officer and asks the Court to reconsider its decision.
The attenuation doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule and allows for the
admission of evidence even in the face of an impermissible stop. In Strief/, a vehicle stop was

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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determined to be illegal. The officer who stopped the car subsequently learned that there was an
arrest warrant for the driver of the vehicle. The officer arrested the individual and searched him,
finding ·controlled substance. The Supreme Court applied the attenuation-doctrine. In applying -three factors the Court found the evidence to be admissible.

First, the Court looked at the

sequential closeness between the unconstitutional act and the discovery of the evidence. Second,
the Court determined if there were "intervening circumstances" that existed. And Third, the
Court considered the "purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct" The Supreme Court
found that evidence obtained after the stop admissible as the pre-exiting arrest warrant was a
sufficient attenuation between finding the evidence and the illegal stop.
Particularly important to note, if the Court were to continue to impose "a reasonable
suspicion requirement" on the ability to search a probationer, as it seems to be doing, it "would
give parolees greater opportunity to anticipate searches and conceal criminality." Samson v.

California, 541 U.S. 843,854 (2006).
As was submitted and established previously in this case, on April 24, 2014, the
Defendant was found guilty of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH
INTENT TO DELIVER, a felony, committed on or about September 23, 2013, and was
sentenced to the custody of the IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION in Case No.
CR2013-07217.

On March 16, 2015, the Court suspended the remainder of Defendant's

sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for five (5) years beginning April 24, 2014. The
-----·-····

..

···-----

Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation was signed ancnnitialed bytnef>efendant-o-n- ---April 20, 2015. The Defendant also signed and initialed the Idaho Department of Correction
Standard Agreement of Supervision on April 20, 2015. The Defendant's probation agreement is
attached again, as previously stipulated to by the parties and marked as Exhibit B.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

2
117

F ·.•,•. ,·,,.·._:- ..·.-.-·,·.•.·.-c,<•,cc•·-.:··-.·~ •'.• .

Given the defendant's active parole/probation status as determined by Officer Stormes
and confinned by Probation Officer Jensen, a search of the defendant's vehicle is justified
without reasonable suspicion. ·--Officer.Stormes· dfd riot· 1earn of the Defendant's felony probation
status until after the initial stop and investigation for traffic infractions. Officer Stormes testified
that he did not learn that the Defendant was on felony probation until after he had completed the
traffic infractions and was giving the citations to the Defendant. This is clearly an intervening
circumstance after the officer had stopped the vehicle. Additionally, the officer's conduct was
by no means involved "flagrant" police misconduct. The attenuation doctrine should apply and
the subsequent search found to be constitutionally permissible.

Based on the foregoing analysis the State respectfully requests the Court reconsider its
decision to suppress the evidence.
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2016

JUSTINJ.COLEMAN
Senior Deputy Prosecutor
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was
(1)

(2)

_

h~ delivered, or

_v{_an
andd delivered via court basket, or

(3) _ _ sent via facsimile, or

(4) _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail.
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING:
Richard Cuddihy
Knowlton & Miles
PO Drawer 717
Lewiston, ID 83501
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2016.

ERIN D. LEAVITT
Senior Legal Assistant
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Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time t.he opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

UTAH v. STRIEFF
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
No. 14-1373. Argued February 22, 2016---Decided June 20, 2016
Narcotics detective Douglas Fackrell conducted surveillance on a South
Salt Lake City residence based on an anonymous tip about drug activity. The number of people he observed making brief visits to the
house over the course of a week made him suspicious that the occupants were dealing drugs. After observing respondent Edward Strieff
leave the residence, Officer Fackrell detained Strieff at a nearby
parking lot, identifying himself and asking Strieffwhat he was doing
at the house. He then requested Striefl's identification and relayed
the information to a police dispatcher, who informed him that Strieff
had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Officer
Fackrell arrested Strieff, searched him, and found methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was derived from an unlawful investigatory stop. The
trial court denied the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, however, and ordered the
evidence suppressed.
Held: The evidence Officer Fackrell seized incident to Striefl's arrest is
admissible based on an application of the attenuation factors from
Brown v. fllinois, 422 U. S. 590. In this case, there was no flagrant
police misconduct. Therefore, Officer Fackrell's discovery of a valid,
pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated the connection
between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence
seized incident to a lawful arrest. Pp. 4-10.
(a) As the primary judicial remedy for deterring Fourth Amendment violations, the exclusionary rule encompasses both the "primary
evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure"
and, relevant here, "evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804.
But to ensure that those deterrence benefits are not outweighed by
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UTAH v. STRIEFF
Syllabus
the rule's substantial social costs, there are several exceptions to the
rule. One exception is the attenuation doctrine, which provides for
admissibility when the connection between unconstitutional police
conduct and the evidence is sufficiently remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547
U. S. 586, 593. Pp. 4-5.
(b) As a threshold matter, the attenuation doctrine is not limited to
the defendant's independent acts. The doctrine therefore applies
here, where the intervening circumstance is the discovery of a valid,
pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant. Assuming, without deciding, that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable suspicion to stop
Strieff initially, the discovery of that arrest warrant attenuated the
connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from
Strieffincident to his arrest. Pp. 5-10.
(1) Three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590,
lead to this conclusion. The first, ''temporal proximity" between the
initially unlawful stop and the search, id., at 603, favors suppressing
the evidence. Officer Fackrell discovered drug contraband on Strieff
only minutes after the illegal stop. In contrast, the second factor,
"the presence of intervening cil'Cumstances, id., at 603-604, strongly
favors the State. The existence of a valid warrant, predating the investigation and entirely unconnected with the stop, favors :finding
sufficient attenuation between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence. That warrant authorized Officer Fackrell to arrest
Strieff, and once the arrest was authorized, his search of Strieff incident to that arrest was undisputedly lawful The third factor, "the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct," id., at 604, also
strongly favors the State. Officer Fackrell was at most negligent, but
his errors in judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or flagrant violation of Strieffs Fourth Amendment rights. After the unlawful stop,
his conduct was lawful, and there is no indication that the stop was
part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct. Pp. 6-9.
(2) Strieffs counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, neither
Officer Fackrell's purpose nor the flagrancy of the violation rises to a
level of misconduct warranting suppression. Officer Fackrell's purpose was not to conduct a suspicionless .fishing expedition but was to
gather information about activity inside a house whose occupants
were legitimately suspected of dealing drugs. Stri.eff conflates the
standard for an illegal stop with the standard for flagrancy, which
requires more than the mere absence of proper cause. Second, it is
unlikely that the prevalence of outstanding warrants will lead to
dragnet searches by police. Such misconduct would expose police to
civil liability and, in any event, is already accounted for by Brown's
"purpose and flagrancy" factor. Pp. 9-10.
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2015 UT 2, 357 P. 3d 532, reversed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITo, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined as to Parts I,
II, and III. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J.,
joined.
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Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publice.tion in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United Ste.tes, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 14-1373

UTAH, PETITIONER v. EDWARD
JOSEPH STRIEFF, JR.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
[June 20, 2016]
JUSTICE THOMAS

delivered the opinion of the Court.
To enforce the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
"unreasonable searches and seizures," this Court has at
times required courts to exclude evidence obtained by
unconstitutional police conduct. But the Court has also
held that, even when there is a Fourth Amendment violation, this exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs
of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits. In some
cases, for example, the link between the unconstitutional
conduct and the discovery of the evidence is too attenuated
to justify suppression. The question in this case is whether
this attenuation doctrine applies when an officer makes
an unconstitutional investigatory stop; learns during that
stop that the suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant;
and proceeds to arrest the suspect and seize incriminating
evidence during a search incident to that arrest. We hold
that the evidence the officer seized as part of the search
incident to arrest is admissible because the officer's discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection
between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest.
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I
This case began with an anonymous tip. In December
2006, someone called the South Salt Lake City police's
drug-tip line to report "narcotics activity" at a particular
residence. App. 15. Narcotics detective Douglas Fackrell
investigated the tip. Over the course of about a week,
Officer Fackrell conducted intermittent surveillance of the
home. He observed visitors who left a few minutes after
arriving at the house. These visits were sufficiently frequent to raise his suspicion that the occupants were dealing drugs.
One of those visitors was respondent Edward Strieff.
Officer Fackrell observed Strieff exit the house and walk
toward a nearby convenience store. In the store's parking
lot, Officer Fackrell detained Strieff, identified himself,
and asked Strieff what he was doing at the residence.
As part of the stop, Officer Fackrell requested Strieff's
identification, and Strieff produced his Utah identification
card. Officer Fackrell relayed Strieff's information to a
police dispatcher, who reported that Strief£ had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Officer
Fackrell then arrested Strieff pursuant to that warrant.
When Officer Fackrell searched Strieff incident to the
arrest, he discovered a baggie of methamphetamine and
drug paraphernalia.
The State charged Strieff with unlawful possession of
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved
to suppress the evidence, arguing that the evidence was
inadmissible because it was derived from an unlawful
investigatory stop. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor conceded that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable
suspicion for the stop but argued that the evidence should
not be suppressed because the existence of a valid arrest
warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful
stop and the discovery of the contraband.
The trial court agreed with the State and admitted the
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evidence. The court found that the short time between the
illegal stop and the search weighed in favor of suppressing
the evidence, but that two countervailing considerations
made it admissible. First, the court considered the presence of a valid arrest warrant to be an '"extraordinary
intervening circumstance."' App. to Pet. for Cert. 102
(quoting United States v. Simpson, 439 F. 3d 490, 496
(CAS 2006). Second, the court stressed the absence of
flagrant misconduct by Officer Fackrell, who was conducting a legitimate investigation of a suspected drug house.
Strief£ conditionally pleaded guilty to reduced charges of
attempted possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, but reserved his right to
appeal the trial court's denial of the suppression motion.
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. 2012 UT App 245,
286 P. 3d 317.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed. 2015 UT 2, 357
P. 3d 532. It held that the evidence was inadmissible
because only "a voluntary act of a defendant's free will (as
in a confession or consent to search)" sufficiently breaks
the connection between an illegal search and the discovery
of evidence. Id., at 536. Because Officer Fackrell's discovery of a valid arrest warrant did not fit this description,
the court ordered the evidence suppressed. Ibid.
We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement about
how the attenuation doctrine applies where an unconstitutional detention leads to the discovery of a valid arrest
warrant. 576 U. S. _
(2015). Compare, e.g., United
States v. Green, 111 F. 3d 515, 522-523 (CA7 1997) (holding that discovery of the warrant is a dispositive intervening circumstance where police misconduct was not flagrant), with, e.g., State v. Moralez, 297 Kan. 397, 415, 300
P. 3d 1090, 1102 (2013) (assigning little significance to the
discovery of the warrant). We now reverse.
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II
A
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Because officers who violated the Fourth Amendment
were traditionally considered trespassers, individuals
subject to unconstitutional searches or seizures historically enforced their rights through tort suits or self-help.
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
Mich. L. Rev. 547, 625 (1999). In the 20th century, however, the exclusionary rule-the rule that often requires
trial courts to exclude unlawfully seized evidence in a
criminal trial-became the principal judicial remedy to
deter Fourth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961}.
Under the Court's precedents, the exclusionary rule
encompasses both the "primary evidence obtained as a
direct result of an illegal search or seizure" and, relevant
here, "evidence later discovered and found to be derivative
of an illegality," the so-called '"fruit of the poisonous
tree.'" Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796, 804 (1984).
But the significant costs of this rule have led us to deem it
"applicable only ... where its deterrence benefits outweigh
its substantial social costs." Hudson v. Michigan, 547
U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Suppression of evidence ... has always been our last
resort, not our first impulse." Ibid.
We have accordingly recognized several exceptions to
the rule. Three of these exceptions involve the causal
relationship between the unconstitutional act and the
discovery of evidence. First, the independent source doc•
trine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an
unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from
a separate, independent source. See Murray v. United
States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988). Second, the inevitable
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discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence
that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431,
443-444 (1984). Third, and at issue here, is the attenuation doctrine: Evidence is admissible when the connection
between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence
is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening
circumstance, so that "the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be
served by suppression of the evidence obtained." Hudson,
supra, at 593.
B
Turning to the application of the attenuation doctrine to
this case, we first address a threshold question: whether
this doctrine applies at all to a case like this, where the
intervening circumstance that the State relies on is the
discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest
warrant. The Utah Supreme Court declined to apply the
attenuation doctrine because it read our precedents as
applying the doctrine only "to circumstances involving an
independent act of a defendant's 'free will' in confessing to
a crime or consenting to a search." 357 P. 3d, at 544. In
this Court, Strieff has not defended this argument, and we
disagree with it, as well. The attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the government's unlawful
act and the discovery of evidence, which often has nothing
to do with a defendant's actions. And the logic of our prior
attenuation cases is not limited to independent acts by the
defendant.
It remains for us to address whether the discovery of a
valid arrest warrant was a sufficient intervening event to
break the causal chain between the unlawful stop and the
discovery of drug-related evidence on Strieff's person. The
three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975), guide our analysis. First, we look to the "temporal
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proximity" between the unconstitutional conduct and the
discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search. Id.,
at 603. Second, we consider "the presence of intervening
circumstances." Id., at 603-604. Third, and "particularly"
significant, we examine "the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct." Id., at 604. In evaluating these
factors, we assume without deciding (because the State
conceded the point) that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable
suspicion to initially stop Strief£. And, because we ultimately conclude that the warrant breaks the causal chain,
we also have no need to decide whether the warrant's
existence alone would make the initial stop constitutional
even if Officer Fackrell was unaware of its existence.

1
The first factor, temporal proximity between the initially unlawful stop and the search, favors suppressing the
evidence. Our precedents have declined to find that this
factor favors attenuation unless "substantial time'' elapses
between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003) (per
curiam). Here, however, Officer Fackrell discovered drug
contraband on Strieff 's person only minutes after the
illegal stop. See App. 18-19. As the Court explained in
Brown, such a short time interval counsels in favor of
suppression; there, we found that the confession should be
suppressed, relying in part on the ''less than two hours"
that separated the unconstitutional arrest and the confession. 422 U.S., at 604.
In contrast, the second factor, the presence of intervening circumstances, strongly favors the State. In Segura,
468 U.S. 796, the Court addressed similar facts to those
here and found sufficient intervening circumstances to
allow the admission of evidence. There, agents had probable cause to believe that apartment occupants were deal--
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ing cocaine. Id., at 799-800. They sought a warrant. In
the meantime, they entered the apartment, arrested an
occupant, and discovered evidence of drug activity during
a limited search for security reasons. Id., at 800-801. The
next evening, the Magistrate Judge issued the search
warrant. Ibid. This Court deemed the evidence admissible notwithstanding the illegal search because the information supporting the warrant was "wholly unconnected
with the [arguably illegal] entry and was: known to the
agents well before the initial entry." Id., at 814.
Segura, of course, applied the independent source doctrine because the unlawful entry "did not contribute in
any way to discovery of the evidence seized under the
warrant." Id., at 815. But the Segura Court suggested
that the existence of a valid warrant favors finding that
the connection between unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence is "sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the
taint." Ibid. That principle applies here.
In this case, the warrant was valid, it predated Officer
Fackrell's investigation, and it was entirely unconnected
with the stop. And once Officer Fackrell discovered the
warrant, he had an obligation to arrest Strief£. "A warrant is a judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a search
or make an arrest, and the officer has a sworn duty to
carry out its provisions." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 920, n. 21 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Officer Fackrell's arrest of Strieff thus was a ministerial
act that was independently compelled by the pre-existing
warrant. And once Officer Fackrell was authorized to
arrest Strief£, it was undisputedly lawful to search Strieff
as an incident of his arrest to protect Officer Fackrell's
safety. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009)
(explaining the permissible scope of searches incident to
arrest).
Finally, the third factor, "the purpose and flagrancy of
the official misconduct," Brown, supra, at 604, also strongly
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favors the State. The exclusionaxy rule exists to deter
police misconduct. Davis v. United States, 564 U. S. 229,
236-237 (2011). The third factor of the attenuation doctrine reflects that rationale by favoring exclusion only
when the police misconduct is most in need of deterrence-that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant.
Officer Fackrell was at most negligent. In stopping
Strieff, Officer Fackrell made two good-faith mistakes.
First, he had not observed what time Strief£ entered the
suspected drug h~use, so he did not know how long Strief£
had been there. Officer Fackrell thus lacked a sufficient
basis to conclude that Strief£ was a short-term visitor who
may have been consummating a drug transaction. Second,
because he lacked confirmation that Strief£ was a shortterm visitor, Officer Fackrell should have asked Strieff
whether he would speak with him, instead of demanding
that Strieff do so. Officer Fackrell's stated purpose was to
"find out what was going on [in] the house." App. 17.
Nothing prevented him from approaching Strieff simply to
ask. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (1991) ("[A]
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer
approaches an individual and asks a few questions"). But
these errors in judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or
flagrant violation of Strieff 's Fourth Amendment rights.
While Officer Fackrell's decision to initiate the stop was
mistaken, his conduct thereafter was lawful. The officer's
decision to run the warrant check was a "negligibly burdensome precautio[n]" for officer safety. Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U. S. _ , _ (2015) (slip op., at 7).
And Officer Fackrell's actual search of Strief£ was a lawful
search incident to arrest. See Gant, supra, at 339.
Moreover, there is no indication that this unlawful stop
was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.
To the contrary, all the evidence suggests that the stop
was an isolated instance of negligence that occurred in
connection with a bona fide investigation of a suspected
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drug house. Officer Fackrell saw Strieff leave a suspected
drug house. And his suspicion about the house was based
on an anonymous tip and his personal observations.
Applying these factors, we hold that the evidence discovered on Strieff 's person was admissible because the
unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the preexisting arrest warrant. Although the illegal stop was
close in time to Strieff's arrest, that consideration is outweighed by two factors supporting the State. The outstanding arrest warrant for Strieff 's arrest is a critical
intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of
the illegal stop. The discovery of that warrant broke the
causal chain between the unconstitutional stop and the
discovery of evidence by compelling Officer Fackrell to
arrest Strieff. And, it is especially significant that there is
no evidence that Officer Fackrell's illegal stop reflected
flagrantly unlawful police misconduct.
2

We find Strieff's counterarguments unpersuasive.
First, he argues that the attenuation doctrine should not
apply because the officer's stop was purposeful and flagrant. He asserts that Officer Fackrell stopped him solely
to fish for evidence of suspected wrongdoing. But Officer
Fackrell sought information from Strieff to find out what
was happening inside a house whose occupants were
legitimately suspected of dealing drugs. This was not a
suspicionless fishing expedition "in the hope that something would turn up." Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U. S. 687,
691 (1982).
Strieff argues, moreover, that Officer Fackrell's conduct
was flagrant because he detained Strieff without the
necessary level of cause (here, reasonable suspicion). But
that conflates the standard for an illegal stop with the
standard for flagrancy. For the violation to be flagrant,
more severe police misconduct is required than the mere
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absence of proper cause fm the seizure. See, e.g., Kaupp,
538 U.S., at 628, 633 (finding flagrant violation where a
warrantless arrest was made in the arrestee's home after
police were denied a warrant and at least some officers
knew they lacked probable cause). Neither the officer's
alleged purpose nor the flagrancy of the violation rise to a
level of misconduct to warrant suppression.
Second, Strieff argues that, because of the prevalence of
outstanding arrest warrants in many jurisdictions, police
will engage in dragnet searches if the exclusionary rule is
not applied. We think that this outcome is unlikely. Such
wanton conduct would expose police to civil liability. See
42 U.S. C. §1983; Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see also Segura, 468
U. S., at 812. And in any event, the Brown factors take
account of the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct.
Were evidence of a dragnet search presented here, the
application of the Brown factors could be different. But
there is no evidence that the concerns that Strieff raises
with the criminal justice system are present in South Salt
Lake City, Utah.

*

*

*

We hold that the evidence Officer Fackrell seized as part
of his search incident to arrest is admissible because his
discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection
between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from
Strief£' incident to arrest. The judgment of the Utah Supreme Court, accordingly, is reversed.
·
It is so ordered.
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JOSEPH STRIEFF, JR.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
[June 20, 2016}

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG
joins as to Parts I, II, and III, dissenting.
The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant
for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer's
violation of your Fourth Amendment rights. Do not be
soothed by the opinion's technical language: This case
allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your
identification, and check it for outstanding traffic warrants-even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the officer
discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will
now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence
anything he happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the warrant. Because the Fourth Amendment
should prohibit, not permit, such misconduct, I dissent.

I
Minutes after Edward Strieff walked out of a South Salt
Lake City home, an officer stopped him, questioned him,
and took his identification to run it through a police database. The officer did not suspect that Strieff had done
anything wrong. Strieff just happened to be the first
person to leave a house that the officer thought might
contain "drug activity." App. 16-19.
As the State of Utah concedes, this stop was illegal.
App. 24. The Fourth Amendment protects people from
"unreasonable searches and seizures." An officer breaches
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that protection when he detains a pedestrian to check his
license without any evidence that the person is engaged in
a crime. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968). The officer deepens
the breach when he prolongs the detention just to fish
further for evidence of wrongdoing. Rodriguez v. United
States, 575 U.S._,_-_ (2015) (slip op., at 6-7). In
his search for lawbreaking, the officer in this case himself
broke the law.
The officer learned that Strieff had a "small traffic
warrant." App. 19. Pursuant to that warrant, he arrested
Strieff and, conducting a search incident to the arrest,
discovered methamphetamine in Strieff 's pockets.
Utah charged Strieff with illegal drug possession. Before trial, Strieff argued that admitting the drugs into
evidence would condone the officer's misbehavior. The
methamphetamine, he reasoned, was the product of the
officer's illegal stop. Admitting it would tell officers that
unlawfully discovering even a "small traffic warrant"
would give them license to search for evidence of unrelated
offenses. The Utah Supreme Court unanimously agreed
with Strief£. A majority of this Court now reverses.

II
It is tempting in a case like this, where illegal conduct
by an officer uncovers illegal conduct . by a civilian, to
forgive the officer. After all, his instincts, although unconstitutional, were correct. But a basic principle lies at the
heart of the Fourth Amendment: Two wrongs don't make a
right. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392
(1914). When "lawless police conduct" uncovers evidence
of lawless civilian conduct, this Court has long required
later criminal trials to exclude the illegally obtained evidence. Terry, 392 U. S., at 12; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S.
643, 655 (1961). For example, if an officer breaks into a
home and finds a forged check lying around, that check
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may not be used to prosecute the homeowner for bank
fraud. We would describe the check as "'fruit of the poisonous tree."' Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
488 (1963). Fruit that must be cast aside includes not
only evidence directly found by an illegal search but also
evidence "come at by exploitation of that illegality." Ibid.
This "exclusionary rule" removes an incentive for officers to search us without proper justification. Terry, 392
U.S., at 12. It also keeps courts from being "made party
to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens
by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits
of such invasions." Id., at 13. When courts admit only
lawfully obtained evidence, they encourage "those who
formulate law enforcement polices, and the officers who
implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals
into their value system." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
492 (1976). But when courts admit illegally obtained
evidence as well, they reward "manifest neglect if not an
open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution."
Weeks, 232 U. S., at 394.
Applying the exclusionary rule, the Utah Supreme
Court correctly decided that Strieff's drugs must be excluded because the officer exploited his illegal stop to
discover them. The officer found the drugs only after
learning of Strieff's traffic violation; and he learned of
Strieff 's traffic violation only because he unlawfully
stopped Strieff to check his driver's license.
The court also correctly rejected the State's argument
that the officer's discovery of a traffic warrant unspoiled
the poisonous fruit. The State analogizes finding the
warrant to one of our earlier decisions, Wong Sun v. United
States. There, an officer illegally arrested a person
who, days later, voluntarily returned to the station to
confess to committing a crime. 371 U.S., at 491. Even
though the person would not have confessed ''but for the
illegal actions of the police," id., at 488, we noted that the
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police did not exploit their illegal arrest to obtain the
confession, id., at 491. Because the confession was obtained by "means sufficiently distinguishable" from the
constitutional violation, we held that it could be admitted
into evidence. Id., at 488, 491. The State contends that
the search incident to the warrant-arrest here is similarly
distinguishable from the illegal stop.
But Wong Sun explains why Strieff 's drugs must be
excluded. We reasoned that a Fourth Amendment violation may not color every investigation that follows put it
certainly stains the actions of officers who exploit the
infraction. We distinguished evidence obtained by innocuous means from evidence obtained by exploiting misconduct after considering a variety of factors: whether a long
time passed, whether there were "intervening circumstances," and whether the purpose or flagrancy of the
misconduct was "calculated" to procure the evidence.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 (1975).
These factors confirm that the officer in this case discovered Strieff's drugs by exploiting his own illegal conduct.
The officer did not ask Strieff to volunteer his name only
to find out, days later, that Strieff had a warrant against
him. The officer illegally stopped Strieff and immediately
ran a warrant check. The officer's discovery of a warrant
was not some intervening surprise that he could not have
anticipated. Utah lists over 180,000 misdemeanor warrants in its database, and at the time of the arrest, Salt
Lake County had a "backlog of outstanding warrants"
so large that it faced the "potential for civil liability."
See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems,
2014 (2015) (Systems Survey) (Table 5a), online at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bjs/grants/249799.pdf (all
Internet materials as last visited June 16, 2016); Inst.
for Law and Policy Planning, Salt Lake County Criminal Justice System Assessment 6. 7 (2004), online at
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http://www.slco.org/cjac/resources/SaltLakeCJSMmal.pdf.
The officer's violation was also calculated to procure evidence. His sole reason for stopping Strieff, he acknowledged, was investigative--he wanted to discover whether
drug activity was going on in the house Strieff had just
exited. App. 17.
The warrant check, in other words, was not an "intervening circumstance" separating the stop from the search
for drugs. It was part and parcel of the officer's illegal
"expedition for evidence in the hope that something might
turn up." Brown, 422 U.. S., at 605. Under .our- precedents,
because the officer found Strieff 's drugs by exploiting his
own constitutional violation, the drugs should be excluded.

III
A
The Court sees things differently. To the Court, the fact
that a warrant gives an officer cause to arrest a person
severs the connection between illegal policing and the
resulting discovery of evidence. Ante, at 7. This is a remarkable proposition: The mere existence of a warrant not
only gives an officer legal cause to arrest and search a
person, it also forgives an officer who, with no knowledge
of the warrant at all, unlawfully stops that person on a
whim or hunch.
To explain its reasoning, the Court relies on Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). There, federal agents
applied for a warrant to search an apartment but illegally
entered the apartment to secure it before the judge issued
the warrant. Id., at 800-801. After receiving the warrant,
the agents then searched the apartment for drugs. Id., at
801. The question before us was what to do with the
evidence the agents then discovered. We declined to suppress it because "[t]he illegal entry into petitioners'
apartment did not contribute in any way to discovery of
the evidence seized under the warrant." Id., at 815.
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According to the majority, Segura involves facts "similar" to this case and "suggest[s]" that a valid warrant will
clean up whatever illegal conduct uncovered it. Ante, at
6-7. It is difficult to understand this interpretation. In
Segura, the agents' illegal conduct in entering the apartment had nothing to do with their procurement of a search
warrant. Here, the officer's illegal conduct in stopping
Strieff was essential to his discovery of an arrest warrant.
Segura would be similar only if the agents used information they illegally obtained from the apartment to
procure a search warrant or discover an arrest warrant.
Precisely because that was not the case, the Court admitted the untainted evidence. 468 U. S., at 814.
The majority likewise misses the point when it calls the
warrant check here a '"negligibly burdensome precautio[n]'" taken for the officer's "safety." Ante, at 8 (quoting
Rodriguez, 575 U. S., at _ (slip op., at 7)). Remember,
the officer stopped Strieff without suspecting him of committing any crime. By his own account, the officer did not
fear Strieff. Moreover, the safety rationale we discussed
in Rodriguez, an opinion about highway patrols, is conspicuously absent here. A warrant check on a highway
"ensur[es] that vehicles on the road are operated safely
and responsibly." Id., at_ (slip op., at 6). We allow such
checks during legal traffic stops because the legitimacy of
a person's driver's license has a "close connection to roadway safety." Id., at_ (slip op., at 7). A warrant check of
a pedestrian on a sidewalk, ''by contrast, is a measure
aimed at 'detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."' Ibid. (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. 8.
32, 40-41 (2000)). Surely we would not allow officers to
warrant-check random joggers, dog walkers, and lemonade
vendors just to ensure they pose no threat to anyone else.
The majority also posits that the officer could not have
exploited his illegal conduct because he did not violate the
Fourth Amendment on purpose. Rather, he made "good-
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faith mistakes." Ante, at 8. Never mind that the officer's
sole purpose was to fish for evidence. The majority casts
his unconstitutional actions as "negligent" and therefore
incapable of being deterred by the exclusionary rule. Ibid.
But the Fourth Amendment does not tolerate an officer's
unreasonable searches and seizures just because he did
not know any better. Even officers prone to negligence can
learn from courts that exclude illegally obtained evidence.
Stone, 428 U.S., at 492. Indeed, they- a;re perhaps the
most in need of the education, whether by the judge's
opinion, the prosecutor's future guidance, or an updated
manual on criminal procedure. If the officers are in doubt
about what the law requires, exclusion gives them an
"incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior."
United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 561 (1982).
B
Most striking about the Court's opinion is its insistence
that the event here was ''isolated/' with "no indication that
this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent
police misconduct." Ante, at 8-9. Respectfully, nothing
about this case is isolated.
Outstanding warrants are surprisingly common. When
a person with a traffic ticket misses a fine payment or
court appearance, a court will issue a warrant. See, e.g.,
Brennan Center for Justice, Criminal Justice Debt 23 (2010),
online at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf. When a
person on probation drinks alcohol or breaks curfew, a
court will issue a warrant. See, e.g., Human Rights
Watch, Profiting from Probation 1, 51 (2014), online at
https: //www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/05 /profiting-probation/
americas-offender-funded-probation-industry. The States
and Federal Government maintain databases with over
7.8 million outstanding warrants, the vast majority of
which appear to be for minor offenses. See Systems Sur-
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vey (Table 5a). Even these sources may not track the
"staggering" numbers of warrants, "'drawers and drawers"' full, that many cities issue for traffic violations and
ordinance infractions. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div.,
Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department 47, 55
{2015) (Ferguson Report), online at https://www.justice.gov/
sites/ default/files/opa/press-releases/ attachments/ 2015 / 0 3 /
04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. The county in
this case has had a ''backlog" of such warrants. See supra,
at 4. The Department of Justice recently reported. that in
the town of Ferguson, Missouri, with a population of
21,000, 16,000 people had outstanding warrants against
them. Ferguson Report, at 6, 55.
Justice Department investigations across the country
have illustrated how these astounding numbers of warrants can be used by police to stop people without cause.
In a single year in New Orleans, officers "made nearly
60,000 arrests, of which about 20,000 were of people with
outstanding traffic or misdemeanor warrants from neighboring parishes for such infractions as unpaid tickets."
Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the
New Orleans Police Department 29 (2011), online at
https://www.justice.gov/ sites/ default/files/ crt/legacy/2011/
03/ 17/nopd_report. pdf. In the St. Louis metropolitan area,
officers "routinely'' stop people-on the street, at bus
stops, or even in court-for no reason other than "an officer's desire to check whether the subject had a municipal
arrest warrant pending." Ferguson Report, at 49, 57. In
Newark, New Jersey, officers stopped 52,235 pedestrians
within a 4-year period and ran warrant checks on 39,308
of them. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation
of the Newark Police Department 8, 19, n. 15 (2014),
online at https: II www .justice.gov Isites/ default/files/ crt/
legacy/2014/07/22/newark_findings_7-22-14.pdf. The Justice Department analyzed these warrant-checked stops
and reported that "approximately 93% of the stops would
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have been considered unsupported by articulated reasonable suspicion." Id., at 9, n. 7.
I do not doubt that most officers act in "good faith" and
do not set out to break the law. That does not mean these
stops are "isolated instance[s] of negligence," however.
Ante, at 8. Many are the product of institutionalized
training procedures. The New York City Police Department long trained officers to, in the words of a District
Judge, "stop and question first, develop reasonable suspicion later." Ligon v. New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 4 78, 537538 (SDNY), stay granted on other grounds, 736 F. 3d 118
(CA2 2013). The Utah Supreme Court described as '"routine procedure' or 'common practice'" the decision of Salt
Lake City police officers to run warrant checks on pedestrians they detained without reasonable suspicion. State
v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,r2, 76 P. 3d 1159, 1160. In the
related context of traffic stops, one widely followed police
manual instructs officers looking for drugs to "run at least
a warrants check on all drivers you stop. Statistically,
narcotics offenders are ... more likely to fail to appear on
simple citations, such as traffic or trespass violations,
leading to the issuance of bench warrants. Discovery of an
outstanding warrant gives you cause for an immediate
custodial arrest and search of the suspect." C. Remsberg, Tactics for Criminal Patrol 205-206 (1995); C.
Epp et al., Pulled Over 23, 33-36 (2014).
The majority does not suggest what makes this case
"isolated" from these and countless other examples. Nor
does it offer guidance for how a defendant can prove that
his arrest was the result of "widespread" misconduct.
Surely it should not take a federal investigation of Salt
Lake County before the Court would protect someone in
Strieff's position.

IV
Writing only for myself, and drawing on my professional
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experiences, I would add that unlawful "stops" have severe
consequences much greater than the inconvenience suggested by the name. This Court has given officers an
array of instruments to probe and examine you. When we
condone officers' use of these devices without adequate
cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an
arbitrary manner. We also risk treating members of our
communities as second-class citizens.
Although many Americans have been stopped for speeding or jaywalking, few may realize how degrading a stop
can be when the officer is looking for more. This Court
has allowed an officer to stop you for whatever reason he
wants-so long as he can point to a pretextual justification
after the fact. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813
(1996). That justification must provide specific reasons
why the officer suspected you were breaking the law,
Terry, 392 U. S., at 21, but it may factor in your ethnicity,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-887
(1975), where you live, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
147 (1972), what you were wearing, United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1989), and how you behaved,
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-125 (2000). The
officer does not even need to know which law you might
have broken so long as he can later point to any possible
infraction--even one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154--155 (2004);
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S._ (2014).
The indignity of the stop is not limited to an officer
telling you that you look like a criminal. See Epp, Pulled
Over, at 5. The officer may next ask for your "consent'' to
inspect your bag or purse without telling you that you can
decline. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991).
Regardless of your answer, he may order you to stand
1'helpless, perhaps facing a wall with [your] hands raised."
Terry, 392 U. S., at 17. If the officer thinks you might be
dangerous, he may then "frisk'' you for weapons. This
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involves more than just a pat down. As onlookers pass by,
the officer may '"feel with sensitive fingers every portion
of [your] body. A thorough search [may] be made of [your]
arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to
the feet."' Id., at 17, n. 13.
The officer's control over you does not end with the stop.
If the officer chooses, he may handcuff you and take you to
jail for d~ing nothing more than speeding, jaywalking, or.
"driving [your] pickup truck ... with [your] 3-year-old son
and 5-year-old daughter ... without [your] seatbelt fastened." Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 323-324
(2001). At the jail, he can fingerprint you, swab DNA from
the inside of your mouth, and force you to "shower with a
delousing agent" while you ''lift [your] tongue, hold out
[your] arms, turn around, and lift [your] genitals." Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U. S. _ , _ - _ (2012) (slip op., at 2-3); Maryland v. King, 569 U. S. _ , _ (2013) (slip op., at 28).
Even if you are innocent, you will now join the 65 million
Americans with an arrest record and experience the "civil
death" of discrimination by employers, landlords, and
whoever else conducts a background check. Chin, The
New Civil Death, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1805 (2012); see
J. Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record 33-51 (2015);
Young & Petersilia, Keeping Track, 129 Harv. L. Rev.
1318, 1341-1357 (2016). And, of course, if you fail to pay
bail or appear for court, a judge will issue a warrant to
render you "arrestable on sight'' in the future.
A.
Goffman, On the Run 196 (2014).
This case involves a suspicion.less stop, one in which the
officer initiated this chain of events without justification.
As the Justice Department notes, supra, at 8, many innocent people are subjected to the humiliations of these
unconstitutional searches. The white defendant in this
case shows that anyone's dignity can be violated in this
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manner. See M. Gottschalk, Caught 119-138 (2015). But
it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate
victims of this type of scrutiny. See M. Alexander, The
New Jim Crow 95-136 (2010). For generations, black and
brown parents have given their children "the talk"instructing them never to run down the street; always
keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even
think of talking back to a stranger-all out of fear of how
an officer with a gun will react to them. See, e.g., W. E. B.
Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903); J. Baldwin, The
Fire Next Time (1963); T. Coates, Between the World and
Me (2015).
By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double
consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black,
guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify your legal
status at any time. It says that your body is subject to
invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights.
It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the
subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.
We must not pretend that the countless people who are
routinely targeted by police are "isolated." They are the
canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal,
warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere. See
L. Guinier & G. Torres, The Miner's Canary 274--283
(2002). They are the ones who recognize that unlawful
police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all
our lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system
will continue to be anything but.

*

*

*

I dissent.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.14-1373

UTAH, PETITIONER v. EDWARD

JOSEPH STRIEFF, JR.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[June 20, 2016]

JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,
dissenting.
If a police officer stops a person on the street without
reasonable suspicion, that seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment. And if the officer pats down the unlawfully
detained individual and finds drugs in his pocket, the
State may not use the contraband as evidence in a criminal prosecution. That much is beyond dispute. The question here is whether the prohibition on admitting evidence
dissolves if the officer discovers, after making the stop but
before finding the drugs, that the person has an outstanding arrest warrant. Because that added wrinkle makes no
difference under the Constitution, I respectfully dissent.
This Court has established a simple framework for
determining whether to exclude evidence obtained
through a Fourth Amendment violation: Suppression is
necessary when, but only when, its societal benefits outweigh its costs. See ante, at 4; Davis v. United States, 564
U.S. 229, 237 (2011). The exclusionary rule serves a
crucial function-to deter unconstitutional police conduct.
By barring the use of illegally obtained evidence, courts
reduce the temptation for police officers to skirt the
Fourth Amendment's requirements. See James v. lllinois,
493 U. S. 307, 319 (1990). But suppression of evidence
also "exacts a heavy toll": Its consequence in many cases is
to release a criminal without just punishment. Davis, 564
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U.S., at 237. Our decisions have thus endeavored to
strike a sound balance between those two competing
considerations-rejecting the "reflexive" impulse to exclude evidence every time an officer runs afoul of the
Fourth Amendment, id., at 238, but insisting on suppression when it will lead to "appreciable deterrence" of police
misconduct, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141
(2009).
This case thus requires the Court to determine whether .
excluding the fruits of Officer Douglas Fackrell's unjustified stop of Edward Strieff would significantly deter police
from committing similar constitutional violations in the
future. And as the Court states, that inquiry turns on
application of the "attenuation doctrine," ante, at 5--our
effort to "mark the point" at which the discovery of evidence "become[s] so attenuated" from the police misconduct that the deterrent benefit of exclusion drops below its
cost. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984).
Since Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604-605 (1975),
three factors have guided that analysis. First, the closer
the "temporal proximity" between the unlawful act and
the discovery of evidence, the greater the deterrent value
of suppression. Id., at 603. Second, the more "purpose[ful]" or "flagran[t]" the police illegality, the clearer
the necessity, and better the chance, of preventing similar
misbehavior. Id., at 604. And third, the presence (or
absence) of "intervening circumstances" makes a difference: The stronger the causal chain between the misconduct and the evidence, the more exclusion will curb future
constitutional violations. Id., at 603-604. Here, as shown
below, each of those considerations points toward suppression: Nothing in Fackrell's discovery of an outstanding
warrant so attenuated the connection between his wrongful behavior and his detection of drugs as to diminish the
exclusionary rule's deterrent benefits.
Start where the majority does: The temporal proximity
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factor, it forthrightly admits, "favors suppressing the
evidence." Ante, at 6. After all, Fackrell's discovery of
drugs came just minutes after the unconstitutional stop.
And in prior decisions, this Court has made clear that only
the lapse of "substantial time" between the two could favor
admission. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626,633 (2003) (per
curiam); see, e.g., Brown, 422 U. S., at 604 (suppressing a
confession when "less than two hours" separated it from
an unlawful arrest). So the State, by all accounts, takes
strike one.
Move on to the purposefulness of Fackrell's conduct,
where the majority is less willing to see a problem for
what it is. The majority chalks up Fackrell's Fourth
Amendment violation to a couple of innocent "mistakes."
Ante, at 8. But far from a Barney Fife-type mishap,
Fackrell's seizure of Strieff was a calculated decision,
taken with so little justification that the State has never
tried to defend its legality. At the suppression hearing,
Fackrell acknowledged that the stop was designed for
investigatory purposes-i.e., to "find out what was going
on [in] the house" he had been watching, and to figure out
"what [Strief£] was doing there." App. 17-18. And
Fackrell frankly admitted that he had no basis for his
action except that Strieff "was coming out of the house."
Id., at 17. Plug in Fackrell's and Strieff's names, substitute "stop" for "arrest" and "reasonable suspicion" for
"probable cause," and this Court's decision in Brown perfectly describes this case:
"[I]t is not disputed that [Fackrell stopped StrieffJ
without [reasonable suspicion]. [He] later testified
that [he] made the [stop] for the purpose of questioning [Strieff] as part of [his] investigation . . . . The illegality here ... had a quality of purposefulness. The
impropriety of the [stop] was obvious. [A]wareness of
that fact was virtually conceded by [Fackrell] when
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[he] repeatedly acknowledged, in [his] testimony, that
the purpose of [his] action was 'for investigation':
[Fackrell] embarked upon this expedition for evidence
in the hope that something might turn up." 422 U. S.,
at 592, 605 (some internal punctuation altered; footnote, citation, and paragraph break omitted).
In Brown, the Court held those facts to support suppression-and they do here as well. Swing and a miss for
strike two.
Finally, consider whether any intervening circumstance
"br[oke] the causal chain" between the stop and the evidence. Ante, at 6. The notion of such a disrupting event
comes from the tort law doctrine of proximate causation.
See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S.
639, 658--659 (2008) (explaining that a party cannot "establish[] proximate cause" when "an intervening cause
break[s] the chain of causation between'' the act and the
injury); Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the
Exclusionary Rule, 99 Geo. L. J. 1077, 1099 (2011) (Fourth
Amendment attenuation analysis ''looks to whether the
constitutional violation was the proximate cause of the
discovery of the evidence"). And as in the tort context, a
circumstance counts as intervening only when it is unforeseeable--not when it can be seen coming from miles away.
See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, B. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser
and Keeton on Law of Torts 312 (5th ed. 1984). For rather
than breaking the causal chain, predictable effects (e.g., X
leads naturally to Y leads naturally to Z) are its very links.
And Fackrell's discovery of an arrest warrant-the only
event the majority thinks intervened-was an eminently
foreseeable consequence of stopping Strief£. As Fackrell
testified, checking for outstanding warrants during a stop
is the "normal" practice of South Salt Lake City police.
App. 18; see also State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,r2, 76
P. 3d 1159, 1160 (describing a warrant check as "routine

149

~ -:..• -·-~

~

..:....:!'--~--

-

-~~·-·

• --

..,_. --

-

•

-

-

•

~--•---~··-•-'-"-

-

·--=-----~--"~- -

---~- -- - --~--~----

Cite as: 579 U. S. __ (2016)

5

KAGAN, J., dissenting

procedure" and "common practice" in Salt Lake City). In
other words, the department's standard detention procedures-stop, ask for identification, run a check-are partly
designed to find outstanding warrants. And find them
they will, given the staggering number of such warrants
on the books. See generally ante, at 7-8 (SOTOMAYOR, J.,
dissenting). To take just a few examples: The State of
California has 2.5 million outstanding arrest warrants (a
number corresponding to about 9% of its adult ·population); Pennsylvania (with a population of about" 12.8 million) contributes 1.4 million more; and New York City
(population 8.4 million) adds another · 1.2 million. See
Reply Brief 8; Associated Press, Pa. Database, NBC News
(Apr. 8, 2007), online at http://goo.gl/3Yq3Nd (as last
visited June 17, 2016); N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2015, p. A24. 1
So outstanding warrants do not appear as bolts from the
blue. They are the run-of-the-mill results of police stopswhat officers look for when they run a routine check of a
person's identification and what they know _will turn up
with fair regularity. In short, they are nothing like what
intervening circumstances are supposed to be. 2 Strike
1 What is more, outstanding arrest warrants are not distributed evenly
across the population. To the contrary, they are concentrated in
cities, towns, and neighborhoods where stops are most likely to occurand so the odds of any given stop revealing a warrant are even higher
than the above numbers indicate. One study found, for example, that
Cincinnati, Ohio had over 100,000 outstanding warrants with only
300,000 residents. See Helland & Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on
Public Versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping, 47 J. Law
& Econ. 93, 98 (2004), And as JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR notes, 16,000 of the
21,000 people residing in the town of Ferguson, Missouri have outstanding warrants. See ante, at 8.
2 The majority relies on Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984),
to reach the opposite conclusion, see ante, at 6---7, but that decision
lacks any relevance to this case. The Court there held that the Fourth
Amendment violation at issue "did not contribute in any way" to the
police's subsequent procurement of a warrant and discovery of contraband. 468 U.S., at 815. So the Court had no occasion to consider the
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three.
The majority's misapplication of Brown's three-part
inquiry creates unfortunate incentives for the police-indeed, practically invites them to do what Fackrell did
here. Consider an officer who, like Fackrell, wishes to stop
someone for investigative reasons, but does not have what
a court would view as reasonable suspicion. If the officer
believes that any evidence he discovers will be inadmissible, he is likely to think the unlawful stop not worth making-precisely the deterrence the exclusionary rule is
meant to achieve. But when he is told of today's decision?
Now the officer knows that the stop may well yield admissible evidence: So long as the target is one of the many
millions of people in this country with an outstanding
arrest warrant, anything the officer finds in a search is
fair game for use in a c1·iminal prosecution. The officer's
incentive to violate the Constitution thus increases: From
here on, he sees potential advantage in stopping individuals without reasonable suspicion-exactly the temptation
the exclusionary rule is supposed to remove. Because the
majority thus places Fourth Amendment protections at
risk, I respectfully dissent.

question here: What happens when an unconstitutional act in fact leads
to a warrant which then leads to evidence?
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IOAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
standard Agr'eement of Supervislon
1. Sup&TVJsfon Level: The defendant's level of supervision, Including ca!~i:iad type .and electronlc monitoring
. shall be determined by the Idaho Deparonent of Correction (IDOC).
2., Laws and Conduct: The defendant shall obey all laws, mun\clpal, county, state and federal. Toe defendant _
shall comply witn al\ lawful requests of the IDOC district manager, sect\cn suparvisor, or proballon and parole ·
officer (PPO). The defendant i.-hall be completely truthfUI at afl times with the IDOC district manager, rieetion
supervisor, or PPO. During any conl:acf with law enforcement personnel the defendar-1t shall provide his Identity,
notify the law enforcement office.r(s) that he Is under supervision and provkla tfv: ~ of his supervising PPO.
The defendant shall notify his 1-upesvlsing PPO of the contact within 24 hrs. L,,,, ·
·
3. Residence.: The defen~ant shall not chaoge resldent:a without first obtaining permission from the lOOC district
manager, section supeivisor, or PPO. 1, . Y
4, Reporting: The defendant snall report to his supervising PPO as dlrer:ted, Tha1ciefandant shaft provide truthful
and accurate lnformatlon or documentE!tlon whenever requestbd by the !DOC. {_ < 1-.
5, Travel: The defendant shall not lea~e
of Idaho or the assigned district without first obtainlng
parmisslon from his superv\slng PPO.
6, Ex:t:raciltlon; If the defendant does leave the state of Idaho, with or without pennisslon, the defendant does
hereby ~ivAexlradi!lon to the slate of Idaho and will not contest any ef'fon to return the defondant to the state· of

~t:

.

'
'.

;

.--

1:~

-~i~

.

.

7. Empfoyment or Alternative Plan: The defendant shail seek and maintain galnfu\, verifiable, full-tlme. ·
employment The defendant shall not acc:ep~ cause to tJe terminated from, or ohange employment without first
obtaining wn1ten permission from his supervising PPO; In lieu of fUJl-t!roe employment, the defendant may

o~ef(-

parl:iclpma In full-time education, a combination of employment and education, vocatlonal program or
aftematlve plan based on the defendanfs specific sitUatlon and as approved by hili supaivlslng PPD. -·~-t__
8, AlpohoI: The defendant shaR not purchase, possess, or conE>ume alcoholic beverages In any form and wlll not
enter any establishment where alcohol ls a pr\maiy source of income.
9, C-ontrollad Substances: The defendant shaft not use or possess any illegal ilnJg. The defendant shaO not use
or possess any paraphernalia for the purpose of ingesting any illegal drug. The defendant shall nol use or
possess any controlled substances unless lawfully prescribed for him by a IJc:ensed physlclan
The
defendant shall use medications only in the manner prescribed by his physician or dentist.
y
1o. Firearms or Weapons: The defendant shall not purchase, carry,. possess have control of any firearms,
chemical weapons, elecb"onlc weapons, explosives or other dangen;,us weapons. Other dangerous weapons may
include, but are not llmlted to, kflives with blades over two and one half Inches (2 ¼."} In lensthi swftc:h-blaqe
_j;n.ives; bn.-sss knuckles; sWords; throwing starsi and other martial arts weapons. Any weapons or fuea.rrns seized
will be forfeited to IDOC for disposal, The defendant shall not reside in eny location that contains fitearrnJI ullless
the firep.rtns are secured and thia portion of the 11-1le is exempted· In writing by the district manager. __
1.1. Search: The defendant shall consent to the search of his pmon, residence, vehicle, personal property, and
other real property or slnlc!tJres owned or leased by the defendant or for which the defendant ls the controlling
autliortty. The search wlll be conducted by the !DOC dlstrict manager, section supervisor, or PPO o!)ayrenforcement officer. The defendapt waiVes his Fourth Amendment-rights c:onoemlng searohes.
L-c ~
12.· Cost of Supe.rvfslon: The. defendant shall·c:omply with ltlaho Code, Section 20-225, which authorizes the
IDOC to collect a co11t of.supervision fee. The defendant shall.make payments as prescribed in his monthly cost of
supervislo-n bDI. ·
L,
13, Associations: The defendant shall not associate with any person(s) designated by the !DOC dlstrlcl
1
•
mari~eer1 section SUpfl{Vlsor, or PPO.
14. Substanc:e Abuse Testing: The defendant shall submit to any tei.t for alcohol or controlled substances as
requested and" directed by the IDO,C district manag-er, section supe~, or PPD or law enforcement officer, The.
defendant may be requirecl to obtain ~ests at his own expense. If the resulls of.the test ln~an adulterant has
been used to interfere with tha results, that test will be cl.aemed to have. been positive. --=kt::""-'-·
15. Eva/iJatlon and Program Plan: Toe defendant shall obtain any treatment evaluaoon deemed neoes1-ary and
as ordered by the court qr ID Dy distrfct manager, sec:Uon supervisor, or PPO, The defendant shall meaningfully
participate in and successfully complete any treatment, counseling or other programs deemed beneflclal and as
directed by the court or ID.DC district manager, section supervisor, or PPO. J:l:le defendant may be required to
attend treatment, counseling orother p1t>grams at his own expense.
bt""
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16. Cooperation with Supervision: When home1 the defendant shall answer the door for the PPO. The •
defendant shall_ aDcw the PPO 1D enter his residence, other real property, place of employment and vehicle for the
purpose of visitation, Inspections and other supeJVlslon functions. The defendant shall not possess, install o,r use.
any monitorlng lnstrume.n\ camera, or other surveillance device to obiaerve or alert them to the PPO's visit The
defendant shall not keep anyvic:.lous or dangerous dog or other animal on ~bl.his property that the PPO
perceives as an ilJlpedlme.nt to accas:slng tha defendant or his properly, ......
b_\--..__
17. Absconding Supervision: The defendant wiU not leave or attempt to leave the state of Idaho or the assigned
dlstrlci: in an effort to abscond or flee supervision. The defendant win make himself available for supervl~~anc
program partic\patlon as lnsbucted by his supeniising PPD and will not ac:tlvely avoid supervision. -~LJ.-...t:__
1a. Court Ordered Finariclaf Obflgations: The defend;;mt shell pay au costs, fees, fines and restitution 111 the
amount and manner ordered by the court. The defendant shall make payments as ordered by the court or as
daslgnated ln a payment agreement and promissory not~{o..be completed with the IDOC district manager, section
supervisor, or PPO and signed by the defendant.
k~ •
19. Confidential Informant Toe defendant shall not act as a oontidentlal Informant for law enforcernen~~t
as allowed per !DOC standard operating procedure (SOP) 701.04,02..019, Informants: Confid&ntJal. -=L..__..1:,.__
__
20. Intrastate. or Interstate V1olations: If allowed to transfer supervision lo another district or state, the
derendant agrees to ai::cept any violation allegation docurnents purportedly submitted by the agency or offi~
superv!si11g the defendant In the receiving distrlct or stata as admissible Into evi~~e as credible and reliable.
The defendant waives any right to confront the author of such documents. - - ~....
21. Additional Rules: The defendant agrees that other supervision rules may be imposed depending on the
distrlt:t or specific disbict office that provides his supervision. M. all times, these addltlonal ru\es,will be lmp~sed
only after considering the 5uccessful supervision of the defendant and the secure operation of the district _or
sp~clfic district office. All additional n.iles wm explalnad/o ~efenclant and prow.led to him, In writing, by the
lDOC district manager, section supeNlsor, o PPO. _ __,_..,.✓"'"'~
\ -_ __
I have read, or have had read to me, the ab e agreement I unden-tand and accept these condilions of
supervision. I a e abide by ancl co
• lhei;n and undemtand that
failure to do so may
In the
a "'I> rt of ~olallon
Y, oen no\ng aulhorlly.
• ~ ()

~· .

r___

-~on

rlt

my

Date:

#

I

.
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'KBvIN'KEMPP
Dm.ECTOR

C. L. "BUTCH" OTTER
GOVERNOR

District Two Additional :B,.ules
!'.

1. I will ~t go into any ~ establishment without first obtainmgpemrlssion from my
supervismg officer._Lt=----.
2. I will not associate with any person vvho is engaged in. illegal activities, is on probation or parole,,
or who has been convicted of a f.elony crime, with.out prior authorization otiny superviBing
officer.
3. · I understand my curfew is from 10pm-6am, where I must be at my residence during these times,
with some exceptions that have already been explain.ed to me. My supervising officer can,..Jllise .
or lower my curfew, based upon my actions, at my supervising officer's discretion.
4. I understand th.at if I owe.my PSI fee, and/or if my Cost of Supervision reaches $120, my curfew
a:utoma:ti.cally reduces to &pm~6am (with exceptions that have already been explained to me.)
My curfew ~es not revert to its prior time until my Cost of Supervision and/or PSI fee are pai.d

l . .E

·

·

·

i·

!

l~

mfull. L'r

13Jc~lt

,

.

· ·

5. I will not
any loan without first obtaining the permission of my supervising
officer.- = - 6. I will ensure all persons in my presence have valid photo idettti:fication at all fun.es. --=-1---7. I will ooey all rules of any city or county jail in which I am incarcerated. LJ,
8. I will not visit any perso~w.any jail or prison with.out first obtaining written pemrlssion from my
supervismg officer. l/r
9. I will fill any prescriptions I receive in the State of Idaho only.
\-

Lt_.

i

i.

I

I.

L,,.,,.

I·

l

I have read1 or have had read to meJ the above agreement. I understand and accept these additional
rules of supervision. I agree to abide by and canfo:a:n to them and understand that my failure to do
so may result in the
'ssion of a report of violation to my sentencing authority.
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COURT MINUTES
CR-2016-0001591
State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 9/9/2016
Time: 9:12 am
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill DJ
Courtroom: 3
Court reporter: Nancy Towler
Minutes Clerk: TERESA
Tape Number: CRTRM 3
Defense Attorney: Rick Cuddihy PD 2016
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman
91253

Defendant present, in custody, with counsel.

91346
Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court and Defendant will admit Summary 5 & 6
and the State will withdraw the remaining allegations.
91412

Court addresses Defendant re: rights.

91438

Report of Violation dated 3-1-16 fi1ed in CR13-7217.

91506

Court Order Condition 13, Summary #5-Defendant admits.

91528

Agreement of Supervision Condition 17, Summary $6-Defendant admits.

91530
allegations.

Court accepts admissions and grants State's motion to withdraw remaining

91624

Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court re: disposition.

91812

Mr. Coleman addresses the Court re: disposition.

91904

Defendant addresses the Court.

92055

Court addresses Defendant

92234
Court reinstates probation, credit for time already served (since 3-4-16 190
days). Defendant to report immediately to Probation and Parole.

Court Minutes
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92333

Mr. Cuddihy addresses the Court re: CR16-1591.

92340

Court releases Defendant on his OR in CR16-1591.

92354

Court recess.
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No. 4553

P. 1/3

F\ LED
Richar-d M. Cuddihy, ISB No, 7064
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
312 Seventeenth Street

201G SE? 1S f\11111 19

Post Office Di-awer 717
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 746-0103
Fax: (208) 746M0113

:;-, C ~·: '. -~- .!•
• .-

-~

..

J

•

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO~-IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
v.

LARRY G. FENTON,
Defendant.

)
)

Case No.CR16-1591

)
)

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE
TO STATE'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

)
)
)
)

~,

COMES NOW the defendant, by and through hls attomey, Richard M. Cuddihy and
objects to the State's Motion for Reconsideration bru:ied upon the following argument.

ARGUMENT
Here, the State argues since Mr. Fenton was on probation this Court should apply the
attenuation doctrine to the illegal seizure as a:rtioulated by the U. S. Supreme Court j_n Utah v.

Strieff. In Strieffth.e Court found a prewe.xisting arrest warrant for the driYer was ":intervening
circumstances" sufficient to apply the attenuation doctrine and not suppress the initial illegal
seizure of the person. The State argues here Mr. Fenton's status as a probationer is akin to a

person with an arrest warrant. However, being on probation is not the same having

DEFENDANT'S ll'ESPONSE
TO STATE'S MO'flON
:FOR RECONSIDERATION

!ill

arrest
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wanant. A person with. an arrest warrant must be seized. A probationer may only seized upon

reasonable suspicion.
While Idaho Court's have applied the "attention doctrine" to illegal seizures of

defendants with a valid arrest warrant; Idaho Cou1t's have not applied the "attenuation doctrine"
to illegal seru:ches and/or detentions ofprobati.oners.
"Relying upon Unltsd States v, Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997), the
Supreme Court held that the discovery of an arrest warrant can, In certairi
circumstances, constitute an intervening circumstance that dissipates the
taint of an otherwise illegal seizure of a person, Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 103
P.3d at 459, The Court applled the 11 attenuation doctrine," which permits Lise
of evidence that' would normally be suppressed as fruit of police misconduct if
the causal chain between the misconduct and the discovery of the evidence
has been sufficiently attenuated." State v. Bigham, 141 Idaho 732. 734

(Ida.App. 2005).
Here. the State also argues that California Courts do not impose a "reasonable suspicion"

requirement on the ability to search probationers. However~ Idaho Courts have not interpreted
this issue the same as the California Courts. In State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 233. 657 P.2d
1095, 1101 (Ct.App.1983), this Court, considering warrantless probation searches, held that a

probation officer could make a warrantless search if: (1) he has reasonable grounds to believe
that the probationer has violated some condition of probation, and (2) the search is reasonably
related to disclosure or confirmation of that violation. The Court also ruled that a search could
not be based on a mere hunch unsupported by any factual basis." See State v. Prestwich, 112
Idaho 590 (Ida,App.1987).
Here~ the officer absent any articulable suspicion illegally detained Mr. Fenton. After
completing tl1e pm.pose of the stop and issuing a citation, the officer learned from N.fr. Fenton
about his probationary status. Instead of releasing Mr. Fenton, the officer continued to detain

Mr. Fenton absent any reasonable suspicion that Mr. Fenton was in violation of his probation or
DEFENJ>ANT,S RESPONSE
TO STATE,S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
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the law. The prolonged detention was absent any reasonable suspicion was also illegal. Both the

initial detention of Mr. Fenton and expanding the length of the detention were constitutional
violations.

Since Idaho Courts have not found a defendant's probation status as an intervening
circumstance pursuant to the attenuation doctrine concerning an illegal seizure; this Court should
deny the State's Motion for Reconsideration.

DATED this 16th day of September, 2016.KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR NEZ PERCE COUNlY

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)
)

District Court No. CR-2016-1591
Supreme Court No.

)

vs.

)

LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR.,

)
)
)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

__________}
Defendant-Respondent.

)

LARRY GLENN · FENTON 1 JR., THE ABOVE-NAMED
RESPONDENT, MACKENZIE WELCH, KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC, P. 0.
BOX 717, LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE~
ENTITLED COURT:

TO:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the

above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the OPINION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 1 entered in the above~
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entitled action on the 17th day of August, 2016, the Honorable Jay P. Gaskill
presiding. A copy of the judgment or order being appealed is attached to this
notice, as well as

a copy of the final judgment if this is an appeal from an order

entered after final judgment.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,

and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable
orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(7), I.AR.

3.

Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district

court erred when it concluded that a probation search was tainted by a prior stop
without reasonable suspicion.

4.

To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been

sealed.

5.

The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of

the reporter's transcript:
Hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress held August 4, 2016
(Nancy Towler court reporter, estimated number of pages unknown).

6.

Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28,

7.

I certify:

I.AR.

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each

reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the
address set out below:
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NANCY TOWLER
P. o. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501

(b)

That arrangements have been made with the Nez Perce

County Prosecuting Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's

transcript;
(c)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee

for the preparation of the record because the State of Idaho is the appellant
(Idaho Code§ 31-3212);

(d)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal ln

a criminal case (1.A.R. 23(a)(8));

(e)

That seivice is being made upon a" parties required to be

served pursuant to Rule 20, l.A.R.
DATED thrs 26th day of September, 2016.
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STATE 0:F IDAIIO. J'.~ AND FOR T.IIE: COUNTX OF Nl.CZ XlERClt
STATE OF ID.A.HO.

)

)
)
)
)

Plainti~
v.

)
)

LARRY GLENN FENTON, J.R.,,

CA6'E NO, Clt2(lJ.G-1591
OPINION Al"'W OlU>EH ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION'l'O
,~HJFFRESS

)
)

Defendant. .

----------·-·---)
.

.
This matter cru;o.e be.fore t1;e Cow:t on the Defendan.t~s Motion to S-uppp~lsS. Th(')
·•i ~

State ofidaho was represented by_ ft~in Coleman, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney fo1 JN"~z
Perce County. The Defendant wcis; opresented by Mackenzie Welch, ofthc fmn
Know~to.n & Miles. Evidence was 111-e.sented to the CoUrt on /4,ugust 4. 2.0 I 6. '11t!'.l Cutn t.
allowed the parties additio111tl tim~ 1~:, submit bdefu1g. The Court, beh>.g folly a~L vb~d ,.r1 .
'•

the matter. hereby renders its deic'i.ei: ,u.

t

•

,·

•l

.t' -
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I

'i. •;
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FA~'.1 AND :fllOCEEDlNGS

[.

1,

On February 28) 2016. O~ey Nick Eyfar of the Lewi~ton Po Hoo J)cpru. b:un.ut wrui
-

.;

r

-a,

'•

on patrol ·when be saw a red/mar~ori GMC Yukon that he recogui,;cd from preyfous

-· .,
narcotic aotlvity. Officer Eylar obw.rved the Yukon enter the pDOOllg lo·c of A&:e r:ood:-i,

.. ,.
...
and then 'Wl'.le.n the vehicle left th~·pmcing lot fu~ was a ·white G.raud Prix fol/.o•wi1ig it•
'

~

•

I

:1

.-

•.

~

.,;I

.

out of•the pm-king lot. Officer Eyi~
testified tb& :in his experionCf:l drug ac;rlv.\1Y. 'Y.!~
t? "'.:
•
~~

C

coDJ!D.o.n at the A&B Foods psrki;?&: lot.

~1 t

.,'

Officer Eylar foll~ fhei·~hiclcis as they traveled .souJ.h. o.u at11 Street a.ud lbcn

I

r ~

.

west on South.way. 'l'ID.til the ~eb:ltt~~ botli e~rtered into the Zi_p Trl'p gas itotlon, Tho
'.r•.,

i'; 1
~

Yuk;on parlc.ed in a parking stop ai-4ie gas station auct tha Ota!'J.d l?ti.."C ]Jatlced at (he goi:i
I

r

I

.'

d

~

pumps. Officer Bylar also pal'kec1.i$,. a pal'ldng spot ru:idl\e was met thc-.re by 0fik.cr
I•

• II

I

,,

I

Stormes. The ofllcel'S discussed. -tji~v'ehfoles and .thl!lll Officer Stonnos left the gDs .sto.lfoo
I·

•

I

I

.

I

''

pm:king lot, Shortly thereafter~ th~ {~liite Grand Prix left the.1nu:ldn_g lot and 01:aci:/?yh~r.
·, :\

contacted Officer Stonues by radi/p io mfonu. l>im, OfficElr Eylar stayed aml co!rl-inuerl 1.o
).

')

,f!

obs~e the Yul<:on,

\

;-

i

}.1 i,, I

•

Officer. Stormes testified t}ia~
a:fte1· he was :informed the white Grand Pd:R; le.ft tlte.
,I·•

gas sta:tio~1, h.e obsened the car

d41!ng north tin Snalce River Aveuue, Officer Sto1mes

!

L

:, i~

•'

estimated. hB was about l 00 yard~ <j' ~ 0 oar l~1gths, awa.y fr~m the white Graud .Pxix

-when he contacted dispatch to
'

~c~ the license numb et of tltc car to

...

,,

~ee jf tbe

... •l

registration was cUJ:rent Officer St~nnes first reported to dispatch a 1ke.llsc 1l!l1:UJ)0t
~

,~

•

.

I

\

•tida', l 8028, whioh dispatch xetuzpt:I as record not ;fo~cl. Officer Storcn'l"-s tl\~11 .aol(~(.(
t

~,

I

•

dispat~h t~ ruu the same ylaten~brt, 'but ch~gethelast nt.UI1.'bert9 the letter "'D~'. -~·J.-1.hi
-

,

•i

1--

..

number also 1-etumed as record not fouud,

.f:~
.I

~

-a

·1 .,,

~ !!
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(:
t

!·

~

Offl.oer StOIInes cau.ghtlij{'\1/Uil the white Grand Prix and tbe intcrscctJ.011 uf
I

Snake Rlver Ave;Que and the Prof_r;ot Grade. He decided to inltlato a h;affi.c slC)j) Ul oxdor

.

.

to investigate the whether the car. c~gist:1:ai.fon "?.ias tip to date. Offioer SLommi u\:for.1:1..,cd
dispatch he was making the stop ::IJ:l,i he repeated tbe plate numb01: for a third time, l.l ds

I

-

- I

time stating '~ora.i• 18028. Dispatbh did not rosp011cl on thfa plate numbc1· ucforo

Stotm.es initiated the 1raffio stop. Later in the day~ well ru?ter tb.c SI.op wn.s r.o;m.1Jlotcd,
~

stonnes found out that cli.s-patch cueI get a rettl[l). on the third plate P,\UJ.Ab0i\ whk-1, tVEW• {J)e
. ,
...

correct plate num.be.r.

;

\
i

Offioex- Sto.unes contacte(,, ·(ie driver ofthe wWte Gmml Pri~ who jdcn(illcu

i

!·

himself as Lany Fenton,, Jr. Fen~·~J.i? provided Officer S·tonnes 1,;ry_Lh tl.10 J:ogb(nthm
info1matioll. for the car and Officxi~s-to1mes
was .able to verify tha.t the v-chlolo w«s
f'.:

.

11

·:;

currently register~d} thus, fue rei,~i~ation ooncems were taken care of. Officer Stom\es
..

also found out tha~ Fenton did not l.~ave a cu:p;oo;t driver's license o( proof of fasurnnc,c, so
,

Officer Sto;anes decided to wn,te . .d!ations
foK tb.ese two violq.r:ious.
!
.

..

1
:,

Officer Stotm.es i-etw.ued tJthe
vehicle io 'issue the citations to the dd.vcr: •.H0
I
..,

!

~

handed the fu.'st oitatio;o. to Fent611, 1.nd at t~la.t time, Fenton infonn.ed hiw. tliat he w~s 'on
'

•

I

.
•

I

probation. StoII!les asked Ferxtox~ ~~e name ofiho probntiou o:ffi.oer, ao.d \Yb.~.P. ~ ~0J'W03

~·

I,..

\:

I

!·

.

heard the name, he was able to d:;r,jm. that Fenton '-VR.S on folony pxobatiou. B::isc<l (JI!
.'
this h;i.fonnation, Officer Stoun.~ 4,jd not issue th.e seoo.ucl citafioTI,, but i11stoad returned to

t

~

t"";

.

his patrol car and contacted the lf1fatio11 office. Officer Storm.cs oipla.lnect to lhe
;probation officer that he had S'toP,p~d Fenton for a traffJ.c ii.ur~ction nnd 3}3o t r.ifoycd lo the
.

·.

'

probation 0£6.oer the observations ~pfficer Eylar ha.cl. ~ade of the two ""obfolos vt ~&D

..

.:

,"f

Foocb aud the Zip Trip gas stati$i
f.
• ~I

t. ;i
i

!
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...

T.b.B probation offic~r st.a.trt,d. to Officer Storm~ that sb.c would ~~omo to Lho .~tr)p

.~ li

...

a:ud search tb.e vehlclo based upofi.' ti>.e lnfonnation Stormes boo p1'oV1clcd. Oft.k.oJ:
.,. ti

Sto.tme,s :tetumed to the Grand PrL:.CDmd gave Fenton the second citntion; ,b.c;, h) rormed
;.;

Fenton that tho probatioii o.ffioer WPS co.ming Co the stop and tlmt she wnutc<l l1i1.,1 tr., ol;soJ.

,l-:

r,,

I!
:•

by, Tr, ttt 24. Officer Stormes tum~~d the: ovediead. lights off on. bis 1>atro1 vchfolH OJ!d

i:

t

!:

I

)'

stayed near Fenton'S vehicle with h~s partner until the probatiou of.£ioo,; all:.iyc(I on r;cn1lo
.

I·

:;

1:

approximately ten minutes late-r, ?:~oer Stonn,es testified 'lhnt Ile <lid no1 h1.fom \ 1•'011:to, 1
. . ~.

....

that he was :free to leave; ho\yeV-ei.r: dtonnes believed Fen:to1J. was free to leu ve bcc~u:ic if
·:

J

Fenton chose to lea1,•e there wasn•~,: i;IJY1:hing Stonnes cou.ld ha"?o done lo stop b.lut
I

,..
l.

I'°

because the trafffo stop was ooncl:ic;ad.
. ,. Tr, a.t 24,
,.

I

'

•.:

When tb.e probatlon offio~ ~(mved she asked FentoJ~ to step out of rho vehicle nnd.
he was handou:ffed for officer safe~ r~asons. Officer. Stozv.1es assfatou the prnb~.tio.n

offioar with the search ofthe vehlpl~• Durlng fue search nwtb.ai.1wheta.i:tti.ne wa~ locutctl

:

'.

[.

,,<

in the vehicle.

!..

~

.,,.
~

L

,. f
'i ~·
,.

I

ANALYSIS .
.

. ..

r..
~

.

The Derendant B.Ss!:!rts he t,,i,is illegally stopped: searclle.d, and seized because ·1hc
.. ·'
faots available to· Officer StoTinei~t'the
time he datained him did not give dsc to fl
' .
~.

·~·.

•

•

reasm:iable suspicion that ori.ntlnaf.:9i~vity
was afoot. Tho f outt1l t-,..memlment to the
.r I
' :I

I.'

United States Constitutlo:u protec\S f;itlzens against um.eas,:11able soo.rcll anc! no~rc. tJ.S,

,.

!:

I

CONST. amend. N. Evidence ob~~~d in violation oftbis amcucTm~JJt gene.rally lt;\ay nol

be used as evidence against the

vi?~;m. ofan illegal gov~rnru~u:L a.cl.ion.
l

St(tle v.

r
I.
!

Pl'lgfl,

.

i

I

140 Idaho 841,846,103 P.3d4S4: 459 (2004); ..~ee. also Wor1g&m 1). UtdttdSt,rte,\~'}_'lI
.

f.

{·

!.

U,S. 47li 485, 83 S-Ct. 407,416. ~ i.Ed.2d 441 1 453.(1,963). wW.ben a. d.cfrni.hml, mpyc!I
. .

yA

•

I ,.

• t

•

r·

• •••.

i·
'j:

I

~
','

l1
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!•

' i'
to ~x.c1ude avidence on the groun.d.s'jfuatit was obtained fa1 viola.tio11 of tile Founh ··
,.

it

,i .

p

•

Amendment;.~ govem.ment cau$"e~the
,, : burden. ofprovj11g tbatthe seurch oJ scizurn Ji.>.
q,uestio.u was reasonable." Stai-e't; $tishoP> 146 Id:al10 804,. 811,203 P.3d 1203~
•

'\

I

t, •

.

12io (2009); aiting State v. Ande~!t'f'I, 1401daho 484, 486~ 95 J! .3tl 635} 637 (2.004).

Brief iuvestigatory detentions m.utth>e reaso.nable uuder the .Foutth Al.ucmlmen·t, See
• {r
Terry v. Oh.to, 392 U.S.1> 19. 88 s. ?t. 1868, 18781 20 LJ?:d,2d. 889l 904 (1'.)Ci8).
The issue fo this case is wh~~er Offioe:r S to:o:o.es had 1-eiumnab:le1 i,i:licnli.lJlle
.

.{

suspic:i.onto stop the De:fendaofs_vfbicle based 1lp0ll wf'orn:raUon he .rccoiV•rJ £rom
I

!1

dispatch -after he pl'ov:ided the in_cc~rtct license number to be ch0ckcd,. 'n)c ~; tnlo
~

contends that Officer Stormes ha(tiasouable articulable suspicion Lhal, n l.rnffk vfolalitin
:1 (
had oocurred or that ha needed to .....
~,;restiga.te :fiutl101• regarding the potoo.tlal rogfotrnH01.1

. .,

violation, Specifically, the State c.'-o~;teutls that at the time tb.~ stop was con<llJl:ted, tbe
~=

s,.

officer had :reasonable a.rticulal,le ~ifl)ioio11 to :mpport fui:> stop.

.

.

The Defendan.trelies ouse°cd;e Y. J.1organg 154 Idaho 109,294 P.3d.J.l21 (201:l) t(.}
assert that the,:0 \v.as not :rea.sonab~e §uspioion iu this casa. 1.u Mot·gan 1 the o,fficor atomlc:d
a vehicle driving without a front lip~nse plate, whicb. would be illegal if the yc-biolo wr.1.s
:·

registered inlruilio pursmmtto
l.C,., 149·428;
Id.at 111,294 P.3d at 1123. T.his
.
~
..

roquii:ement does not extend to ve{-li:?fos tegistered in othor .si.11.te,s~ wltich wus roc. .,.gu{zetl

...'

by tlie office;r durlng cross-exanili}mio:u. Id. at 112~ 294 P.3d nt 117A, The o:fllcor had

:~ ~
afao testified that it appeared the trlyer was eithe;r very lost or ·try.b:i.g to avoid hh:u. Th0
~
l i
Cou,,t found thes~ observations W(tfli', AlOt sufficient to cteate reasoD.nble~ a.\tlcufoblo
:~ '}
..,,

.

'

The police o:ffioer1s suspicio;). of Morgan. was based primarily on 'II scricB
of:fbur loft..h~d toms that'11organ made. Al:though tl1e ot:G.oor :ii.a led lh..1.t
'

'
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'(

(

h l~

i .:·
I

he belie,1ed Morgan.may ~~e beb11 'tl.)'ingto aYoidb.i.ul,. the of.(icer
·provided no .tactual justi;fi,P.~Ji;,n for that belief. Abse.nt other
circumstances, chiving ar~~d the bloolc o.n a Fliday night does not l'fa;e 10
the level of specifio,
1e fnot;J that justify ru1 :i:o.vesti¢ory st<ip.

arlic1r,!f
.. ,,'
'

.

Id.·

.,,.'

The case at hand lS s:imila:r 'tp }/[organ where the police officer bellC:\'Ved 1.h0l'C \:\Yns
i~ :

•

a vl,olatio~ but then learned later fh~t there was not In 1he case Ett l1nud1 the oftJce.t·
: ,.(

checked tb.e vehicle registration mf&mia.tion and co.ufln11ed the cal' WJ.S' fawfL\lly
'•

,r

•I

registered. T.be State contends ~t ·(l police offioe{s re.;"UJonn.blol good-foitli. misJ.aJm d<>ci1
' .·
not violate. a person• s Fourth Am~~{-ttnent rights. 11.ei.en ,,_ North Cm-oUna, '135 S. Ct.
~~

530 1 190 L. Ed, 2d 475 (2014).

':.

'j ~-

i i:

As the text iuclioates and "i¥eJPave repeatedly o.ff.1.rm.ed, ''tbo l\ltir1JAte

touch5tone of tbe Fourth Afll;~dme11t is 'reason~\bJ.eness.' " Riley v.
California, 573 U.S.-;-'-. 134 S.Ct, 2473, 2Lf 82, 189 L.Ed.Zd. 43 O
{2014) (some :ln.temal quotat'lon marks omitted), To b6) xoaso.uablo fa not 1.0
be pe.tfect) and so the Foll:(1:h~ Amendment allows for some mfatokes on lb.e
part of government o:fflciat:3;, giving them. "'fair leeway for enforcing 01e
lawm the oonununi:ty' s prot';:,ctioJl," Brinegar v. United States, 33 8 U.S.
160~ 176, 69 S.C~ 1302~ 93 ~.,.Ed. 1879 (1949), We have rccogrliz.od tbnt
.searches and sai:zw;e.s baseg. ~mmiet.alces offaot can bercasonabfo. The
wm:a.o.tless seaioh of a hom~\ for fostauce, is reasonable if un.dcrL,tl<:e,n.
with the conse11t of arel3id~E~ and remains lawful whQ~ offi:ers_ obt~\to. ·1JJ,c
1 consen.t of someone who rmir.o;nably appem"S to be but 19 not LU fa1Jt o.
resident. See llltn.ois v. Ro;!rr;~uez-1 497 U.S.177, 183-186, 110 .~.Ct.
2793, l U L.Ed.2d 148 (l~~>). By the same token. if officers wil.h
probable cause to a.nest a ~u~pect n:tlsfokouly arrest 011 individual matchiDg
. the suspect' s description} ~-ef~hor fll,e seizure nor au aooompanyi:n1, s<?rarch
ofthe anestee would be1ll!:.l;rful. SeeHillv. Califomta, 401 U.S. 797,
802-805, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 2~ i~Bd.2d 484 (1971). The lwri:t is tl\at •lthf)
;mistakes must be those of J·C1".1sQ{l.a.ble men," JJrtnega.r, supra, at 176. G9

s,Ct. 1302:
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Id. at 536,
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~
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In the caSfl- at hand, this CqP:itmus~ decide wlletb.er·1~e n;t.i.1::tflkq o.f foot iuai.le l\Y
'the offi.cel' or .dfopatch iu the ~l~,lµ:r.ssion of the Hoe.use plate nmnbcr Wf.W olti C(; ti V•)ly
reasonable, and fuus, whether the ~~take of.fact will opei:a:L~ to fc:n:givo m: vnHd~~l.t~ l-4.0
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Fourth Amendment --·iolatlon.

·.:

:I,

l\{f~ e of fact

fill~ mistake l.'lf law WOTTi cJfa,:u[;scd j11 ,~/, 1r11

v, Horton> 150 Idaho 300~ 303~ 24'6~P.3d 673 1 676 (Ct. A.pp. 20JO).
The parties, in essence) dw~ee "Yhcther. the offioer1$ n:ustako .hoi:e wn~:
one of :fact or law. Bnd fu1f·Iib.e betweeu. the tv,ro is not ahva.ys easy lo
d,:aw. For instance, in McCarthy, 133 Idaho Bt.124-25. 982 P.2.<l al .95 'J 60, an offi.ce.t stopped a vE;bk.Je fot speeding btrt was mh:lnkon r.oncor11.1n.11,
thelooatio:t1. of a sign where/the speed lhnit dcctea.sed from 3:5 m.pll t•.i 25.
m.ph. The .state asseited th...·t',:.hc x:o.istalcc was one of ~tci· (1he .!iign's
location) .BD.d we. oited Un{te\.-1. States Supremo Court precedent to t.hc 1):Cfcct
that a mistake offact wlll 'to::netimes operate to fotglve or y01idrth} a
Fo1.1rth .~en.dme.ut 'Violaf::u.i.. Howevel', we did not blindly acc(lpt lhe
state1~ characterization ofb{· office11s mistake as one of fact ~.3 tlto
applicabla speed limit is c1~ii)inly a question ofla.w, \Ve J.].Oted n split of
authority from other jurlscJ>!c:tons as to whether a mistake o;f lnw co.u cvet
be held to be reasonable ~i:d~:further noted that the issue itl Idalw i:va;suudeoided, See, G,g., Unite,d,;'itates v. King, 244 F.3d 736~ 737•--4). (9Ut
C:ir.2001) (officer,s mistake ~flaw, although ,reasom,olc,. c-annotfonr1 l:i1.1n1,;1
for reasonable suspicio;r,,. to i,,ntiate traffic stop); United Str;t.tes v, TwJffoy,
·222 F.3d 1092, 1096 n, 1 (9th Cir.2000) (of"fioe:r's i:.ou.ect u.11d.t)rstilUdiltg of
tho Jaw1 togather with. a gopJj-faitb. e,:tor regarding 'tb.e faotsi cau ostab.lbl t
reasonable suspicion) (als(,
McC«rthy, sup1'a ); compare People v, ·
Glick, 203 Cru.App.3d 799; ,f50 Cal.Rptr. 3151 318 (1988) (inist:1]1:e of fact
and law treated the same) ~ People 11. Whfte, 107 Cal.App.4th 6361 132
Cal.Rptr.2d 371, 376-77 (l,.0.~3) (distinguishi.ng and disag1:coing wi1l1
Gliclcrationale), See dl.so t)r4fe v. Yor,mgi 144 Il!aho 646) 649 ~ 1, 167
)?,3d 783, 786n.1 (Ct-Api.iJ..D06);Statey, Schmadek~ 136.Idaho 595,599
u. 3, 38 .P.3d 633} 637 n, 3J1;t.App.2001). UltiIDaa:toly~ iP.J..[cCcirthy wo
held that the two types of~µ,.:;takes were ''hle.,:IJ:ica.bly co.o.uecCe<l/' b1.1l
i found ft wmeoessru:y to de~~F.~-e whether a mistake of law is um·ensonuble
· per se booa-use1 -were that ~~'l~oonect cl1aractorization of the ml.stake, we
.concluded that the off].cer\.:Ifj:lstake was not objectively reasonable:.
ll~cCarthy, 133 Idaho at i~:.S~i982 P.2d at 960.
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Jd. at 303~ 246 P .3d at 676.
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In tbi.s matter., Oflicer-Stor411,\~ candidly testified that ho wa~ a s:iguificarJ.l distimoo
•

~t

~

I

· fron1 the mrr when he fb;st react th~. tnse plate nmnbcr to d13.{latcl.t. It is clo..11· ho w,1s 110 t
'

certain regarding the l:iumbers h~ ~~~ off ln his seoo,,d co~lunttn.ic;;tr_ion \.Vi!:l~ dfa;a:tch.,

I

j'

'!'

whete he suggested the Jastnuinb!r!.nay be the lettor •tB'' 111.thcr th;;iu 'llle Ul.tr.tlbcr ui:;;,,
-

,'J

!Ji

•, i

.

Officer Stormes 'provided disoatcFh~lfu
a. license n.umber. three; tiW'-:lS uascd. urw.11 · lbo
f"
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uncerlolnty oftb.e plate nl1nlboc. -~:6:>n>, based 1,pon tba facts 0£0~• ~,;c,
cannot :find the officer'~ mistake
.

'

j. ~l

tl:i" '~"'

1

~,r obJ<,ctively reasonable, ancl thus croat1:d a.

j'

.

,! .:

1
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reaso.uable, B.rt:iculablo b.isis for *'~affic stop.
·
.
¼~· . .
.. Asimilm- issue was addre,~dmtlie state ofWashmgt.o.n. fa State.,,. C/'{Jt:ill l 70
'

D'

Wash.App. 534i 319 P.3d 80 (201L~~ In. this case, a11 officer J:ao, the, clcfe.ndl:lllt1 s IioCJ1Gt'l
plate .nuuibe:r as part of a routine 9h~k during his nigb.tH.u.,e p-nkol. The ofJ-inct
•• i'.·

.

•

erron~ously entered the n.umheZ' ~ {1s4 Yl\dK'> instead of the a.cr.m,l aumbar-~l 5,f-

, r£:

I.

'

.

.'

''

YDK'p- The incorrect np.m,bei- ret\~.E>Cl
-~ .. that the oar was stoleu m:ttl the office.r iniJ.fo.fot1 a
~

~"

t

tni.ffic stop on this basis, Id. at 53Jfps 8, 319 P.3d at 81.

I-

~~ j

t-

Extendfug Snapp Gii.}he facts presented hore would ehwato tuc
innocence or culpability o}f t)l officer over tb~ real conccm of nri:1cfo I.
sectlon 7: the right of citizfri;s fo be protected .from mrwa.r1'l'l.nted. l ll. va.:iioor:
and .inirllBions. .As our Sum-e.'m.e Court explained in Day, "'[w]i:, st1:ppr.cs!l
[unlawfully seized] eyid~c~_not to punish tile police w/11; 1mv1 ~erst!:;,· /un-•e
erred inno~e11t!y. We supp;tJ~s unlawfully- seized evidence bocauso we do
not want to become knovr.ib.tiy OOU'>.plicit m. &n un.constcl.utional e~excise <;}f
power. See genera/Jy Olmsttad v. United Stc1t«s, 277 U.S. tl,38! 484-85> irn

,:
,,~.

l.

7

'

!.'

S.CL 564~ 72L.Erl. 944 (1~1~) (B;candeis, J., dissenting)/> 161 Wasb,2.d at
894, 168 F.3d 1265 (emplias,ts added).. · .
T.hls means that \v'Jillh polioe may som~im.es 1·eas.on11hfy rely on
inconect info:r.matlon provj_~ by third parties~ tb,ey :w,ay 11ot ra,uo,wbly
; rely on their o\'>r'llmistake.n;~jsessment ofn:ta.terfol ;facts. See, e.g., !>"fate v.
1
Mance, 82 Wash.App_ 539, [?18 P.2d527 (199'6) (holding thatpoliocmny
: not tE)ly upon infonnationx~it is inco:crect or incomplete th.1·ouglt U1oir
fault); Stat(j ,,. O-Cain. 10f1Wagh,App, 54Z. 31 P,9d 733 (2001) (ltolt.JiJJg·
lhat a poliol!l dispatch indlc;.a4n_g vehlole driven by defendant had ueon reported stolen did not p.co~~;te reasonablo suspicion for in-.restigatory
stop); Str.t.r.e-v. S@clholrn1 ~;$,~ash.App. 846,848,980 P.2d 1292 (1999)

(noting that !<exclusive reUa,tce on the WACIC stolen vpbioJc repmt Vfl)U]d
not have provided su.fflojei~ttoa5is forthe State t.o establis.h prollabfo cawJc

to an-est''); cf State v. Gczaklf, 152 Wash..zd 64 1 71,741 93 l1.3d. 872 (2004)
(disun.guishing officers'
to rely on erro.uaous lloense :luforw.n.tfoJJ.
from Dc;plilrf:ment of Licensii,ig~ which is not a _police age.o.cy a.ucl w].,1o~{c
:in.formation is presi.µz1ptivel}'. reliable. from informa.tion.Buhjec1 to (he}

ri/~l

''fellow of.fleer mW').
.
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id. at542'--43, 319 P,3d at 83-84,; ~;
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While-this Court~ not bo~d by the d~tcrmination.iu Craed~ it is il1.sl.n1divc ,;,_,_
.

..

.

~

'

the. 09:3e at fomd. In. this case, ~c,~:r Stonnes testified he proYi.dcd 'I.ho i1ioo1It.r,t .Uc.cm(!)

1~

.

nurnher to dfapatch. Officer Storfu.1,\ 'distance. from the Dcfe;odDnt' i!l vch:ick> :m.-.1:1 lli'l'vo

been a factor in thls error. It is
'

.

cllJ

ill this cast'! that ofuor tban 1·bo c1;,~;::·J.·c;gnrrl in 1; -~he
~

t~

0

lioe.nse plate number, the Defeudijwas dri1'ing hi a. lawf1.1l 01w.nei-. 'l'l,\o officer did not

i~

o_bs~rvi: an.y other traffic .iJ.lfracti~~ Fui:fuer. Officer Eylru.-~s ob.sarvotloll:.J ofthe vc-lJiclc ·
,r. i•

at 1:b.e groce_zy store and gas stanoff'laiso cud not give r.:\s~ to a reaso.na,ble r;usj}~don ·1:0
:,
.

.

conduct a t.rafiio .stop. fu tl.J.is case, fhe Ollly olaho of rcaw:uablo orlicufate susp1don hi
'

.

.

/.

~

~i

based upon the officer).s iucorrectftita:tion of the lAce11so plate nmnbox, _Tlli1J, ·wil.hottt
L

more. is not a su.fiicie.ut basis for t1-1i lraffio stop. The.r.cfore ·th El Defcr,dwJt~ is mo tiou. -to
;.; f;
•
-r-:
suppress is granted.
i:.,, i.!-.
0

I
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!l ~;s
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1! ~ONCLU5'ION
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t~
Based upon the foregoingk:a.lysis, th1:> dcl"e:uda.llt1s mofio.n to :.mrni,.-e.;s j_:i e.rmn>:.1L
.

i

~ff
f (.

~

OR'Dl!r.(l

.

The Defendant's Motion t~ ju_ppress is hereby GRA.NTE.D.

IT.IS SO ORDERED.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
V.

LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2016~1591
OPINION AND ORDER ON
STATE'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

1bis matter came before the Court on the State's Motion to Reconsider this
Court's order granting the Defendant's motion to suppress, filed, August 17, 2016. The
State of Idaho was represented by Justin Coleman, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez
Perce County. The Defendant was represented by Mackenzie Welch, of the firm
Knowlton & Miles. The matter was submitted to the Court on the briefs filed by the
parties. The Court, being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.
The facts of this case are set forth in detail in the suppression order, and thus, will
not be repeated here. The motion to suppress was granted because the officer did not
have reasonable, articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction had occurred, beyond the
officer's error in reciting the license plate number to dispatch.
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The State asks this Court to reconsider the ruling based upon the attenuation
doctrine. The State relies on a recent United States Supreme Court case, Utah v. Strieff,
136 S. Ct. 2056, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016) in support of the argument that evidence from
the search should have been allowed even in the face of an impermissible stop. In this
case, the Court considered how the attenuation doctrine applies where an unconstitutional
detention leads to the discovery of a valid arrest warrant. Id. at 2060. 1

In Utah v. Streiff, law enforcement received an anonymous tip that reported drug
activity at a particular residence. Law enforcement began intermittent surveillance of the
residence, and the officer noted visitors who left a few minutes after arriving at the house.
Streiff visited the house in this manner, so an officer followed him as he left the house
and detained him at a convenience store parking lot. As pait of the stop, the officer
relayed Strieft' s information to dispatch, who informed the officer he had an outstanding
warrant. Strieff was arrested pursuant to the warrant, and in a search incident to arrest,
methamphetamine was found on bis person. Id. at 2059-2060.
The Court considered three factors regarding the attenuation doctrine: first the
temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence;
second the presence of intervening circumstances, and third, the purpose and flagrancy of

1Toe Court noted there was a difference in application of the attenuation doctrine:

We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement about how the attenuation doctrine applies
where an unconstitutional detention leads to the discovery of a valid arrest warrant. 576
U.S.--, 136 S.Ct. 27, 192 L.Ed.2d 997 (2015). Compare, e.g., United States v. Green,
111 F.3d 515, 522-523 (C.A.7 1997) (holding that discovery of the warrant is a
dispositive intervening circumstance where police misconduct was not flagrant), with,
e.g., State v. Moralez, 297 Kan. 397,415,300 P.3d 1090, 1102 (2013) (assigning little
significance to the discovery of the warrant).
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060, 195 L. Ed. 2d400 (2016).
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the official misconduct. Id. 2061-2062. The Idaho Supreme Court set forth these same
factors in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004).
Generally, evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search may not
be used against the victim of the search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471,485, 83 S.Ct. 407,416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441,453 (1963). To
determine whether to suppress evidence as "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
the coUit must inquire whether the evidence has been recovered as a result
of the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Green, 111 F.3d at 520.
The attenuation doctrine-whether the causal chain has been sufficiently
attenuated to dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct-has been used to
support the admission of evidence, including for example, voluntary
confessions obtained after unlawful arrests. Id. at 522 (citing Brown v.
lllinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). There are
three factors for a court to consider when determining whether unlawful
conduct has been adequately attenuated. Id at 521 (citing Brown, 422 U.S.
at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d at 426--427). The factors are:
(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the
evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the
flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action. Id

Id. at 846, 103 P.3d at 459. In Page, an officer discovered an outstanding warrant for the
defendant after unlawfully detaining him. The Court determine the discovery of the
outstanding warrant was an intervening circumstance that allowed the officer to continue
to detain and eventually arrest and search the defendant. Id. at 846-847, 267 P .3d at
1284-1285.
The Idaho Court of Appeals considered the attenuation doctrine in State v.

Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 267 P.3d 1278 (Ct. App. 2011). In this case, officers observed a
vehicle in an usual location with respect to nearby homes. The officer approached the
vehicle on foot and noted a sleeping bag covering the rear window. The officer could see
Liechty sitting in the driver's seat, with something in bis hand. The officer was able to
observe this even though there was a shade on the passenger side window he was looking
through. Liechty leaned over to the passenger window to remove the shade, and at that
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moment the officer opened the passenger door to make sure Liechty did not have a
weapon in his hand. Standing in the open passenger doorway, the officer asked Liechty
what he was doing, and if he had weapons. Liechty responded there was a kitchen knife
under the backseat and the officer ordered him out of the vehicle and handcuffed him.
The knife was located, Liechty was charged with possession of a concealed weapon.
Methamphetamine was found when the car was searched. Id. at 165-166, 267 P.3d at
1280-1281.
The Court of Appeals considered the attenuation doctrine and found it was not
applicable to the case.
The state concedes that the time between the seizure and the discovery of
methamphetamine was short. Regarding the second factor, the state asserts
that the officer did not learn about the methamphetamine based on his
seizure of Liechty. Rather, the state argues, Liechty1s clothing and the
presence of women's underwear and binoculars in the vehicle, coupled
with the officer's routine questions, were intervening circumstances that
resulted in the discovery of the methamphetamine. Liechty1s seizure
occurred from the moment that the officer opened the door, stood in the
open passenger doorway, and began questioning Liechty. Liechty1s arrest
led to the discovery of the methamphetamine, and his arrest was the direct
result of questions posed by the officer while standing in the open
passenger doorway. Liechty1s admission that there was a weapon in the
vehicle was not the product of some other intervening circumstance, nor
was there an arrest or search warrant that would have allowed for the
search of Liechty's vehicle despite the officer's conduct. While we
acknowledge that the officer did not appear to act flagrantly or with an
improper purpose, we cannot conclude that the attenuation doctrine
applies here.

Id. at 170, 267 P .3d at 1285.

In the case before this Court, the Defendant was stopped based upon the officer's
error in stating his license plate number. There were no other factors which supported the
traffic stop. After the officer confirmed the vehicle was registered, he issued citations
because the Defendant did not have a current driver's license or insurance. When issuing
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the citations, the officer learned the Defendant was on probation, so the officer held back
one citation, and returned to his patrol car to contact the probation officer. Based upon
that communication, the probation officer asked the officer to infonn the Defendant that
she was coming to search the vehicle. The officer issued the second citation and
infonned the Defendant that the probation officer was on the way. Once the probation
officer arrived, the vehicle was searched and drugs were found.
The State asks the Court to consider the Defendant's status as a probationer as
akin to a person with an outstanding search warrant. This Court declines to do so. While
a probationer may have agreed to a diminished expectation of privacy in exchange for
being placed on probation, this is not equivalent to an active search warrant, which
authorized the immediate arrest of an individual. The Court finds the case at hand
distinguishable from Utah v. Strieff and State v. Page. The matter is similar to State v.

Liechty. In this case, but for the officer's error, the Defendant's vehicle would not have
been stopped, and the probation office would not have been contacted-thus a search
would not have occurred. Therefore, the State's motion for reconsideration is denied.

ORDER
The State's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this..3)T"-day of September 2016.

JAYP. GA
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I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON
STATE'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER was:

✓ FAXED,or
_ _ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
day of September, 2016, to:

3it,...

Mackenzie Welch
Fax: (208) 746-0118
Justin Coleman
Fax: (208) 799-3080

Deputy

OPINION AND ORDER ON STATE'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

6

180

~-:=::

1'i!l.f/J-s.

Qct.

7. 2016

4: 08PM

No. 4908

.,.........

P. 1/2

l''ialJ

Fl LED

Richard M. Cuddihy ISB NO. 1064
KNOWLTON & Miles, PLLC

2016 OCT 7 PPl Y 16

312 Seventeenth Street

Post Office Drawer 717
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone; (208) 746-0103
Fax! (208) 746-0118

Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND IDDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
)

STATE OF IDAHO~
Plaintiff,

vs.

LARRY FENTON, JR.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 16-1591

)

APPELLATE~UBLICDEFENDER

MOTION TO APPOINT STATE

)
)
)

COMES NOW, the above-na,ed Defendant. by and through his Attorney of record,
Richard M. Cuddihy, and hereby moves the Court to appoint the Office of the State Appellate
Public Defender to represent the above named Defendant in his pending appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court/Court of Appeals, as the Defendant has been declared indigent and is currently
represented by the public defenders office. This Motion is based on the records and files of this
case.

·-1· l-,

DATED

this__1_ day of October, 2016.

Richa:rd M. Cnddiby
MOTION TO APPOINT STATE

APPELLATEPUBLICDErENPRR
Pnge l ofl
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qct.

7. 20'!6

4:08PM

No. 4908

P. 2/2

CERTIFlCATE OF DELIVERY
~~

.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this.1_ day of October. 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Appoint State Appellate Pnblic Defender to be:
[X] Faxed to:

Nez Perce County Prosecutor
P .0. Box 1267

Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Fax: 208-799-3080

[X] Mailed to:

State Appellate Public Defende:,;
3647 N Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703-6914
.Attorney General
Post Office Box 83720 ·
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Larry G. Fenton, Jr.
RISINGSUN
322 AdalD.s Lane

Lewiston, ID 83501

MOTION ro APPOINT STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIST CT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

,

LARRY FENTON, JR.,

I

Defendant.

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR 16-1591
ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

After reviewing the records and files herein and after considering the Motion to Appoint
State Appellate Public Defender and being fully advised in the premises.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender is
appointed to represent the above named Defendant in the pending appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court/Court of Appeals.

IT IF FURTHER ORDERED that Richard Cuddihy of Knowlton & Miles, PLLC, shall
continue to represent the above-named in all other aspects of this case, subject to the further order
of this court.

'11 11\..,
DATED this_
day of October, 2016.

Judge (

~

~--)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i't\_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1l_ day of October, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following:

[X] Mailed to the follo~iing:

[X] Sent Via Valley Messenger Service

State Appellate Public Defender

Richard Cuddihy
Knowlton & Miles, PLLC
31217th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

P.O. Box 2816
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorney General

Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office
Post Office Box 1267 ,
Lewiston, Idaho 83501

Larry G. Fenton, Jr.
RISINGSUN
322 Adams Lane
Lewiston, ID 83501

ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

)
Plaintiff-Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 44546

)

)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.
LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR.,
Defendant-Respondent.

I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of I4aho, in and for Nez Perce
County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the
exhibits offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the
Supreme Court or retained as indicated.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of the Court this

9," nt\
' ·-r:A
;~ l

1/

r-

day of

r

t~ (; UPn1trtL(..)

-i

2016.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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Date: 11/14/2016

User:
BDAVENPORT

Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County

Time: 11:52AM

Exhibit Summary

Page 1 of 1

Case: CR-2016-0001591
State of Idaho vs. Larry Glenn Fenton Jr
Sorted by Exhibit Number
Storage Location

Number

1

Description

Result

Property Item Number

State's exhibit 1 - ISP Forensic
Services Controlled Substance
Analysis Report. Admitted
5/18/16

Admitted

Exhibit Vault

Assigned to:

Coleman, Justin J., 8023

Destroy
Notification
Date

Destroy or
Return Date
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

)
Plaintiff-Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 44546

)

)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)

v.

}
LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR.,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)

I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound by me and
contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and
papers designated to be included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate
Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and
additional documents that were requested.
I further certify:
1.

That all documents, x-rays, charts, and pictures offered

or admitted as exhibits in the above-entitled cause, if any,
will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court with
any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record.

The above

exhibits will be retained in the possession of the
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

187

undersigned, as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
2.

That the following will be submitted as exhibit to the

record:
o

Transcript of Preliminary Hearing filed 6/1/2016

o

Transcript of Pretrial Motion Hearing filed 8/25/2016

o

DVD attached to Motion to Suppress and Brief in Support
filed 6/24/2016

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said court this

~,JJ0ti\

day of

I\JDVt'.~'i"')bcv\___ 2016.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
SUPREME COURT NO. 44546
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

v.
LARRY GLENN FENTON, JR.,
Defendant-Respondent.

I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the Clerk's Record
were placed in the United States mail and addressed to Lawrence
G. Wasden, Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-

0010 and Eric D. Frederickson, SAPD, P.O. Box 2816, Boise, ID
83701 this

./.j 1 ·;;::~ay

of /J~>(/iir·rCiff./L, 2016.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of the said Court this

,J. g,··.:t'...day

of /v';'t'lt,tl-'d)(.(A,/ 2016.

PATTY 0. WEEKS
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
......

i

~

.._.,,;;:.::-

1
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